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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE VALUE RELEVANCE OF EARNINGS MEASURES 
 
By 
 
 
CHIMA MBAGWU 
 
Under the supervision of Professors Glenn D. Feltham and Gary M. Entwistle 
at the University of Saskatchewan 
 
 
 This dissertation presents two studies on the value relevance and perceived 
credibility of pro forma earnings.  In the first study, I investigate the value relevance of 
pro forma earnings relative to two alternative earnings measures – GAAP earnings and 
analysts’ actual earnings.  Value relevance is assessed using two approaches.  The first 
approach examines whether the market’s expectations (contemporaneous returns or price) 
is best reflected in future pro forma earnings, future GAAP earnings, or future analyst’s 
actual earnings.  The second approach is to determine through pair-wise comparisons of 
the three earnings measures (e.g., pro forma earnings versus GAAP earnings), which has 
the greatest explanatory power (comparing adjusted R2s) in explaining price and returns.  
Across approaches and models, each of the three earnings measures tends to be value 
relevant.  However, Pro forma is consistently the most value relevant, followed by 
analysts’ actuals, with GAAP earnings having the least value relevance.   That is, pro 
forma earnings have the greatest information content. This finding is consistent with 
managers, in aggregate, using pro forma to inform rather than to manage expectations or 
to mislead.  
 In the second study, I examine the impact of credibility attributes – board 
characteristics, auditor quality and overall information quality – on the value relevance of 
pro forma earnings.  It is hypothesized that the credibility attributes will have a 
statistically significant impact on investors’ reaction to pro forma earnings.  Consistent 
with the predictions, I find that stronger board characteristics, higher auditor quality and 
higher overall information quality are positively associated with higher market reaction to 
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the pro forma announcement. That is, credibility attributes increase the value relevance of 
pro forma earnings.  This finding is consistent with some firms providing pro forma 
earnings that are perceived to be credible and others providing pro formas that are 
perceived as less credible and possibly provided to manage expectations or to mislead. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Arguably, the single most important financial information reported by a firm is 
its earnings.  Historically, when the term “earnings” has been used it has referred to 
GAAP earnings – the traditional bottom-line number prepared according to generally 
accepted accounting principles.  However, the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings – any 
earnings number which deviates from generally accepted accounting principles – has 
become more common.  The primary focus of this study is on a non-GAAP earnings 
measure, pro forma earnings.   
This dissertation reports the results of two studies that examine pro forma 
earnings.  In the first study presented in Chapter Two, the value relevance of pro forma 
earnings is compared to that of GAAP earnings and analysts’ actual earnings (a second 
measure of non-GAAP earnings also referred to as economic earnings).  This 
comparison is performed in two ways.  First, the market’s ability to predict future 
earnings (future pro forma, GAAP, and analyst actual earnings) is examined.  This 
approach provides a joint test of value relevance and the market’s expectation of future 
earnings.  The second approach is to determine through pair-wise comparisons of the 
three earnings measures (e.g., pro forma earnings versus GAAP earnings), which has the 
greatest explanatory power (comparing adjusted R2s) in explaining returns and price. 
The second study, presented in Chapter Three, introduces three credibility 
attributes which investors may consider in determining the credibility of pro forma 
earnings.  The credibility of pro forma earnings is measured by the association between 
cumulative abnormal returns and the interaction of pro forma and the credibility 
attributes.  Thus, this study examines the value relevance of pro forma earnings 
conditioned on these credibility attributes. 
Earnings measures – GAAP, analysts’ actuals and pro forma earnings – provide 
information about current period wealth creation as well as provide a basis for predicting 
future earnings.   Ball and Brown (1968), which studies the association between GAAP-
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based earnings and changes in share prices, pioneered information studies that 
demonstrate that earnings have information content and thus affect stock prices.  
Since this seminal study, numerous academic articles have examined the relationship 
between share prices and GAAP-based earnings.1  As a result, a theory has emerged 
on the informational affects of earnings on firm value.  As part of this theory, Beaver 
(1989) specifies three links needed to establish the relationship between financial 
statement data or earnings and firm value.  These links are: (1) from current earnings 
to future earnings (i.e., current period earnings provides information to predict future 
period’s earnings); (2) from future financial statement earnings to future expected 
dividends (i.e., expectations of future earnings provides expectations of what future 
dividends will be); and (3) from future dividends to firm value (i.e., a firm’s share 
price represents the present value of expected future dividends).  These three links – 
from current earnings to future earnings, from future earnings to future dividends, 
and from future dividends to share value – provide an intuitive framework for 
understanding the relation between earnings and share value and are theoretically 
and empirically established to varying degrees in accounting research.  For example, 
the dividend discount model is widely accepted in accounting and finance as a valid 
representation of the third link, while the Clean Surplus Relationship (CSR) of 
Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) attempt to establish the second link.  
However, there does not appear to be a widely accepted representation of the first 
link, even though it lies at the heart of valuation.  This link assumes that current 
period earnings provide information useful for forecasting future earnings, in 
addition to providing information about current wealth creation.  Frankel and Lee 
(1989) argue that the forecasting of future earnings is the most important and 
difficult task in a valuation exercise.  In summary, it is these links that help explain 
why many capital market participants focus on current earnings numbers and why 
analysts develop and publish earnings forecasts.  It is this first link that is explored 
in this dissertation.  That is, I explore the relationship between the above three 
measures of earnings and valuation using an approach that relies on the first link and 
                                                 
1 Lev (1989), Bernard (1989), Kothari (2001) and Scott (2003), to name a few, provide detailed 
surveys of research investigating the relationship between earnings and stock returns. 
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examine whether the non-GAAP earnings measures are perceived to be more 
credible given certain credibility attributes.   
In the first study, I examine the relative value relevance of GAAP earnings, 
analysts’ actuals and pro forma earnings.  Earnings prepared according to GAAP are 
not defined solely to provide value relevant accounting information.  Other 
objectives underlie our financial accounting system, such as contracting, which may 
reduce the value relevance of accounting-based earnings.  Alternative earnings 
measures, such as analysts’ actuals or pro forma earnings, could therefore provide 
greater value relevance than GAAP based earnings.  The reason being that the 
application of GAAP adds noise to true economic earnings – that is, GAAP earnings 
is neither intended nor presented as a true or unbiased measure of the change in 
economic value of the firm.  Therefore, by providing alternative measures which 
focus on value relevance (e.g., recurring earnings or cash income) investors are 
better able to understand and evaluate a firm’s performance.  It may be argued that 
analysts’ actuals should be the most value relevant of the three earnings measures as 
its sole purpose is to measure the sustainable earnings power of the firm.  The 
potential dual motive in creating pro forma – to provide value relevant information 
or to mislead – may lead to firms providing measures which are more or less value 
relevant than are GAAP-based earnings.  Note, however, that if the primary purpose 
of reporting pro forma by management is to provide value relevant information, this 
information may in fact be more value relevant than analysts’ actuals as it is 
expected that management will have a greater sense as to which adjustments better 
reflect sustainable earnings.  Consistent with management providing pro forma to 
inform investors, the results of the first study find that pro forma earnings are 
informative and more value relevant than either GAAP or analysts’ actuals.  This 
result is robust to alternative model specifications and extensions.   
Following from the results in the first study, the second study examines whether 
board characteristics, auditor quality and overall information quality – collectively 
referred to as credibility attributes – affect the perceived credibility of pro forma 
earnings.  While the first study demonstrates that collectively pro forma provides 
value relevant information, particular managers may provide pro forma measures to 
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inform, or to manage perceptions.  Does the market distinguish between these 
objectives?   The credibility of the non-GAAP earnings measure (i.e., that it reflects 
true economic fundamentals) should be a function of the credibility attributes that 
are observable.  Where a firm has strong board characteristics, a high quality 
external auditor and high overall information quality, we may expect an increase in 
the value relevance of its pro forma earnings.  That is, a firm with strong governance 
characteristics is more likely to provide value relevant information (is less likely to 
provide a misleading measure), and the market should recognize the pro forma as 
evidence that the manager has observed an information signal.  The results of the 
second study suggest that the credibility attributes do matter and that investors 
perceive pro formas of firms with higher credibility attributes to be more credible 
than those of firms with lower credibility attributes.  For example, pro formas of 
firms with higher quality board characteristics are perceived to be more credible 
than those with lower quality board characteristics. 
 This dissertation is motivated by the increased emphasis that has been placed 
on non-GAAP earnings measures – analysts’ actuals and pro forma earnings.  The 
earnings measures are important because it is believed that they provide information 
about current period wealth creation, as well as providing a basis for predicting 
future earnings.  In support of the importance of earnings measures, the FASB’s 
Conceptual Framework states in its Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts 
(SFAC) No. 1  
 
“Financial reporting should provide information to help present and 
potential investors, creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, 
timing and uncertainty in prospective cash receipts from dividends or 
interest and the proceeds from the sale, redemption or maturity of securities 
or loans” (FASB 1978).   
 
In reporting earnings information, traditionally referred to as Net Income (NI), firms 
have relied on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as a basis for 
measurement.  However, recently there have been arguments among academics that 
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accounting earnings (GAAP earnings) have lost their relevance (see for example, 
Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999 and Brown et al. 1999).2  As a 
result of this decline in value relevance, non-GAAP earnings are being provided by 
both managers and analysts to shore up accounting information.    
 Over the past few years, pro forma earnings measures have become common 
in earnings press releases.  While those who provide analysts’ actual earnings claim 
that it is a measure of true economic earnings, it is unclear that this is the principal 
purpose behind managers’ reporting of pro forma earnings.  It is the investigation of 
the claims regarding the usefulness of the earnings measures that motivates this 
dissertation.  While the value relevance of earnings measures have been studied in 
the past, prior studies do not distinguish between the three earnings measures used in 
this dissertation – pro forma earnings, GAAP earnings, and analysts’ actuals.  Most 
have compared only GAAP earnings and a proxy for pro forma earnings (typically 
analysts’ actuals).  This dissertation examines the value relevance of each of these 
three measures using two different approaches. 
 Another factor that motivates this dissertation is the perceived credibility of 
pro forma earnings.  Prior research has not examined this issue.  As it is, there is no 
evidence that the market takes the credibility of the pro forma earnings measure into 
consideration when it is impounded in price.  This study therefore examines whether 
perceived credibility is associated with an increase in value relevance.  In this thesis, 
perceived credibility is based on three observable credibility attributes – board 
characteristics, external auditor quality, and overall information quality.   
By answering questions about the value relevance and credibility of pro forma 
earnings measures, the dissertation makes two main contributions.  First, it provides 
evidence on the value relevance of earnings measures by examining which of the 
three earnings measures is closest to the markets’ expectations of future earnings.  
By studying the value relevance of earnings measures, additional evidence is 
provided on the usefulness of different earnings measures for valuation.  Better 
understanding the valuation properties of earnings categories is both of academic 
                                                 
2 By this, the authors mean the declining relationship between accounting earnings and stock price 
measured in terms of the declining R2. 
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and practical interest.  Recall that according to the three links espoused by Beaver 
(1968), investors form expectations of what future earnings will be in valuing a 
firm’s shares.  Accordingly, knowing which earnings measure is closest to investors’ 
expectations of future earnings is important in ensuring appropriate resource 
allocation.   
Second, this dissertation supports the hypotheses that credibility is reflected 
in the pricing of pro forma earnings.  That is, pro forma from firms with better 
governance, better auditors, and better overall information quality have greater value 
relevance.  This finding is consistent with expectations of regulators that 
strengthening governance mechanisms will increase the likelihood that earnings will 
be more credible and consequently, investor confidence. 
Collectively, this dissertation provides new insights into the markets’ 
expectations of pro forma earnings measures, and the role of credibility in these 
expectations.   
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CHAPTER 2:  PAPER 1 
 THE VALUE RELEVANCE OF PRO FORMA EARNINGS  
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Arguably the single most important piece of financial information regarding 
a firm is its earnings.  Earnings measures are important because they provide to 
shareholders, and to the broader financial markets, an indication of both current and 
future firm performance.  In this paper, the value relevance of three different 
earnings measures – traditional accounting (or GAAP) earnings, analysts’ actual 
earnings, and pro forma earnings – is examined.3  
 
2.1.1. Three Alternative Earnings Measures  
Traditional accounting earnings – henceforth “GAAP earnings” – are 
determined using generally accepted accounting principles.  These principles are 
promulgated by formal accounting standard setting bodies including the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the U.S and the Accounting Standards 
Board (AcSB) in Canada.  Public companies are required to report GAAP earnings 
to the financial markets on both a quarterly and an annual basis, and must have a 
qualified public accounting firm audit the annual figure. 
A second earnings measure is analysts’ actual earnings – henceforth 
“analysts’ actuals”4.  This non-GAAP measure refers to earnings provided – on both 
a quarterly and an annual basis – by a financial intermediary, independent of 
management which includes data tracking services such as Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P).  Unlike GAAP earnings, analysts’ actuals are not constrained by generally 
accepted accounting principles, and are determined using proprietary models which 
attempt to measure the core or sustainable earnings potential of a firm (also referred 
to as economic earnings).  Also unlike GAAP earnings, analysts’ actuals are 
unaudited. 
                                                 
3 In the extant literature, an accounting measure is defined as value relevant if it has an association 
with share prices. 
4 This measure differs from analysts’ forecasted earnings.  Forecasted earnings are ex ante predictions 
of a firm’s performance provided in advance of the end of the forecasted period.  Analysts’ actuals 
are ex post measures of the firm’s performance during the period. 
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A third earnings measure – and the measure of primary interest in this study 
– is pro forma earnings (henceforth “pro forma”).  Like analysts’ actuals, this 
category of earnings measure is unaudited and unconstrained by generally accepted 
accounting principles.   However, unlike analysts’ actuals, pro formas are 
determined by firm management.  That is, management will determine whether to 
issue a pro forma, and its calculation.  The use of pro forma earnings is very 
common, with Entwistle et al. (2006) finding that in 2003 over 50 per cent of S&P 
500 firms report a pro forma measure.   
 
2.1.2. Research Objective and Questions 
 The primary objective of this research is to contribute to the existing 
literature on the value relevance of pro forma earnings relative to other earnings 
measures.  This is done by empirically examining whether the market impounds 
information about future pro formas in estimates of price and by comparing the 
relative value relevance of pro formas to both GAAP earnings and analysts’ actuals.  
This study uses S&P 500 firms during the period 2000 to 2004 (i.e., five fiscal year 
ends).  This period covers the introduction of significant regulation – Sarbanes 
Oxley – into the financial reporting environment.  The research design uses both a 
returns model and a price model.  The following research questions are explored: 
 
RQ1: Are pro forma earning, GAAP earnings, and analysts’ actual earnings 
informative? 
 
RQ2: Are pro forma earnings more value relevant than GAAP earnings and 
 analysts’ actuals? 
 
 The study of earnings measures is important.  As earlier mentioned, investors 
and other market watchers fixate on earnings numbers because they perceive that the 
numbers provide an important measure of a firm’s current and potential future 
profitability.  This current and future profitability is reflected in stock prices, hence 
the association between earnings and stock prices first documented in Ball and 
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Brown (1968).  Importantly for this study is that accounting academics have recently 
argued that GAAP earnings have lost their relevance.5  For example, Lev and 
Zarowin (1999) document the declining relation between annual stock returns and 
contemporaneous annual GAAP earnings.  Further, Elliot and Jacobson (1991) and 
Jenkins (1994) argue that GAAP earnings do not provide useful measures in the new 
knowledge economy.  Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) 
among others also document that GAAP earnings appear to have lost relevance, 
although this may be compensated for by increased disclosure.  These latter findings 
are consistent with a strand of analytical research which argues that, as a result of 
the poor quality of GAAP earnings and the information asymmetry which exists 
between managers and shareholders, there is an added incentive to disclose more 
information (Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983).6  In these settings, the value of the 
additional information is greater because of the poor quality of GAAP earnings.  It is 
against this backdrop of information asymmetry and the limitations of GAAP 
earnings that this present study is framed. 
 In the search for additional information, investors are interested in measures 
that closely approximate true economic earnings.  In this paper one such measure, 
analysts’ actuals, is used.  While analysts’ forecasts receive significant attention in 
the literature, analysts’ actuals are also important because they form the basis for 
computing analysts’ forecast accuracy (see Kanagaretnam et al. 2005).  That is, 
analysts are not forecasting GAAP earnings, but rather a measure they claim reflects 
the firm’s true economic earnings – analysts’ actuals.  Also analysts’ earnings, 
unlike pro formas, are substantially independent (of management) and therefore less 
likely to be managed.  
Another means through which additional information is provided is by 
management reporting pro forma earnings in their earnings press releases.  Such 
reporting, however, has come under fire in recent times.  While pro forma earnings 
is one of the more recent disclosure tools used by managers to supplement mandated 
                                                 
5 This decrease in relevance is measured by the adjusted R2 in a price - earnings regression. 
6 There is an opposing argument which is that firms with good information quality will disclose more 
(Verecchia, 1990).  In this thesis, my primary interest is in the value relevance of non-GAAP 
earnings measures relative to GAAP earnings and not with the role voluntary disclosures play in 
terms of their substitutive or complementary affect. 
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earnings computed using GAAP, the debate surrounding its use relates to managers’ 
motivation; is it to provide an informative and value relevant measure, or is it to 
affect perceptions?  If it is the former, pro forma earnings may arguably be more 
value relevant than GAAP earnings (due to GAAP’s limitations), and perhaps 
analysts’ actual earnings (as managers may have a better sense of what adjustments 
to make).  If it is the latter (i.e. to affect perceptions or to mislead), pro forma 
measures may not be value relevant, or may have low value relevance compared to 
both GAAP and analysts’ actual earnings. 
  
2.1.3. Motivation for and Importance of the Research 
 This research is motivated by the debate in both the academic literature and 
the business press between whether the purpose of pro forma earnings is to provide 
value relevant information or to manage investors’ perceptions of firm performance.  
The majority of business articles suggest that managers disclose pro forma earnings 
to manage perceptions or to mislead investors (Derby, 2001; Dreiman, 2001; Elstein, 
2001).  This view is consistent with the findings of Schrand and Walther (2000) that 
managers are opportunistic in their disclosure decisions – emphasizing metrics that 
influence stakeholders’ perceptions of earnings.  Managers, however, counter these 
claims suggesting that firms disclose pro formas because they provide a 
complementary or even an improved metric over existing firm performance 
measures for assessing future cash flows and firm value (Bray 2001 and Weil, 
2001).  Relatedly, while some previous studies (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003) provide evidence that pro 
forma earnings are more value relevant than are GAAP earnings, this evidence, 
based on various data limitations, is not conclusive.  As Berger states (2005, 968), 
“… none of the prior papers seem able to provide convincing evidence on the key 
issue of whether pro forma earnings are used to mislead or inform.”  This research is 
therefore also motivated by this inconclusive evidence.   
 Investigating the value relevance of pro forma earnings is important because 
it adds to the normative debate regarding the appropriate regulation of firm’s 
voluntary disclosures. It is also important because the valuation effects of pro forma 
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earnings are to date largely unknown.  If pro forma earnings enable market 
participants to form more accurate expectations of future performance (i.e., are 
better reflected in price) than does GAAP earnings or analysts’ actual earnings, then 
pro forma measures may be useful for resource allocation decisions.  However, prior 
studies have not examined the importance of pro forma disclosure in terms of its 
affect on the amount of information it provides about future fundamentals as 
reflected in stock prices.7  In this regard, this paper presents a new approach to 
studying the informativeness and value relevance of earnings measures.  It is also 
one of the few studies which compares GAAP earnings, analysts’ actuals and pro 
forma earnings.  Finally, the study is important because it examines whether the 
value relevance of pro forma earnings has changed in the pre- and post-SOX period. 
  
2.1.4. Research Design 
 Prior studies that seek to measure value relevance do so by relating a firms’ 
performance, however measured, to its stock price.  This method requires that 
researchers make assumptions about market expectations of future levels of the 
performance measures even though little is known about the time series properties of 
the measures.  As such, lags of varying orders are used even when there is no 
theoretical justification (Lorek et al., 1993; Schaefer and Willinger, 1993). This 
study contributes to the literature by shedding new light on this information versus 
distortion debate.  The value relevance of pro formas is assessed in this study 
through both a returns model and a price model.   
With regards to the returns approach, an important contribution of this study 
is to use the Collins et al. (1994) model which investigates the association between 
current stock returns and future earnings.  This model employs an alternative 
approach to assess the informativeness of earnings measures by examining the 
market’s ability to predict future earnings based on the expectations of the future 
earnings embedded in prices.  Thus, price is used to infer a characterization of the 
                                                 
7 Lougee and Marquardt (2004) examine the predictive power of pro forma earnings for year ahead 
returns, however, they use the expenses excluded from GAAP as their independent variable and not 
actual pro forma earnings.  In addition, their use of a long window provides the possibility that their 
findings are due to other events that occurred between the measurement of the pro forma earnings and 
the measurement of the returns.  Also the small sample size may be a factor for their results.  
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earnings generating process.  This enables statements to be made about the 
relationship between earnings and returns without making assumptions about 
investors’ expectations of future earnings.  This association is identified in the prior 
literature as the future earnings response coefficient (FERC), and is based on the 
maintained assumption of efficient markets.  Essentially, this approach suggests that 
prices impound information regarding both current and future expected earnings.  If 
managers use their discretion to communicate a pro forma assessment of current and 
sustainable future performance, and prices are found to reflect information regarding 
the future pro formas, then pro forma earnings are informative.  However if 
managers use pro formas to manage perceptions – and thus distort reported earnings 
– then future pro formas will be found to only add noise.  The returns model is used 
to compare the relative explanatory power of pro forma, GAAP and analysts’ 
actuals.8  These “relative” comparisons include both the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and a comparison of adjusted R squares, achieved using both the 
Biddle et al. (1995) χ2 test and the Vuong (1989) test.9   
To complement the returns approach, this study also addresses the two 
research questions using a price model.  This model expresses stock price as a linear 
function of the variables of interest, being the three different earnings measures.  
While the returns models used earlier is less subject to econometric problems such 
as scale effects, the price model yields less biased coefficients (Kothari and 
Zimmerman, 1995).  Therefore this second approach – the price model – is used to 
strengthen the evidence. 
 In terms of research design, this study is related to two recent papers on the 
value relevance of pro forma earnings.  Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that both pro 
forma and analyst’s actual earnings are more value relevant than GAAP earnings, 
while analysts’ actual earnings are also more value relevant than pro forma earnings.  
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) meanwhile find that pro forma earnings have greater 
                                                 
8 According to Biddle et al. (1995) relative comparisons ask which measure has greater information 
content and apply when making mutually exclusive choices or when a ranking by information content 
is desired.  Incremental information content on the other hand, is desirable when one measure is 
viewed as given and the additional information content provided by a second measure is being 
examined. 
9 Refer footnote 30. 
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relative information over GAAP earnings.  Both studies, however, differ from this 
study in that they examine the relation between returns and contemporaneous 
accounting information.  Examining the relation between returns and 
contemporaneous earnings is prone to such confounding factors as risk and the 
persistence of earnings rather than the informativeness about the future.  Also, using 
year ahead returns, as in Lougee and Marquardt (2004), to examine value relevance 
provides a wide window within which these confounding factors could possibly 
affect the findings.  Lastly, and as noted in Bradshaw and Sloan (2002), the use of 
I/B/E/S forecasts as the earnings expectation for all three measures (as in 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003) limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the study 
because the forecast of GAAP and pro forma earnings are likely to differ from those 
of “street” earnings.   
 This study also differs from the Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and the Lougee 
and Marquardt (2004)  studies by using actual bottom line GAAP net income, and 
not diluted operating earnings (used in Bhattacharya et al.; 2003) or earnings before 
extraordinary items (used in Lougee and Marquardt, 2004).  This feature of this 
study consequently allows three bottom line earnings measures to be compared: 
bottom line according to accountants - GAAP; bottom line according to analysts – 
analysts’ actuals; and the bottom line according to managers’ - pro forma.10   
 Two final points are important to note in terms of this study’s design.  First, 
although managers’ discretion in terms of measuring (and reporting) earnings is 
examined, this study differs from prior studies on traditional (within GAAP) 
earnings management, (see the reviews in Healy and Wahlen, 2000; Tucker and 
Zarowin, 2006; Subramanyam, 1996; and Hunt et al. 2000).  That is, while the 
traditional earnings management literature focuses on managers’ discretion within 
accounting regulation, this study focuses on managers’ discretion outside of 
regulation.11  I consequently examine the informativeness of pro forma earnings 
prepared under managers’ full discretion.12   
                                                 
10 I also performed series of sensitivity tests (untabulated) using operating earnings and earnings 
before extraordinary items (sub-bottomline numbers) and find consistent results. 
11 Focusing on managers’ discretion within accounting regulation requires researchers to make 
estimates of what discretionary accruals will be and to back these out in order to get an estimate of 
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Second, the fact that differences exist between GAAP earnings and both 
managers’ pro formas and analysts’ actual earnings may be reasonably well 
understood.  In contrast, the existence of differences between pro formas and 
analysts’ actuals are not obvious.  Indeed, these two non-GAAP earnings measures 
may differ in significant respects; furthermore, it is these differences that could lead 
to differences in value relevance of the measures.  As noted earlier, one of the 
differences between pro forma earnings and analysts’ actual earnings is that while 
pro formas are internally generated by managers, analysts’ actuals are external 
measures.  Managers are presumed to have more information about the operation 
and profitability of their business (e.g., market size and share, cost structure, profit 
margins, etc.), than would external monitors.13  However, while they may be capable 
of providing information that is more value relevant, it is unclear that they will do 
so.  Also, while pro forma earnings are prepared by management and are firm 
specific, analysts’ actual earnings are more mechanistic (that is based on a set of pre-
determined heuristics).  As a result, important firm variations necessary for 
computing firm specific adjusted earnings (pro formas) may not be incorporated into 
analysts’ actuals.   
 
2.1.5 Findings and Implications 
Findings on RQ1 
The study finds that pro forma earnings are informative both in terms of 
being statistically significant and economically meaningful.  The Future Earnings 
Response Coefficient (FERC) of pro forma earnings is positive and statistically 
significant.  This result is robust to controlling for firm characteristics such as size, 
growth, timeliness of earnings, earnings variability and loss.  The results also hold 
                                                                                                                                         
the extent of earnings smoothing or earnings management.  This approach is subject to measurement 
error. 
12 Even though the SEC has stated rules governing the disclosure of pro forma earnings, these rules 
govern the format of presentation and the requirement for a reconciliation and not the manner in 
which the measure should be computed. 
13 Prior research documents that analysts whose earnings models are guided by management in the 
pre Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) regime made more accurate forecasts than those analysts that 
weren’t (Lim, 2001; Hutton, 2005).  This suggests that managers do have information that is pertinent 
to predicting future performance.   
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when firms are partitioned by the nature of their pro forma earnings (i.e., when pro 
forma is greater than GAAP, when GAAP is greater than pro forma, and when firms 
are partitioned into pre and post-SOX periods).  GAAP and analysts’ actual earnings 
were also statistically significant in almost all tests – suggesting that GAAP has not 
fully lost its relevance.  
 
Findings on RQ2 
With respect to the relative explanatory power, pro forma earnings models 
were consistently the most value relevant. In almost all cases the value relevance 
ordering was the same: Pro forma being more value relevant than analysts’ actuals 
which in turn were more value relevant than GAAP earnings.  These differences 
tended to be statistically significant, as well as economically meaningful. 
I find that the future earnings response coefficients (FERC) for the pro forma 
earnings model has the largest adjusted R-squared and is a better model as evidenced 
by the Akaikie Information Criterion (AIC).  The Biddle et al. χ2 test and the Vuong 
test also lead to the same conclusion.  Pro forma earnings measures are also better 
than both GAAP earnings and analysts’ actuals at predicting future cash flows.  The 
only inconsistent finding arises when firms are partitioned into pre and post-SOX 
periods.  In the post-SOX period, analysts’ actuals are more value relevant than are 
pro forma (although pro forma continues to outperform GAAP earnings).  This may 
indicate that the restrictions imposed under SOX have lessoned the relative 
informativeness of pro forma.  Taken together these findings suggest that pro forma 
earnings are, in aggregate, disclosed for value relevant reasons.  Also, even though 
the number of firms disclosing pro formas in the post SOX period declines, the 
informativeness of pro forma earnings does not decline in the post SOX period.   
This study has several implications.  First, managers appear to provide 
voluntary disclosures of pro forma earnings for reasons of informativeness and not 
to mislead investors.  That these measures are more value relevant than are analysts’ 
actuals and GAAP earnings is consistent with managers having a better 
understanding of the firm’s operations, and disclosing this private value relevant 
information in their pro formas.  Second, the findings lend support to the decision by 
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regulators not to proscribe the reporting of pro formas but rather to suggest methods 
of disclosure that will limit their use in a manner that could be misleading.  Lastly, 
for academics, this study suggests an alternative approach to examining value 
relevance.  It addresses some of the limitations of prior studies on the value 
relevance of pro formas and confirms some of the findings of earlier studies.  It also 
provides an interesting area for research which is to examine the shift in the 
information environment surrounding the SOX Act wherein analysts’ actuals are 
found to be more value relevant than pro forma earnings and GAAP earnings.  
 
2.1.6 Organization of the Chapter 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section two reviews the 
prior literature on the motivations and effects of pro forma earnings.  This review 
includes a discussion of the disclosure research and the value relevance literature 
followed by a review of the empirical pro forma research.  Section three presents the 
research design and the data selection method.  In section four, the results of the 
research are presented as well as comparisons to prior empirical pro forma research 
findings.  This section also presents the sensitivity tests.  Section five concludes the 
chapter by describing the contributions of the study’s findings and also includes the 
study’s limitations and suggestions for future research.   
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2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This study’s research questions focus on the value relevance of pro forma 
earnings, a measure disclosed by management on a voluntary basis.  The literature 
review consequently begins with the theoretical disclosure research that helps 
understand and predict manager’s voluntary disclosure actions.  Next, it reviews 
some empirical research on the general theme of voluntary disclosure.  It then 
provides a brief overview of the value relevance literature.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the competing motives ascribed for pro forma disclosure: value 
relevance or managing expectations.  Finally, the empirical research examining pro 
forma earnings is presented.  From the review, gaps in the pro forma literature are 
identified.  These gaps motivate the questions this empirical study intends to 
address. 
 
2.2.1. Theoretical Disclosure Research14 
 Shareholder value can be enhanced where value relevant information is 
disclosed.  This is easiest seen in models of unconditional disclosure.  Diamond 
(1985) provides a general equilibrium model whereby a firm with a policy to pre-
commit to disclose all relevant information makes all shareholders better off than a 
corresponding policy that precludes disclosure.  Thus, by reducing or eliminating 
incentives for investors to become privately informed at some cost, costless public 
disclosure makes investors better off despite adverse risk sharing effects.  Along the 
same lines of welfare improvements, Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) argue that 
voluntary disclosures should lower information asymmetry and consequently the 
cost of capital.   
 But what is the incentive for a manager to disclose?  A manager’s decision to 
voluntarily disclose information is influenced by how external parties without access 
to the information interpret its absence (Verrecchia, 1990).  Information asymmetry 
between firm insiders and external parties (e.g., investors) creates a demand for 
                                                 
14 In this review, there is no distinction made between theoretical research that provides 
explanations/predictions of managers’ behaviour (referred to as discretionary-based disclosure 
research) and that focusing on which disclosure arrangements are preferred unconditionally (i.e., 
given no knowledge of the information), referred to as efficiency-based disclosure in Verrecchia, 
(2001).    
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additional disclosure and provides firms an incentive to disclose (Grossman and 
Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; and Verrecchia, 1983 and 2001).  This 
incentive relates to adverse selection.  That is, in the absence of information 
disclosure by a firm, a rational investor will interpret this withheld information as 
unfavourable news and consequently discount the value of the firm.   
 Dye (1985) argues that managers have a greater incentive to disclose non-
proprietary information when the information is value relevant to investors. Thus, if 
publicly available mandated disclosure (e.g., GAAP earnings) is of poor quality and 
there exists private information of higher quality, managers have a greater incentive 
to disclose the higher quality non-proprietary information that is value relevant.   
But what are managements’ incentives to disclose where the information is 
proprietary?   Notable studies on this subject include Verrecchia (1983), Jovanovic 
(1982) and Lanen and Verrecchia (1987) who suggest that the threshold level of 
disclosure occurs at the level where managers can equate the costs of disclosure – in 
terms of revealing proprietary information – with the benefits of increased 
disclosure.  In this model, information is withheld even though rational investors 
have expectations about its content – (i.e., that they assume unfavourable 
information).   
 In summary, the theoretical disclosure literature has two findings salient to 
this study: Firms will disclose value relevant non-proprietary information, and 
second, that a manager will disclose proprietary information if the benefits to the 
disclosure outweigh the costs.  These findings help provide a frame for this 
dissertation which examines the voluntary disclosure of pro forma earnings. 
 
2.2.2. Empirical Disclosure Research 
Empirical disclosure research includes a large and growing literature that  
uses secondary or archival data to examine various aspects of a firm’s voluntary 
disclosure.15    Corporate disclosure is critical for the efficient functioning of capital 
markets.  Both mandated (regulated) and voluntary disclosure are provided.  In 
addition to this information, financial information intermediaries including financial 
                                                 
15 Verrecchia (2001) refers to these as association-based disclosure studies. 
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analysts, industry experts and members of the business press also provide 
information about a firm.   
This information, which includes earnings information, is important for 
investors’ resource allocation decisions.  According to Dye (1985), managers have a 
greater incentive to disclose private information when mandated information is of 
low quality.  Consistent with this, Chen et al. (2002) provide evidence that firms 
which report relatively less informative earnings are more likely to provide 
voluntary balance sheet disclosures.  Tasker (1998) finds that firms with low quality 
reported earnings are more likely to hold quarterly conference calls.  This suggests 
that additional information is provided to offset information deficiencies in the low 
quality mandated earnings.16   
Healy et al. (1999) find that firms that expand disclosure experience 
significant increases in contemporaneous stock prices, and that these increases are 
unrelated to current performance.  Similarly Gelb and Zarowin (2000) find that firms 
with high (low) disclosure ratings have high (low) stock price associations with both 
contemporaneous and future earnings.  Bloomfield and Libby (1996) also report a 
stronger market reaction to information that is made widely available – for example 
to analysts – than to signals that are made available to a few investors.   
Overall, these empirical findings suggest that managers have an incentive to 
voluntarily disclose when mandated information is of low quality, and that these 
disclosure strategies can affect stock prices.  These studies consequently provide the 
basis to argue that mandated GAAP measures (including GAAP earnings) may not 
be sufficient, and need to be supplemented by non-GAAP measures.  Further, these 
non-GAAP measures may be more effective if they are widely disseminated.  The 
next section provides a brief discussion of the value relevance literature.  
 
2.2.3. Value Relevance Literature 
Ball and Brown (1968) set the stage for subsequent studies which examine 
the association between accounting information, including earnings, and stock price.  
                                                 
16 However, Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999) find that less profitable firms hold fewer 
conference calls.  This is consistent with the theoretical disclosure that argues that lower information 
quality firms will provide less expansive disclosure.  
  20
Such “value relevance” studies form a substantial portion of contemporary 
accounting research.  Topics examined include the value relevance of information 
revealed in new accounting standards (Ayers, 1998 and Barth 1994), in cash flows 
from operations (Barth et al., 1999), in research and development costs (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996), and in patents (Griliches, 1990).   
In this study, similar to Vincent (1999) and Harris et al., (1994), relative 
association tests are performed.  Relative value relevance is assessed by comparing 
the adjusted R2s between models that regress earnings measures against earnings (or 
price). 
 
2.2.4. Motivations for Pro Forma Disclosure 
 The quarterly earnings press release which managers are required to provide 
has become an avenue for managers to disclose not only earnings measures prepared 
in accordance with GAAP, but also pro forma measures.  Managers often emphasize 
these pro forma measures in their quarterly earnings press releases with limited 
mention of the GAAP earnings.    However, this trend has moderated with the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations 
aimed at controlling the disclosure of non-GAAP measures (Entwistle et al. 2006).  
Nevertheless, recent studies show that pro forma earnings are still being reported by 
managers in a large number of firms (Entwistle et al. 2006; Heflin and Hsu, 2005), 
fuelling continuing debate as to why these measures are provided.   
 In the academic literature and in the business press, there are two main 
reasons offered as to why managers report pro forma earnings – the provision of 
value relevant information (to inform) and for strategic reasons (such as to mislead 
investors).  The first reason, advanced by managers and other proponents of pro 
forma, suggests that managers want to reduce information asymmetry by providing 
value relevant information to investors.  For example managers may use pro forma 
to separate items in GAAP earnings between those which are transitory and/or non 
cash from those of a more permanent nature.17  Proponents of pro forma argue that 
                                                 
17Transitory items include special or one-time items such as restructuring charges or significant write 
downs of assets.  Items which are non-cash can include depreciation and amortization expense.  Each 
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removing these transitory items provides more value relevant information through 
reducing noise in the earnings measure (Bray, 2001).  According to former SEC 
chairman Harvey Pitt, the increasing trend of pro forma disclosure may be partly 
driven by a legitimate desire by corporate executives to focus on areas that 
management thinks are important (Pitt, 2001).  Academic studies that support the 
value relevance argument for pro forma earnings include Doyle et al. (2003), Brown 
and Sivakumar (2003), and Bradshaw and Sloan (2002). 
Members of the financial press and regulators are, however, skeptical.  They 
argue that pro forma earnings are provided for strategic reasons such as to mislead 
investors into believing that a firm’s performance is better than it actually is.  To this 
end, the financial press raised a number of red flags when the use of pro forma 
disclosure was increasing.  The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published articles, 
including: “Companies Pollute Earnings” (August 21, 2001) and “ ‘Pro forma’ 
Profits don’t Impress Pros” (November 21, 2005).  In these articles, the WSJ 
strongly criticized the use of pro forma measures by managers.  Regulators echoed 
the same concerns.  Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant of the SEC, nicknamed 
pro forma “Earnings before the bad stuff” – or EBS (Turner, 2001).  Also, in a 
cautionary release, the SEC stated “ … We wish to caution public companies on 
their use of this ‘pro forma’ financial information and to alert investors to the 
potential dangers of such information” (SEC 2001).  The release further warns 
managers about the importance of clearly describing the basis for calculating the pro 
forma and applying this basis uniformly across comparable periods.  It further 
suggests that omitted expenses may constitute a material omission if by their 
omission a GAAP loss is recast as a pro forma profit.  Despite this warning, the SEC 
did concede that such information can serve useful purposes if used properly and 
that “…companies may quite appropriately wish to focus investors’ attention on 
critical issues…” (SEC, 2001).  Academic studies that have found that managers use 
                                                                                                                                         
of these items is then adjusted from GAAP to arrive at pro forma earnings. The new SOX regulation 
requires that managers provide a quantitative reconciliation of their pro forma number to the 
comparable GAAP earnings.  This is aimed at reducing the potential for the pro forma measure to 
mislead investors. 
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this disclosure strategy to hide the firm’s true economic performance include Doyle 
et al. (2003), Schrand and Walther (2000), Degeorge et al. (1999).    
 
2.2.5. Empirical Pro Forma Research18 
2.2.5.1. Research Using Pro Forma Proxies 
 These two competing motives, debated in the financial press and amongst 
regulators, have been a focus of several academic studies.  A first group of studies 
use proxies for pro forma, with the inherent limitation that managers’ intent is 
absent.  Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) investigate two alternative definitions of 
accounting earnings: earnings computed under GAAP, and a modified Street version 
of accounting earnings that excludes various items recorded under GAAP (their 
proxy for pro forma).19  For the period 1986 to 1997, they document a marked 
increase in the exclusion of significant expenses from the earnings reported by 
analyst tracking services, and a corresponding increase in firms specifically 
identifying large portions of their expenses as nonrecurring.  Bradshaw and Sloan’s 
findings suggest that firms and analysts have successfully refocused investor 
attention to modified versions of GAAP earnings, overlooking large amounts of 
expenses that are recorded under GAAP.  Similar to Bradshaw and Sloan (2002), 
Brown and Sivakumar (2003) use data during 1989 to 1997 to compare the quality 
of three different quarterly earnings measures: two accounting measures found in 
required financial reports (10-Q and 10-K), these being EPS from operations and 
EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and one based on 
Street numbers.  They find higher quality for street numbers in terms of predictive 
ability, value relevance and information content, than either EPS from operations or 
EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations.  Doyle et al. (2003) 
investigate the informational properties of expenses excluded in determining pro 
forma earnings.  They find that the excluded expenses are important in predicting 
future cash flows, although investors may not fully appreciate this at the time of the 
earnings announcement.   
                                                 
18 Details of these studies are provided in the appendix.  
19 Street earnings refer to analysts’ actual earnings. 
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It is important to note, however, that the above studies use I/B/E/S analysts’ 
actual earnings as a proxy for pro forma earnings.  They do not use actual pro forma 
earnings as reported by management in their earnings press releases, which may 
differ from the I/B/E/S amounts.20   Hence, while the authors find that pro formas 
are of higher quality than GAAP measures (i.e., are more value relevant), they do 
not make this determination based on examining actual managers’ pro forma 
disclosure.  As managers are not reporting analysts’ actuals, there is no incentive to 
mislead.  That is, one cannot test between managerial motives – to inform or to 
mislead – when the motive to mislead is incongruent with the proxy. 
 
2.2.5.2. Research Using Actual Pro Forma Earnings 
 Other studies have analyzed actual pro forma releases.  One such study, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) examines 1,149 earnings press releases from 1998 to 
2000.  Using short-window abnormal returns and revisions in analysts’ one-quarter-
ahead earnings forecasts, they find that manager’s pro forma measures are viewed as 
more informative and permanent than GAAP earnings.  Their findings suggest that 
market participants believe pro forma earnings are more representative of “core 
earnings” than are GAAP operating income.  However, they do note that this finding 
is limited by the fact that they calculate forecast errors for all three measures based 
on earnings forecasts made by analysts.  As there are no separate expectations used 
for future pro forma or future GAAP earnings, this approach is subject to 
measurement error which biases the results in favour of analysts’ actual earnings.   
 Using a sample of 249 press releases from 1997 to 1999, Lougee and 
Marquardt (2004) find that manager’s pro forma earnings have greater relative and 
incremental information content than GAAP earnings.  However, this result only 
                                                 
20 Bhattacharya et al. (2003) in their study find that the differences in means between EPSIBES and 
EPSPRO FORMA (taken from actual press releases) are significant.  However, Bradshaw (2003), in 
commenting on Bhattacharya et al. (2003), concedes that while the differences in means between 
EPSIBES and EPSPRO FORMA are significant, this difference appears to be driven by the tails of the 
distributions because other measures of the distribution such as median difference is zero.  As such, 
to a certain extent, overall it remains an open question whether EPSIBES = EPSPRO FORMA.  In this 
study, I find that EPSIBES ≠ EPSPRO FORMA.  In addition, my findings are robust to winsorizing the data 
to plus or minus 3 s.d. from the mean.   
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holds when GAAP earnings quality is low, and when strategic considerations are 
absent (as measured by the direction of the earnings surprise).21  Their assessment of 
information content is based on the earnings measure’s predictive ability for future 
operating performance and its association with contemporaneous returns.22  
 Johnson and Schwartz (2005) use a market multiples approach to examine 
433 firms that disclosed pro forma measures in their earnings press releases in the 
period June to August, 2000.  This approach is used to determine if investors assign 
a higher multiple to pro forma firms than to other firms.  They find that while pro 
forma firms appear to have traded at a market premium during their sample period, 
the magnitude of this premium is unrelated to characteristics of pro forma 
disclosures.  Collectively, their results suggest that investors are not misled by pro 
forma earnings disclosures and that pro forma measures are value relevant.  Of note 
here is that Johnson and Schwartz examine the effect of pro forma on sophisticated 
investors (i.e., the overall market).  As a result, their results may not capture the 
differential effects of pro forma disclosures on less-sophisticated or smaller 
investors, as is suggested in the experiment by Frederickson and Miller (2002).  To 
capture the effects of pro forma on unsophisticated investors, Bhattacharya et al. 
(2006) examine trading by small, and presumably less-sophisticated, investors.  
They find that trading by less-sophisticated investors around pro forma earnings 
release dates explains more of the variation in contemporaneous abnormal returns 
than does trading by large and sophisticated investors, suggesting that 
unsophisticated investors may be differentially affected by pro forma earnings. 
  
2.2.6. Conclusions and Implication from the Literature Review 
 The empirical pro forma literature has to date been unable to provide 
conclusive evidence on either the value relevance of pro forma earnings or the 
motivations behind its disclosure.  That the findings are not conclusive may also 
arise from design limitations of the prior studies including their use of pro forma 
                                                 
21 Earnings quality, a measure of value relevance, is measured by the earnings-return correlation and 
its related R2.  Earnings surprise is measured as the change (positive or negative) in earnings.   
22 In their test of predictive ability the authors use expenses excluded from GAAP (special items) in 
the determination of pro forma, rather than actual pro forma earnings. 
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proxies in place of actual pro forma earnings disclosed by managers, and the 
empirical models employed that introduce bias.  These two limitations are addressed 
in this study.  First, rather than using a proxy (e.g., an I/B/E/S or COMPUSTAT 
measure), actual pro forma measures reported by firms are hand collected from their 
earnings press releases.  Second, a returns model is used for measuring value 
relevance that uses actual rather than estimated future earnings, thereby avoiding the 
problem of an appropriate proxy for future earnings.  The next section presents the 
research design. 
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2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 In this section, a detailed description of the research design is presented.  
First, the returns model is introduced.  This is the primary empirical model used to 
examine both research questions.  This is followed by a discussion of the control 
variables used in the study.  Next, the price model is described.  A cash flow 
prediction test and a test examining the introduction of SOX are then presented.  
This section also presents information on the sample selection procedure and the 
measurement of variables.  Lastly, some summary statistics and correlations are 
provided.   
 
2.3.1. Returns Model 
In this model, informativeness relates to the amount of information about 
future earnings which is impounded in stock returns.   This econometric approach 
examines which earnings measure best characterizes the Ohlson (1995) theoretical 
clean surplus relationship.23  Specifically, the Collins et al.’s (1994) model is used.  
This model assumes that revisions in expected dividends are correlated with 
revisions in expected earnings.  Consequently, current stock returns are a function of 
the current period’s unexpected earnings and changes in expected future earnings.  If 
non-GAAP earnings – either analysts’ actuals or pro forma earnings – provide value 
relevant information about the recurring earnings of a firm, then this information 
will enable the market to better forecast future performance.  If on the other hand, 
non-GAAP earnings introduce noise, then investors are unable to accurately forecast 
future performance.  This study therefore examines whether current stock returns are 
more highly correlated with future GAAP, future analysts’ actuals, or future pro 
formas.   
 Following Collins et al. (1994), the annual stock return is characterized as 
the sum of three components: the unexpected earnings for the period; the change in 
                                                 
23 To gain a full understanding of this characterization, refer to Ohlson (1995).  By way of 
illustration, consider a firm with a two year life cycle, a discount rate of zero, and zero distribution 
of capital.  Denote book value by BV and earnings by X.  From this, price at time 0 and time 1, under 
the clean surplus relation, can be expressed as P0 = BV0 + E0(X1) + E0(X2) and P1 = BV1 + E1(X2).  
We can substitute BV0 + X1 for BV1.  This yields: P1 = BV0 + X1 + E1(X2).  With this we can 
calculate return as P1 – P0 = BV0 + X1 + E1(X2) – BV0 –E0(X1) – E0(X2) or R = UX1 + ∆E1(X2) 
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expectations between time t-1 and time t about future earnings in year t +1; and 
random noise unrelated to current or future earnings.  Unexpected earnings for each 
of the three earnings measures are defined as the annual earnings less the prior 
period’s expectation.  Mathematically this characterization is expressed as follows 
(ignoring firm subscripts): 
            t
i
ittitt XEUXR εααα +Δ++= ∑∞
=
+ )(
1
210    (2.1) 
 where: 
Rt               =  annual stock return; 
UXt            =  unexpected earnings (GAAP, analysts’ actuals, or pro forma) for the 
period; 
∆Et(Xt+i)   =   change in expectations between time t-1 and time t about future 
earnings in    year t+i; and 
εt                =  random noise. 
  
 As in Collins et al. (1994), the regression coefficients α1 and α2 in equation 
(2.1) allow for other factors such as time value, risk and the precision of the proxies 
used to measure unexpected current earnings and changes in expected earnings.  
Because the independent variables in (2.1) are unobservable, Collins et al. (1994) 
proxy for current unexpected earnings and changes in expected future earnings by 
using observed current change in earnings and changes in reported future earnings, 
respectively.  This results in a regression of current annual stock returns Rt, on 
current and future annual earnings changes (ignoring firm subscripts and limiting to 
one year): 
tttt UR +ΔΕ+ΔΕ+= +1210 ββα                   (2.2) 
In the regression the earnings variables are in per-share form and scaled by share 
price at the beginning of the current year (Christie, 1987), and the stock returns are 
total annual stock returns (measured over the period from nine months prior to fiscal 
year end to three months after fiscal year end).24 
                                                 
24 A short returns window – three days after the earnings announcement – is also examined. 
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Using earnings changes as explanatory variables assumes that earnings 
follow a random walk.  Rather than impose this limitation, Lundholm and Myers 
(2002) suggest estimating the levels form of the regression.25  Also they include 
prior year’s earnings in order to allow the regression to find the best representation 
of the prior expectation for current earnings.  Thus the model is expressed as 
follows:26,27 
      tititititi UbbbR ,1,2,11,0, +Ε+Ε+Ε+= +−α      (2.3) 
In equation (2.3), b2 is the future earnings response coefficient which in this 
study is the coefficient of interest – it is expected to be positive.  Consistent with 
prior literature, it is also expected that the coefficient on Et-1 will be negative while 
the coefficient on Et will be positive.  This simply reflects the mean-reverting nature 
of earnings information. A   regression is estimated for each of the three earnings 
measures.   
It may be argued that analysts’ actual earnings should be more value relevant 
than GAAP earnings as its purpose is to provide a measure of economic or core 
earnings.  In contrast, the potential dual motive in disclosing pro forma – to provide 
value relevant information or to mislead – may lead to firms providing pro forma 
measures which are more or less value relevant than analysts’ actuals and GAAP-
based earnings.  If the primary purpose of reporting pro forma by management is to 
provide value relevant information, this measure may be more value relevant than 
analysts’ actuals as management arguably has a greater sense as to which 
adjustments to GAAP better reflect sustainable earnings for the firm.  This augment 
is consistent with Hutton (2005) who found that analysts whose earnings models are 
reviewed by management provide more accurate forecasts.  If managers are using 
pro forma to inform, we therefore would expect that pro forma would be more 
                                                 
25 I perform a unit root test to examine the data for stationarity prior to estimating the regressions and 
the results suggest stationarity of the data.    
26 The value relevance literature has also used only current and past earnings as its proxy for UXt.  
See for example, Francis and Shipper (1999) and Lev and Zarowin (1999). 
27 The tables report undeflated results in order to remain close to the measure of interest (EPS).  
However, as earlier mentioned, I deflate the EPS numbers by price at time t-1 (Christie, 1987).  My 
results remain substantively similar.  The explanatory power of the price model and the coefficient on 
book value of the deflated model are closer to levels reported in prior studies that deflate the earnings 
measures. 
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informative than analysts’ actuals, which in turn would be more informative than 
GAAP earnings.  Alternatively, if managers are using pro forma to manage 
expectations or mislead, one may expect that pro forma will be less informative than 
analysts’s actuals, and may be less informative than GAAP earnings. 
 The proxy for changes in expected future earnings, Et(Et+i)  is central to the 
the model and since this proxy is unobservable, Beaver et al. (1980) and Warfield 
and Wild (1992) use actual future earnings.  However, actual future earnings has 
both expected and unexpected components.  Therefore, this proxy contains 
measurement error and introduces an error-in-variable bias in the estimation of the 
future earnings response coefficient.  Collins et al. (1994) control for this 
measurement error by introducing future returns into the model to control for the 
unexpected component of future earnings.28   
        tittitititi URbbbbR ,131,2,11,0, ++Ε+Ε+Ε+= ++−α        (2.4) 
Collins et al. further state that the hypothesized coefficient on Rt+1 is negative 
because Rt+1 is correlated with the unexpected component of Et+1.  In order to 
maximize the R2 of the returns-earnings model, Collins et al. include three future 
years of earnings and returns in their regression aimed at improving the explanatory 
power of earnings.  However, the goal of this study is to test the ordering of the 
explanatory power of the three regression models.  Hence, the key implication of 
Collins et al.’s results for the test in this study is that the association between current 
returns and future returns is correctly measured.  Since the maximization of the R-
squares is not part of the objective of the tests, and also as a result of data 
constraints, only future earnings for one year is used in the regression.  Also 
according to Ettredge et al. (2005) using a one year horizon is consistent with 
analysts who focus on year ahead earnings.  This test then provides the basis to 
answer the first research question.   
                                                 
28 Lundholm and Myers (2002) provide an explanation for this.  The idea being that an unexpected 
shock to future earnings is measurement error when using the actual future earnings to proxy for the 
expected future earnings.  According to them, this unexpected shock will generate future returns 
therefore introducing future returns into the model corrects for the unexpected component in future 
returns.   
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 To answer the research questions, I focus on both the standardized future 
earnings response coefficients in each of the three regressions and the magnitude of 
the adjusted R-squares.  The standardized coefficients are examined because in a 
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, the researcher is unable to conclude 
that the independent variable with the largest coefficient has the greatest explanatory 
power for the dependent variable.  This is because the magnitude of the coefficients 
is sensitive to the units used to measure the independent variables.29  While the 
standardized estimated coefficients cannot be statistically compared across the 
models, it is possible to comment on the size of the coefficients in each of the 
regression models since the units are standardized.  This provides an indication of 
the informativeness of each of the earnings measures and specifically, the pro forma 
measure.  Also, by comparing the explanatory power of the models – as is 
commonly done in the value relevance literature – the relative value relevance of 
one measure over the other is examined.  This comparison is performed using the 
AIC and both the Biddle et al. (1995) χ2 test and the Vuong (1989) test.  The 
measure that enables the market to better predict future earnings (however defined), 
and that in which its regression model has the greatest adjusted R-square, is 
considered the most value relevant earnings measure.  
 Note that an important difference between this study and others that have 
examined the value relevance of earnings is that in this study, the focus is on the 
future earnings response coefficients between alternative earnings measures.  
Previous papers have either examined cross sectional variation in the future earnings 
response coefficient based on certain firm characteristics (for example, Tucker and 
Zarowin, 2006; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004) or tested for an intertemporal shift in 
the earnings response coefficient in response to a mandated accounting change (e.g. 
Ettredge et al. 2005).  Since the informativeness of price for each of the earnings 
measures is examined, the same firms are used to serve as their own control for 
other confounding effects that may affect the results.   
                                                 
29 Fortunately, even though this does not apply in this case, as the same measure, EPS, is used, I still 
consider standardized coefficients and coefficients from standardized variables (Woolridge, 2000). 
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2.3.2. Returns Model - Controlling for Firm Characteristics 
 In addition to price informativeness, the relation between current returns and 
future earnings depends on both the timeliness and forcastability of earnings.  More 
timely earnings implies a stronger relation to contemporaneous returns and a weaker 
relation to future earnings.  Conversely, returns have a stronger relation to future 
earnings that are less variable.  To ensure that the results are not due to omitted 
correlated variables, changes in the firms’ earnings characteristics and in the firms’ 
information environment are controlled for, as are variables that have been identified 
in prior literature as proxies for timeliness and forecastability.  Following Ettredge et 
al. (2005) the market-to-book ratio is used to control for growth (growth).  
Lundholm and Myers (2002) use a dummy variable to proxy for earnings persistence 
(loss).  This variable equals one if next year’s earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. 
This variable also controls for the differential valuation of loss firms documented in 
Hayn (1995).  To control for timeliness of earnings, similar to Basu (1997) a 
variable (current) is used for the contemporaneous return.  This variable is coded 
one for negative returns and zero otherwise.  For earnings uncertainty, a measure of 
firm level variability (Var) is included.  This is a relative measure of earnings 
dispersion calculated by dividing the absolute standard deviation of a company’s 
percentage change in EPS over 20 quarters by the company’s average four quarter 
percentage for 20 quarters.  The information environment is controlled for by the 
size of the firm (size).  Size is measured as the log of market capitalization each year.  
Equation (2.4) is modified and the following model is estimated: 
         
tttt
ttttttt
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541312110α      (2.5) 
 
Recall that the coefficient of interest is b2, and that the sign is expected to be 
positive.  The expected signs on the control variables are as follows.  Since growth 
firms represented by high M/B ratios tend to have high capitalized future earnings 
the sign on growth is expected to be positive.  The expected sign of loss is negative 
since negative earnings are both timelier and less persistent.  The expected sign on 
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current is negative because bad news is timelier than good news.  The expected sign 
of Var is negative since high variance firms and high variance firms have earnings 
that are more difficult to forecast.  Lastly, the coefficient on size is expected to be 
positive since larger firms have a richer information environment.    
2.3.3. Price Model – Relative Value Relevance Tests 
 To provide further evidence on the relative value relevance of pro forma 
earnings, and following other value relevance studies (Barth et al., 1999), alternative 
price model tests are performed to examine the robustness of the results.  Using a 
simple earnings capitalization model with price as the dependent variable, the 
adjusted R-squares for each of the earnings measures is subjected to pair-wise 
comparisons using both the Biddle et al. (1995) χ2 test and the Vuong (1989) test.  
This approach was adopted by Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Brown and Sivakumar 
(2003).  Of note is that these previous studies use a proxy for pro forma earnings 
being an amount obtained from I/B/E/S, which in this study is analysts’ actual 
earnings.  These studies do not, therefore, effectively compare GAAP, analysts’ 
actual and pro forma earnings.  As analysts’ actual earnings is not the same as actual 
management disclosed pro forma earnings there is a potential for measurement error 
in their tests.  To address these limitations, actual manager disclosed pro forma 
earnings is used, as well as bottom line GAAP net income.   
 To compare the value relevance of the three measures (Ei) I examine which 
of the three measures has the highest adjusted R2 in a simple earnings capitalization 
regression (Barth et al., 1999).  Ignoring firm subscripts, it takes the following form: 
ititt UEbP ++= 0α                      (2.6) 
where Pt represents the market price per share three months after the fiscal year end 
and Ei represents each of the three earnings measures.  This approach has the 
advantage of not requiring an event window.   
 An additional specification is used that includes past year’s earnings.  This 
allows the regression to find the best representation of expectation for current 
earnings (refer Lundholm and Myers, 2002)   
itittit UEbEbP +++= − 1)1(0α                    (2.7) 
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If the coefficient on past earnings is of similar magnitude but opposite in sign to the 
coefficient on current earnings, this implies that the market treats earnings as if it 
follows a random walk.  If on the other hand, the coefficient on the lagged earnings 
is approximately zero, then it suggests that the market treats earnings as a white 
noise process. 
2.3.6. Cashflow Prediction Model 
 I also examine the relationship between the earnings measures and cash 
flows.  Examining cash flows is important because valuation models show that a 
firm’s stock price is the present value of future dividends, which in turn can be 
expressed as a function of cash flows.  Therefore, if pro forma provides more 
information about future cash flows than other earnings measures, then it is a more 
value relevant measure.  In Equation (2.8) a model that predicts CFO in period t+1 
based on information in periods t and t-1 is estimated as follows:  
tttt UEbEbCFO +++= −+ 1101 α                                                    (2.8) 
If the earnings measure provides information about future cash flows, then I expect 
b1 to be positive.  Relative value relevance is assessed by comparing adjusted R-
squares of the cash flow prediction tests. 
 
2.3.7 Impact of SOX 
 In this section, the possibility that the informativeness of the earnings 
measures may be affected by the implementation of the SOX Act is examined. The 
SOX Act was signed into law on July 30, 2002.  Part of the Act focused on pro 
forma reporting, ultimately resulting in the SEC introducing regulation aimed at 
limiting manager’s reporting of pro forma earnings for strategic reasons.  If the 
SOX Act limits the ability of managers to report misleading pro forma earnings, 
then in the post (pre)-SOX period, it is expected that pro forma will (not) be 
informative.  The returns model is reexamined to assess the potential impact of this 
regulation on the informativeness of the various earnings measures.  A dummy 
variable (post) is therefore introduced to proxy for the introduction of the Act, 
where the years 2001 and 2002 are the pre-SOX period and 2003 and 2004 
represent the post-SOX period. 
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2.3.8. Sample Selection, Variable Measurement and Data Reliability 
 In this section, a detailed description of the sample of firms used in the study 
is provided along with how each of the variables of interest was measured.  
Information is also provided regarding the process used to ensure the reliability of 
the data.  Summary statistics and correlation data are also presented.   
  
2.3.8.1. Sample Selection  
 The firms of interest are S&P 500 firms.   The sample period begins in 2000 
and ends in 2004 covering five successive year ends.  As noted previously, an 
important aspect of this five year period is that it encompasses the period during 
which new regulation of pro forma reporting – associated with Sarbanes Oxley – 
was introduced into the financial markets.  
 As shown in Table 1 Panel A, 1,608 firms were identified as having reported 
a pro forma earnings measure in their annual earnings press release during the 
sample period.  Similar to prior pro forma studies [e.g., Entwistle et al. (2006), 
Heflin and Hsu (2005)], a declining incidence over the five year period is found.  
Panel B shows the distribution of the pro forma firms by industry.  While absolute 
numbers declined over the five year period, the relative percentages across industries 
were stable over time.  Similar to prior studies, pro forma firms are mostly 
concentrated in the technology and financial services industries.  Panel C reports the 
difference between pro forma and GAAP earnings.  It demonstrates that while pro 
forma earnings tend to consistently exceed GAAP earnings, this difference decreases 
in the years following the implementation of SOX.  That is, while pro forma tends to 
be income increasing, the magnitude of this difference decreased following SOX. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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 To be included in subsequent data analysis each of the firms in Table 1 must 
have reported pro forma earnings for three consecutive years.  As noted in Table 2, 
Panel A this restriction eliminates 680 of the 1,608 firms.  Also eliminated were 38 
firms with missing CRSP data, 22 firms with missing I/B/E/S analysts’ actual 
earnings, and 311 firms with missing COMPUSTAT data.  This leaves a total of 557 
firm years in the sample.  Table 2, Panel B shows a breakdown of this reduced 
sample of pro forma firms by industry, while Panel C reports the per share 
differences.  This reduced sample appears to be very similar to the larger set of firms 
presented in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
  
2.3.8.2 Variable Measurement and Data Reliability   
 To determine whether a firm disclosed a pro forma earnings measure in its 
earnings press release, a full reading of the release was performed.30 This involved a 
detailed and time intensive coding process.  To be considered a pro forma earnings 
disclosure, an alternative measure of earnings (to GAAP earnings) for the year has 
to be provided somewhere in the press release, either specifically in the headline or 
in the narrative.31  Second, this alternate measure has to be expressed on a per share 
basis.  This pro forma per share amount is the measure used for the subsequent 
analysis.32  
To ensure the reliability of the coding, for each of the five years a significant 
number of the press releases were independently coded by individuals (graduate 
students and accounting faculty members) well versed in the coding protocol, and 
the findings were compared.  In only a few cases were different assessments made, 
and in all these cases a consensus was obtained as to whether a pro forma earnings 
amount was reported.     
   The other variables used in this paper are as follows.   
                                                 
30 The press releases were primarily obtained from the firms’ websites, although in a few cases the 
firms had to be contacted directly for a copy of the release. 
31 The headline refers to that part of the earnings press release which is usually in bold and offset 
from the rest of the press release while the narrative is the body of the press release. 
32 Diluted EPS was used for pro forma, GAAP, and analysts’ actuals. 
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Primary independent variables of interest (in addition to pro forma) 
 
• GAAP earnings per share is obtained from either the earnings press release 
or from the Compustat database (data item #169).   
 
• Analysts’ actual earnings is collected from the I/B/E/S annual data file.   
 
Dependent variables 
 
• Annual returns is obtained from the CRSP database and is computed three 
months after the firm’s fiscal year end.  An alternative time period – one 
month after – is also computed. 
 
• Price is obtained from the CRSP database.  Similar to returns, it is computed 
three months after the firm’s fiscal year end. 
 
• Cashflow from operations for the fiscal year is obtained from Compustat 
(data item A308). 
 
Additional independent (control) variables 
 
• Growth at time t, is proxied by market-to-book ratio.  Book value is 
Compustat data item (#216) while market value is Compustat data items 
(#25*#199). 
 
• Loss is proxied by a dummy variable which equals 1 if next year’s GAAP 
earnings are negative and 0 otherwise.   
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• Current is proxied by a dummy variable coded one for negative 
contemporaneous return and zero otherwise.  Returns are obtained from the 
CRSP annual database  
 
• Earnings uncertainty is calculated by dividing the absolute standard 
deviation of a company’s percentage change in EPS over 20 quarters by the 
company’s average four quarter percentage for 20 quarters.  This is obtained 
from the Compustat annual data file. 
 
• Size is measured as the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization, and is 
obtained from the Compustat annual data file.  
 
2.3.9. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the primary variables of interest used in the 
study along with some control variables.  Even though the sample is composed of 
large firms [the S&P 500 - the mean (median) of the natural log of market 
capitalization is 12.305 (10.3755) which represent $221 million ($32 million)], there 
is substantial variation among the sample of firms as the standard deviation of firm 
size is 4.044 representing $57 million.  Regarding the performance measures, the 
mean (median) of the pro forma earnings measures in all three periods, t-1, t, and 
t+1 are greater than either GAAP or analysts’ actual earnings.  In period t, the mean 
(median) of the GAAP, analysts’ actual and pro forma earnings are $0.89 ($1.18); 
$0.53 ($0.85) and $1.75 ($1.59) respectively.  These amounts are consistent with 
prior studies that have found that pro forma measures tend to be greater than GAAP 
earnings measures, and that analysts’ earnings measures are generally less than 
GAAP earnings (Matsumoto 2002).   
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
  38
 Table 4 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the 
variables used in the regression. Past, current and future earnings (GAAP, analysts’ 
actual and pro forma) are all positively correlated with each other. In addition, 
current returns are also positively correlated with all three future performance 
measures but negatively related with past GAAP and analysts’ actual earnings  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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2.4. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL TESTS 
  
This section presents the empirical results of this study.  
 
2.4.1. Relative Informativeness using Returns   
 Table 5, results using returns as the dependent variable, examines the 
informativeness of future pro forma earnings.  The future earnings response co-
efficient (FERC) for pro forma is 0.10866 (t-statistic = 7.42) which is both positive 
and statistically significant.33  This suggests that the market impounds a significant 
amount of future pro forma earnings in forming expectations about price, and further 
that pro forma earnings are informative and value relevant.   The FERC on analysts’ 
actuals is 0.05861 (t-stat = 5.85) and on GAAP earnings is 0.02847 (t-stat = 4.67).  
That is, all three earnings measures are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 Table 5 also presents the relative informativeness results for the three 
earnings measures.  Relative informativeness is assessed by examining the FERC of 
the earnings measures, and by examining which earnings measure yields the greatest 
explanatory power.  The future earnings response coefficient for GAAP earnings is 
0.02847 (t-stat = 4.67), for analysts’ actual earnings is 0.05861 (t-statistic = 5.85), 
and is highest for pro forma at 0.10866 (t-statistic = 7.42).  Since all three measures 
have the same dependent variables, a comparison of the standardized betas provides 
an indication of which future earnings response coefficient is greater.34  Table 5 
shows that pro forma has the greatest standardized beta estimate 0.4799 compared to 
0.3292 for analysts’ actual earnings and 0.2107 for GAAP earnings.  The pro forma 
                                                 
33 The results reported here are based on pooled regressions with t-statistics based on Newey and 
West (1987).  Adjusted standard errors are used to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
As a sensitivity, I estimate the regressions for each group of three years i.e. 2000, 2001, 2002 
together, 2001, 2002, 2003 together and 2002, 2003, 2004 together.  The untabulated results are 
similar to the reported results. 
34 Note that this is a visual comparison (not statistical) of the magnitude of beta coefficients. 
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earnings model also has the largest explanatory power with an adjusted R2 of 
12.74% followed by analysts’ actual earnings (10.38%) and lastly GAAP earnings 
(10.15%).  According to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) the pro forma 
earnings model is superior to both the analysts’ actual and GAAP earnings models.  
A Biddle et al. (1995) χ2 test finds that there is a statistically significant difference 
between pro forma and and the other two earnings models (analysts’ actuals and 
GAAP).  However, the difference between analysts’ actuals and GAAP is not 
statistically significant.35,36,37 
 
2.4.2. Relative Informativeness Tests Controlling for Firm Characteristics 
 Firm characteristics, especially those that affect the timeliness and 
forecastability of earnings, could make the stock price impound more (or less) 
information about future earnings.  Hence, omitting these variables could bias the 
coefficients in the model, including the future earnings coefficient.  As a result, I 
control for various firm characteristics. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 Table 6 reports that after controlling for firm characteristics, the market 
impounds little or no information concerning future GAAP earnings [0.00627 (t-
statistic = 1.08)].  In contrast, both future analysts’ actual earnings and future pro 
forma earnings remain significantly impounded in stock price, with future earnings 
response coefficient of 0.02508 (t-statistic = 2.81) and 0.06592 (t-statistic = 5.20), 
respectively.  The explanatory power of the pro forma earnings model also continues 
                                                 
35 The difference between the adjusted R2 is based on the Biddle et al. (1995) χ2 test statistic.  The 
Vuong (1989) statistic yields identical results.  Note that in this and subsequent sections of the paper 
and Tables, where the Biddle et al. test is referred to and reported, the Vuong test is also performed, 
although not reported.  The results of the two tests lead to identical conclusions.  
36 Note that the signs on the contemporaneous and lagged earnings for both analysts’ actual and pro 
forma earnings are negative, while for GAAP earnings it is only negative for lagged earnings. This 
suggests that the time series properties of analysts’ actual earnings and pro forma earnings are distinct 
from those of GAAP earnings.  The implication of this difference is an unexplored area that future 
research can examine. 
37 In untabulated results, and similar to prior studies, I use earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI) 
from Compustat as a proxy for GAAP earnings and re-estimate equation (2.4).  Results from this test 
indicate that both pro forma earnings and analysts’ actuals are still more informative than GAAP. 
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to be highest with a best fit model [AIC = -1153.8336] and with greater explanatory 
power – according to the Biddle test – than both GAAP and analysts’ actual earnings 
model.  However, similar to the base model, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the GAAP earnings and analysts’ actual earnings models.  The 
sign on the control variables for growth and size are in the opposite direction to that 
hypothesized in all three of the earnings regressions, with the coefficient on size 
being statistically significant.  This inverse relationship between size and returns 
could be due to a more complex information environment for large firms and its 
corresponding higher risk (Lu, 2007).  The signs on the coefficient loss and current 
are all in the predicted direction and statistically significant for all three earnings 
measures. 
 
2.4.4. Value Relevance Tests using Price   
 To ensure the robustness of the results, alternative tests are performed using 
price as the dependent variable.  First, in Table 7, a simple earnings capitalization 
model is used. 
   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Consistent with the returns’ tests, the coefficient of each of the earnings measures is 
positive and statistically significant.  Using the Biddle et al. test, the adjusted R2 for 
the pro forma earnings regression (27.11%) is significantly greater than either 
GAAP (15.18%) or analysts’ actual earnings (16.79%).  The AIC test also yields 
similar conclusions. 
 In Table 8 the model controls for past years’ earnings.  Again, the 
coefficients of all three earnings measures are statistically significant and positive.  
The adjusted R2 of the pro forma earnings model (30.52%) is greater than that for 
analysts’s actual model (26.02%) and GAAP earnings model (19.13%), but the 
difference between the pro forma model and analysts’ actual model is not 
statistically significant using the Biddle et al. (1995) X2 test. 
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
2.4.5. Cashflow Prediction Tests   
 Table 9 presents the results of the cash flow prediction tests.  Each of the 
three earnings measures significantly predicts year ahead future cash flows.  
However, the pro forma model (13.87) significantly outperforms the other two 
earnings measures (GAAP - 4.39; analysts’ actuals - 10.37) in terms of explaining 
future cash flows. That is, pro forma is not only better at predicting returns and 
price, but also cash flows.  In fact, it has over three times the explanatory power in 
explaining cash flows than does GAAP earnings (R2 of 13.87% versus 4.39%). 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
  
2.4.6. Tests of the Impact of SOX 
 Table 10 presents the results of tests that examine the impact of SOX.  These 
results are presented along the lines of the two research questions being the 
informativeness of the earnings measures (RQ1) and the relative value relevance of 
the earnings measures (RQ2).  The informativeness of the earnings measures (RQ1) 
is examined in two ways.  First, by using a dummy variable “Post” that represents 
the period after the implementation of the Act and second by dividing the data set 
into pre- and post-SOX periods and running the regressions for each period 
separately.   Next, I examine the relative value relevance of the earnings measures 
(RQ2).   
 Panel A of Table 10 presents results of the informativeness of the earnings 
measures using the dummy variable approach.  According to the table, the future 
earnings response coefficient for GAAP earnings is [0.03218 (t-statistic = 4.48)] 
while the future earnings response coefficient for the interaction between future 
GAAP and Post is [-0.01128 (t-statistic = -1.15)].  This interaction represents the 
difference in the overall level of the FERC between the post group and the omitted 
reference group (i.e., the informativeness of GAAP is 0.1128 smaller than the 
reference group which is equal to 0.0209).  An F-test that the two coefficients 
[0.03218 and 0.0209] are equal cannot be rejected [F-test = 1.33].  This suggests that 
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there is no difference in the amount of information about future fundamentals that is 
impounded in stock returns between the pre and post-SOX periods.  Similar to 
GAAP earnings, the market does not appear to impound any additional information 
regarding future pro forma in the post-SOX period, compared to the pre-SOX 
period.  The coefficient of future pro forma earnings in the pre-SOX period is 
0.08836 (t-statistic = 7.07) while in the post-SOX period the coefficient of future pro 
forma is 0.07861 [0.08836 - 0.00975].  A test of equality of the two coefficients 
cannot be rejected.  This suggests that the introduction of the Act did not change the 
value relevance of the earnings measures. 
However, with respect to analysts’ actuals, the results show that there is additional 
information about future fundamentals impounded in analysts’ actual earnings in the 
post-SOX period.  The difference between the FERC for analysts’ actuals and the 
omitted reference group is .05418, thus the informativeness of analysts’ actuals in 
the post-SOX period is 0.08413 [i.e. 0.02995 + 0.05418] in the pre and post –SOX 
periods respectively.  That is, analysts’ actuals became more informative following 
SOX.  It is unclear why analysts’ actuals – with no direct link to SOX – became 
more informative in this period.   
 To control for possible multicollinearity between the interaction terms and 
the components, I estimate separate regressions for both the pre SOX period 
consisting of information for years 2000 to 2002 and the post-SOX period, 
consisting of information for years 2002 to 2004.   While 2002 represents a possible 
overlap in the two periods, this does not affect the results because the coefficient of 
interest is 2002 in the pre-test and 2004 in the post test.  Results presented in Table 
10 panels B and C are qualitiatively similar to the initial results presented in Panel 
A.  In the pre-SOX period (Panel B), the future earnings response coefficient for pro 
forma is largest and has the largest t-stat [0.08121 (t-stat = 6.18)] compared to 
0.02257 (t-stat = 4.21) for GAAP earnings and 0.03165 (t-stat = 3.75) for analysts’ 
actuals.  In the post SOX period, Panel C, the future earnings response coefficient 
for pro forma earnings, while larger than that for GAAP earnings (0.08271 
compared to 0.03406) is not larger than the future earnings response coefficient for 
analysts’ actuals.  Overall these results suggest that the informativeness of pro 
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formas (and GAAP) remained constant between the pre and post-SOX periods while 
the informativeness of analysts’ actuals increased in the post-SOX period.38   
 In terms of the relative value relevance of pro forma earnings (RQ2) this is 
examined in Panels B and C.  In the pre-SOX period, the adjusted R-square for pro 
forma (22.38%) is greater than for both GAAP earnings and analysts’ actuals at 
21.77% and 21.19% respectively.  Using the Biddle et al. (1995) X2 test, the 
difference in adjusted R-squares between pro forma and both GAAP and analysts’ 
actuals, is weakly significant at the 10% level.  However, there is no difference in 
the adjusted R-square between analysts’ actuals and GAAP earnings.  In the post-
SOX period, analysts’ actuals is the most value relevant measure (adjusted R-square 
= 19.20%) compared to 13.08% and 9.97% for both pro forma earnings and GAAP 
earnings respectively.  These results suggest that there has been a change in the 
information environment following the introduction of the Act and represents an 
area for future research.   
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
2.4.7. Results of Sensitivity Tests   
 Several concerns have been raised about whether the motive for managers’ 
disclosure of pro forma is to shield poor performance, for example, converting a 
GAAP loss into a pro forma profit.  I consequently examine GAAP loss firms, 
which may have an incentive to report pro forma earnings that are not value 
relevant.  The result for these GAAP loss firms are reported in Table 11. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
 In the first regression, the coefficient of interest, that of future GAAP 
earnings [0.01729 (t-statistic = 1.47)] is not statistically significant.  This suggests 
                                                 
38 Results from both tests (i.e. the use of a dummy variable and the partitioning of the data set into the 
two periods) are similar.  The future earnings response coefficient for analysts’ actuals is 0.08413 
[Panel C and Panel A (0.02995 + 0.05418)] from both tests.  Coefficients for GAAP and pro formas 
do not significantly differ between the two tests. 
  45
that for loss firms, GAAP earnings (or in this case losses) are not value relevant.  
This is consistent with prior research that demonstrates that profits are more value 
relevant because they are more transitory than are losses (Basu, 1997), and because 
the liquidation option provides a lower boundary for the value of the firm (Hayn, 
1995).39  For analysts’ actual earnings, the coefficient of interest [0.03808 (t-statistic 
= 1.79)] is found to be weakly significant (at the 10% level).  However, the 
coefficient of future pro forma earnings [0.10857 (t-statistic = 3.05)] is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Taken together, these findings call into question the 
argument that managers of loss firms disclose pro forma earnings for strategic 
reasons. 
 I also consider a set of firms whose GAAP earnings are greater than their pro 
forma earnings.  If, as is argued by critics, pro forma is reported to enable the firm to 
meet or exceed earnings targets, then this group of firms – where pro forma is less 
than GAAP – should have the least incentive to disclose pro forma earnings. I expect 
that in this group of firms pro forma will be least informative, if it is not disclosed 
for value relevance reasons.  The results for these firms are presented in Table 12.  
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
The coefficient of future GAAP earnings [0.01808 (t-statistic = 1.87)] is weakly 
significant, at the 10% level.  However, the coefficient of future pro forma earnings 
[0.07105 (t-statistic = 2.91)] is statistically significant at the 1% level.  These results 
counter the argument that pro formas are reported for strategic reasons. 
 Also, prior research documents that in price-earnings regressions, the 
omission of book value may lead to model misspecification (Collins et al., 1997).  
As a result, the price model equation is re-estimated, this time including book value 
of equity at time t.  The results are presented in Table 13. 
 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
                                                 
39 In untabulated results, GAAP earnings are found to be positive and significant for the firms with 
profits. 
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 Similar to the initial contemporaneous price-earnings regression (refer Table 
7), the signs on the earnings measures are positive and statistically significant.  The 
pro forma earnings regression still yields the greatest explanatory power (36.16%) 
compared to 32.92% for the GAAP earnings model and 33.43% for the analysts’ 
actual earnings model.  A comparison of the adjusted R2 shows that the pro forma 
earnings model provides significantly greater explanatory power than both GAAP 
and analysts’ actual earnings.  However, analysts’ actual earnings do not provide 
significant explanatory power over GAAP earnings. 
 Lastly, similar to prior studies I use earnings before extraordinary items 
(EBEI) from Compustat as a proxy for GAAP earnings and re-estimate equation 
(2.4).  Results from this test which are untabulated, indicate that pro forma earnings 
are still more informative than earnings before extraordinary items and that analysts’ 
actuals are more informative than EBEI. 
 
2.4.8. Comparing with other Pro Forma Studies   
 Four pro forma studies are benchmarked to the findings of this study.  Three 
of these: Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Lougee and Marquardt (2004) and Johnson and 
Schwartz (2005) use actual pro forma press releases, while Doyle et al., (2003) uses 
analysts’ earnings as a proxy for pro forma.  Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that pro 
forma earnings are more informative and more permanent than GAAP operating 
earnings.  Market participants also believe pro forma earnings to be more 
representative of core earnings.  These results are generally consistent with the 
findings of this study (i.e., that pro forma earnings are informative beyond GAAP 
and analysts’ actual earnings).  However, as Bradshaw (2003) points out, the 
research design underlying their comparison of I/B/E/S, pro forma and GAAP 
operating earnings suffers from an error-in-variables problem that renders the 
interpretation of results somewhat difficult. The design adopted in this study 
alleviates this concern.  
 Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms with low GAAP earnings 
quality, as measured by the earnings-return correlation and its related R2, are more 
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likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms.  They also find significantly 
greater relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings over 
GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings quality is low and when strategic 
considerations are absent. Lastly, pro forma earnings also have significant predictive 
ability for future operating performance and returns.  Their findings are also 
generally consistent with the findings of this study.  However, as Berger (2005) 
notes, Lougee and Marquardt’s evidence provides no clear support for either side of 
the debate.  This is largely due to the low power of the future profitability and future 
returns tests.  My study however uses a larger sample size and also uses two models 
(returns and price) in the assessment of informativeness and value relevance.  While 
not reported, I also find that for the period of this study (which differs from their 
study), that when GAAP earnings are of higher quality, as evidenced by the earnings 
returns relation, pro forma firms are still more informative than GAAP and analysts’ 
actual earnings.  This finding also holds for firms with low quality GAAP earnings 
as evidenced by the earnings returns regression. 
 Johnson and Schwartz (2005) find that pro forma firms may be priced higher 
than non-pro forma firms, but that this overpricing is not related to the pro forma 
earnings numbers.  They also find no evidence of a stock return premium for pro 
forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date.  Johnson and Schwartz do 
not find pro forma to be incrementally informative to GAAP operating earnings, a 
finding contrary to the current study.  However, a replication of Johnson and 
Schwartz’s results by Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that their results are sensitive to 
the time period and the sample used.  Berger (2005) also notes that Johnson and 
Schwartz’s findings are based on the rejection of the null hypothesis, and 
interpreting a failure to reject the null when sample size is small is fraught with 
problems.  Moreover, the between-samples design adopted by Johnson and Schwartz 
is problematic as the pro forma firms differ from non-pro forma firms in areas such 
as risk, growth, earnings informativeness and sign of GAAP earnings surprise.  In 
this study, using a within subjects design, the informativenss of pro forma earnings 
is examined controlling for firm characteristics.  Also, the use of Collins et al.’s 
  48
(1994) model provides information on the informativeness of pro forma earnings, 
GAAP earnings and analysts’ earnings. 
2.4.9. Implications of Results 
Implications of this study have relevance to management, to regulatory 
bodies including the SEC, and lastly to academics.  Contrary to wide spread belief in 
the business press, it appears that overall (in aggregate across firms), managers 
provide voluntary disclosures of pro formas for informative reasons and not to 
mislead investors.  That pro formas are informative may be interpreted as managers 
disclosing information to inform consistent with their better understanding of the 
firm’s operations. Even though analysts are independent, it does not appear that they 
have complete information about a firm’s recurring earnings potential. 
Prior to the enactment of the SOX Act, there were calls for a total prohibition 
of pro formas as the overwhelming belief was that they are reported to influence and 
possibly mislead investors.  The results of this study are consistent with pro formas 
being provided for value relevant reasons.  The SEC appears to have made the 
correct decision in not prohibiting the reporting of pro formas.   
For academics, this study furthers research in voluntary disclosure and pro 
forma earnings.   It uses an alternative econometric approach, consistent with 
Feltham-Ohson to examine value relevance. These results on future returns suggest 
that pro forma earnings provides a better representation of the clean surplus 
relationship than does GAAP earnings or analysts’ actuals. It addresses some of the 
limitations of prior studies on the value relevance of pro formas and confirms some 
of the findings of earlier studies.  The study also presents an avenue for further 
research – why have analysts actuals become more value relevant in the post SOX 
period, and why are they now more informative than pro froma earnings?  
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2.5. CONCLUSION 
 This study uses the Collins et al. (1994) returns model in the examination of 
the value relevance of three earnings measures – GAAP, analysts’ actual and pro 
forma earnings.  This model assesses the informativeness of the earnings measures 
as a function of the markets’ ability to anticipate future earnings.  The empirical 
evidence is that future GAAP, future analysts’ actual and future pro forma earnings 
are all impounded in current stock price.  Across a series of models, pro forma 
earnings are more value relevant than are analysts’ actuals which in turn are more 
value relevant than are GAAP earnings.  These findings are robust to alternative 
model specifications (e.g., using price as the dependent variable).  The findings also 
hold where the earnings measure is used to predict future cash flows, or for those 
firms that report a GAAP loss and a pro forma profit or where their GAAP earnings 
exceed their pro formas.  This provides additional evidence that pro forma earnings 
are used for value relevance reasons and not for strategic reasons.   
 Note however that the findings in this paper are based on the assumption that 
the markets are efficient (a maintained assumption throughout the literature).  If 
stocks are mispriced, then the results are open to alternative interpretations.   
 Interestingly, these results hold in the post-SOX period as future pro forma 
earnings are informative although not as value relevant as analysts’ actuals.  Future 
studies can adopt a similar approach and perhaps using a longer time span to 
examine the value relevance of pro forma earnings in the post-SOX period. 
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Table 1- Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: S&P 500 Firms Reporting Pro Forma for the Period 2000-2004 
Year Number Percent 
2000 367 73% 
2001 380 76% 
2002 331 66% 
2003 264 53% 
2004 266 53% 
Total observations 1,608  
Panel B: Sample Pro Forma Firms by Industry 
Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Basic Materials 26 (7%) 26 (7%) 22 (7%) 14 (5%) 14 (5%) 102 (6%) 
Services 51 (14%) 54 (14%) 49 (15%) 42 (16%) 38 (14%) 
234 
(15%) 
Health Care 38 (10%) 40 (11%) 39 (12%) 30 (11%) 37 (14%) 
184 
(11%) 
Technology 80 (22%) 83 (22%) 69 (21%) 47 (18%) 52 (20%) 
331 
(21%) 
Consumer 
Goods 24 (7%) 25 (6%) 23 (7%) 19 (7%) 18 (7%) 109 (7%) 
Industrial 
Goods 
49 
(13%) 49 (13%) 42 (12%) 34 (13%) 21 (8%) 
195 
(12%) 
Utilities 24 (7%) 26 (7%) 29 (9%) 24 (9%) 28 (10%) 131 (8%) 
Energy 19 (5%) 19 (5%) 16 (5%) 16 (6%) 19 (7%) 89 (6%) 
Financial 56 (15%) 58 (15%) 42 (12%) 38 (15%) 39 (15%) 
233 
(14%) 
Total 367 380 331 264 266 1,608 
Panel C: Calculation of Pro Forma Earnings 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Per share Difference  
(Pro Forma – GAAP)      
Average $0.26 $0.80 $1.29 $0.32 $0.45 
25th percentile $0.00 $0.08 $0.05 $(0.04) $(0.06)
Median $0.03 $0.34 $0.34 $0.13 $0.09 
75th percentile $0.37 $0.93 $1.19 $0.48 $0.48 
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Table 2- Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Process 
1. Total number of firm year observations 1,608 
2. Less observations lacking 3 years of consecutive data 680 
3. Less observations with missing returns data from CRSP 38 
4.  Less observations with missing analysts’ earnings data 22 
5. Less observations with missing COMPUSTAT data 311 
6. Total observations used in study 557 
Panel B: Sample Pro Forma Firms by Industry 
Industry 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Basic Materials 15 (6%) 8 (5%) 7 (5%) 30 (5%) 
Services 33 (14%) 26 (16%) 18 (12%) 77 (14%) 
Health Care 30 (13%) 23 (14%) 24 (16%) 77 (14%) 
Technology 50 (21%) 33 (20%) 33 (21%) 116 (21%) 
Consumer Goods 19 (8%) 9 (6%) 5 (3%) 33 (6%) 
Industrial Goods 31 (13%) 24 (15%) 13 (8%) 68 (12%) 
Utilities 20 (8%) 14 (9%) 19 (12%) 53 (9%) 
Energy 12 (5%) 6 (3%) 11 (7%) 29 (5%) 
Financial 30 (12%) 19 (12%) 25 (16%) 74 (13%) 
Total 240 162 155 557 
Panel C: Calculation of Pro Forma Earnings 
Per share Difference 
(Pro Forma – GAAP) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
      
Average $0.29 $0.92 $1.21 $0.40 $0.32 
25th percentile $0.00 $0.08 $0.1 $(0.04) $(0.07) 
Median $0.05 $0.33 $0.38 $0.17 $0.07 
75th percentile $0.44 $0.97 $1.28 $0.60 $0.38 
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TABLE 3 
 
Panel A: Sample Summary Statistics for Main Variables 
Descriptive Statistics (557 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2004) 
Variable Mean Median  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Rt 0.08391 0.05150 0.45646 -0.93325 3.29663 
Rt+1 0.08372 0.03776 0.47447 -0.85207 3.29663 
GPt-1 1.07339 1.29 3.72095 -46.30 39.0 
GPt 0.88948 1.18 3.26868 -51.40 7.35 
GPt+1 1.2004 1.43 3.37851 -41.07 14.30 
AEt-1 1.00495 1.22 3.13297 -51.40 8.37 
AEt 0.53178 0.85 2.40828 -20.60 7.01 
AEt+1 0.95714 1.10 2.56408 -25.43 14.18 
PFt-1 1.82646 1.61 1.63716 -8.46 9.310 
PFt 1.75127 1.59 1.75343 -8.58 7.20 
PFt+1 1.94110 1.75 2.01603 -18.10 11.57 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Summary Statistics for Other Dependent and Control Variables 
Descriptive Statistics (557 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2004) 
Price 34.52 33.17 18.00 4.73 107.84 
CFOt+1 0.09736 0.08545 0.12909 -1.07369 0.91455 
growth 1.61812 1.60602 0.32764 1.15121 3.61912 
loss 0.18133 0 0.38564 0. 1 
current 0.47936 0 0.5000 0 1 
Var 7.14508 4.20800 8.57146 0.22900 81.43400 
size 12.30528 10.37546 4.04409 6.97165 23.23134 
 
The sample consists of 557 firm year observations that have reported pro forma earnings over the 
period 2000 – 2004.  R, obtained from CRSP, represent the returns computed three months after the 
firms’ press release date for years t and year t+1 respectively.  GP is obtained from the earnings press 
releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less than 5%), it is obtained from Compustat 
(data item # A169).   AE is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.  PF is 
obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites.  Price is obtained 
from CRSP and represents the firms’ closing price three months after the press release date.  CFO is 
Compustat data item # A308. Growth is the ratio of market value of equity (Compustat data items 
#25*#199) to book value of equity (Compustat data item #216).  Loss is proxied by a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if next year’s GAAP earnings are negative and 0 otherwise.  Current is proxied by a 
dummy variable coded one for negative contemporaneous return and zero otherwise. Var is  
calculated by dividing the absolute standard deviation of a company’s percentage change in EPS over 
20 quarters by the company’s average four quarter percentage for 20 quarters. Size is the natural log 
of the market value of equity (Compustat data items #25*#199).   
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TABLE 4 
Panel B: Pairwise Pearson (Spearman) Correlations above (below) the Diagonal of the Main Variables 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0, n=557 
 Rt Rt+1 GPt-1 GPt GPt+1 AEt-1 AEt AEt+1 PFt-1 PFt PFt+1 
Rt  -0.1588 (0.0001) 
-0.0561 
(0.1722) 
0.1731 
(<0.0001) 
0.1808 
(<0.0001) 
-0.0028 
(0.9464) 
0.1239 
(0.0025) 
0.2385 
(<0.0001) 
0.0052 
(0.8991) 
0.0712 
(0.0833) 
0.2087 
(<0.0001) 
Rt+1 -0.1749 
(<0.0001)  
-0.1184 
(0.0039) 
0.02345 
(0.5687) 
0.1605 
(<0.0001) 
-0.1935 
(<0.0001) 
-0.0120 
(0.7714) 
0.0665 
(0.1058) 
-0.1313 
(0.0014) 
0.04206 
(0.3066) 
0.0664 
(<0.0001) 
GPt-1 0.0054 
(0.8959) 
-0.1148 
(0.0051)  
0.2140 
(<0.0001) 
0.2123 
(<0.0001) 
0.7291 
(<0.0001) 
0.2672 
(<0.0001) 
0.2160 
(<0.0001) 
0.4578 
(<0.0001) 
0.3029 
(<0.0001) 
0.2821 
(<0.0001) 
GPt 0.2192 
(<0.0001) 
0.0966 
(0.0187) 
0.4567 
(<0.0001)  
0.3467 
(<0.0001) 
0.2948 
(<0.0001) 
0.7224 
(<0.0001) 
0.4646 
(<0.0001) 
0.3516 
(<0.0001) 
0.5116 
(<0.0001) 
0.4273 
(<0.0001) 
GPt+1 0.2300 
(<0.0001) 
0.2343 
(<0.0001) 
0.4254 
(<0.0001) 
0.6124 
(<0.0001)  
0.2215 
(<0.0001) 
0.5218 
(<0.0001) 
0.7658 
(<0.0001) 
0.3660 
(<0.0001) 
0.5737 
(<0.0001) 
0.7139 
(<0.0001) 
AEt-1 0.0336 
(0.4148) 
-0.1644 
(<0.0001) 
0.8619 
(<0.0001) 
0.4921 
(<0.0001) 
0.4092 
(<0.0001)  
0.3421 
(<0.0001) 
0.2495 
(<0.0001) 
0.5101 
(<0.0001) 
0.3591 
(<0.0001) 
0.3337 
(<0.0001) 
AEt 0.1461 
(0.0004) 
0.0507 
(0.2173) 
0.4404 
(<0.0001) 
0.7781 
(<0.0001) 
0.6034 
(<0.0001) 
0.4814 
(<0.0001)  
0.6958 
(<0.0001) 
0.3741 
(<0.0001) 
0.6476 
(<0.0001) 
0.5604 
(<0.0001) 
AEt+1 0.2983 
(<0.0001) 
0.1567 
(0.0001) 
0.4194 
(<0.0001) 
0.6425 
(<0.0001) 
0.8167 
(<0.0001) 
0.4470 
(<0.0001) 
0.7474 
(<0.0001)  
0.3777 
(<0.0001) 
0.6301 
(<0.0001) 
0.7716 
(<0.0001) 
PFt-1 0.0831 
(0.0431) 
-0.0741 
(0.0715) 
0.7813 
(<0.0001) 
0.5546 
(<0.0001) 
0.5113 
(<0.0001) 
0.7748 
(<0.0001) 
0.4985 
(<0.0001) 
0.4952 
(<0.0001)  
0.6402 
(<0.0001) 
0.6010 
(<0.0001) 
PFt 0.1284 
(0.0017) 
0.0914 
(0.0261) 
0.5696 
(<0.0001) 
0.7636 
(<0.0001) 
0.6817 
(<0.0001) 
0.5910 
(<0.0001) 
0.7306 
(<0.0001) 
0.6734 
(<0.0001) 
0.7213 
(<0.0001)  
0.7801 
(<0.0001) 
PFt+1 0.2338 
(<0.0001) 
0.1253 
(0.0022) 
0.5420 
(<0.0001) 
0.6631 
(<0.0001) 
0.7914 
(<0.0001) 
0.5308 
(<0.0001) 
0.6357 
(<0.0001) 
0.7735 
(<0.0001) 
0.6735 
(<0.0001) 
0.8358 
(<0.0001)  
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TABLE 5 
Relative Informativeness Tests using Returns 
(
tttttt URbbbbR ++Ε+Ε+Ε+= ++− 1312110α ) 
[Standardized estimate] 
(n=557) 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
GAAP Earnings  Analyst’s Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 0.07251[0] (3.59)*** 
0.06644[0] 
(3.24)*** 
0.07303[0] 
(2.56)** 
Ei,t-1 - -0.01782[-0.1453] (-3.45)*** 
-0.01455[-0.0999] 
(-2.29)** 
-0.06261[-0.22457] 
(-4.18)*** 
Ei,t + 0.01671[0.1197] (2.68)*** 
-0.01223[-0.0646] 
(-1.12) 
-0.03826[-0.1470] 
(-2.20)** 
Ei,t+1 + 0.02847[0.2107] (4.67)*** 
0.05861[0.3292] 
(5.85)*** 
0.10866[0.4799] 
(7.42)*** 
Rt+1 - -0.22096[-0.2297] (-5.57)*** 
-0.20893[-0.2172] 
(-5.26)*** 
-0.22335[-0.2322] 
(-5.68)*** 
Adj. R2  0.1015 0.1038 0.1274 
Akaike Information 
Criterion  -928.2886 -929.7247 -944.5909 
  (0.245)  
  (0.000) 
Biddle et al X2 test 
(p value) 
 (0.000) 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
E i,t-1, E i,t and E i,t+1 represent each of the earnings measures at times t-1, t and t+1. 
 
Rt and Rt+1 , obtained from CRSP, represent the returns computed three months after the firms’ press 
release date for years t and year t+1 respectively.  Returns computed one month after the press 
release date yields identical results. 
 
PF is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%), it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169).   
 
AE is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
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TABLE 6 
Relative Informativeness Tests using Returns and Controlling for Firm Characteristics 
ttttt
tttttt
Usizebarbcurrentblossb
growthbRbbbbR
++++
+++Ε+Ε+Ε+= ++−
8765
41312110
v
α  
[Standardized Estimate] 
(n=557) 
Variables Predicte
d sign 
GAAP Earnings  Analyst’s Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 0.55601[0] (8.58)*** 
0.55757[0] 
(8.69)*** 
0.57184[0] 
(8.87)*** 
Ei,t-1 - 
-0.01116[-0.0909] 
(-2.54)** 
-0.01001[-0.0687] 
(-1.87)* 
-0.02491[-0.0893]
(-1.93)* 
Ei,t + 
0.00736[0.0527] 
(1.40) 
-0.01314[-0.0693] 
(-1.44) 
-0.04971[-0.1920]
(-3.41)*** 
Ei,t+1 + 
0.00627[0.0464] 
(1.08) 
0.02508[0.1409] 
(2.81)*** 
0.06592[0.2911]
(5.20)*** 
Rt+1 - 
-0.24571[-0.2554] 
(-6.18)*** 
-0.24819[-0.2580] 
(-6.24)*** 
-0.24796[-0.2578]
(-6.33)*** 
growth + -0.02574[-0.0184] (-0.51) 
-0.03722[-0.0266] 
(-0.74) 
-0.04875[-0.0349]
(-0.96) 
loss - -0.11605[-0.0981] (-2.27)** 
-0.10749[-0.0908] 
(-2.21)** 
-0.09908[-0.0837]
(-2.17)** 
current - -0.45185[-0.4950] (-13.86)*** 
-0.45056[-0.4936] 
(-13.80)*** 
-0.44288[-0.4852]
(-13.78)*** 
var 
 - 
-0.00156[-0.0292] 
(-0.87) 
-0.00158[-0.0296] 
(-0.89) 
-0.00134[-0.0252]
(-0.77) 
size + -0.01570[-0.1391] (-3.42)*** 
-0.01594[-0.1412] 
(-3.49)*** 
-0.01630[-0.1444]
(-3.60)*** 
Adj. R2  0.3820 0.3846 0.4033 
AIC  -1134.7574 -1136.8480 -1153.8336 
 (0.1063)  
  (0.000) BBW X
2 test 
(p value)  (0.000) 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
E i,t-1, E i,t and E i,t+1 represent each of the earnings measures at times t-1, t and t+1. 
 
Rt and Rt+1 , obtained from CRSP, represent the returns computed three months after the firms’ press 
release date for years t and year t+1 respectively.  Returns computed one month after the press 
release date yields identical results.   
 
Pro forma earnings is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web 
sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169).   
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Table 6 continued          
 
Analysts’ actual earnings is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
 
growth represents the ratio of market value of equity (Compustat data items #25*#199) to book value 
of equity (Compustat data item #216). 
 
loss is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if next year’s earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. 
 
current represents a dummy variable coded 1 for negative contemporaneous returns and 0 otherwise. 
 
Var is a measure of earnings predictability.  This is a relative measure of earnings dispersion 
calculated by dividing the absolute standard deviation of a company’s percentage change in EPS over 
20 quarters by the company’s average four quarter percentage for 20 quarters. 
 
size represents the natural log of market value (Compustat data items #25*#199) 
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TABLE 7 
Relative Value Relevance Tests using Price 
( ttt UEbP ++= 0α ) 
n=1486 
Variables Predicted sign GAAP Earnings 
Analysts’ Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 32.25704 (50.48)*** 
31.61396 
(48.84)*** 
25.46867 
(32.51)*** 
Ei,t + 
1.98258 
(11.57)*** 
3.20727 
(12.28)*** 
4.75487 
(16.64)*** 
Adj. R2  0.1518 0.1679 0.2711 
AIC  4175.0559 4160.8195 4062.4064 
 (0.000)  
  (0.000) BBW Х
2 test 
(p-value) 
 (0.000) 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
Note: In this test, the sample size is 1486 firm year observations because the criterion that each firm 
have pro forma earnings for three consecutive years is dropped.  However, there are still missing 
price observations from the CRSP database. 
 
 
Ei represents each of the earnings measures at time t. 
 
The dependent variable represents price, three months after the firm’s fiscal year end.  This is 
obtained from the CRSP database.  Price data obtained from Compustat yields identical results. 
 
Pro forma earnings is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web 
sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169).   
 
Analysts’ actual earnings is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
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TABLE 8 
Relative Value Relevance Tests using Price and Controlling for Lagged Earnings 
( tttt UEbEbP +++= − 110α ) 
n=1486 
Variables Predicted sign GAAP 
Earnings  
Analyst’s 
Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 31.28451 (48.58)*** 
30.60047 
(49.41)*** 
23.35816 
(27.83)*** 
Ei,t-1 - 
1.11301 
(6.10)*** 
1.87176 
(6.63)*** 
2.74984 
(6.11)*** 
Ei,t + 
1.67466 
(9.58)*** 
2.52261 
(9.67)*** 
3.16833 
(8.31)*** 
Adj. R2  0.1913 0.2602 .3052 
AIC  4140.6542 4074.4475 4027.8697 
 (0.0479)  
  (0.1014) BBW Х
2 test 
(p-value) 
 (0.000) 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Note: In this test, the sample size is 1486 firm year observations because the criterion that each firm 
have pro forma earnings for three consecutive years is dropped.  However, there are still missing 
price observations from the CRSP database. 
 
 
Ei represents each of the earnings measures at times t-1 and t. 
 
The dependent variable represents price, three months after the firm’s fiscal year end.  This is 
obtained from the CRSP database.  Price data obtained from Compustat yields identical results. 
 
Pro forma earnings is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web 
sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169).   
 
Analysts’ actual earnings is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
  67
 
TABLE 9 
Results of Cash flow Prediction Tests using Earnings Measures 
tttt UEbEbCFO +++= −+ 1101 α  
n=1486 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
GAAP 
Earnings  
Analyst’s Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 0.08796 (15.48)*** 
0.08617 
(15.74)*** 
0.04755 
(6.06)*** 
E i,t-1 - 
0.00263 
(1.78)* 
0.00262 
(1.49) 
0.00165 
(0.41) 
E i,t + 
0.00739 
(4.39)*** 
0.01610 
(7.05)*** 
0.02672 
(7.16)*** 
Adj. R2  0.0439 0.1037 0.1387 
AIC  -2302.6596 -2338.6606 -2360.8096 
 (0.000)  
  (0.000) BBW Х
2 test 
(p-value) 
 (0.000) 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
Note: In this test, the sample size is 1486 firm year observations because the criterion that each firm 
have pro forma earnings for three consecutive years is dropped.  However, there are still missing 
price observations from the CRSP database. 
 
CFO is Compustat data item # A308. 
 
Ei represents each of the earnings measures at times t-1 and t. 
 
Pro forma earnings is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web 
sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169).    
 
Analysts’ actual earnings is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
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TABLE 10 
Panel A 
Informativeness Tests using Returns and Controlling for the Impact of SOX 
tttt
tttttt
URPostbEPostbEPostb
EPostbPostbRbbbbR
+++
++++Ε+Ε+Ε+=
++
−++−
)*()*()*(
)*(
18176
1541312110α  
n=557 
Variables Predicted sign GAAP 
Earnings  
Analyst’s 
Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? -0.09068 (-4.77)*** 
-0.8406 
(-4.55)*** 
-0.14274 
(-5.08)*** 
Et-1 - 
0.00333 
(0.66) 
0.00100 
(0.19) 
-0.00842 
(-0.63) 
Et + 
0.01105 
(2.11)** 
0.01286 
(1.35) 
-0.03400 
(-2.38)** 
Et+1 + 
0.03218 
(4.48)*** 
0.02995 
(3.04)*** 
0.08836 
(7.07)*** 
Rt+1 - 
-0.25598 
(-7.65)*** 
-0.24049 
(-7.30)*** 
-0.24728 
(-7.46)*** 
Post ? 0.63355 (15.63)*** 
0.55836 
(14.84)*** 
0.73640 
(14.78)*** 
(Post* Et-1) - 
-0.02090 
(-2.32)** 
-0.04759 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.06041 
(-1.83)* 
(Post* Et) + 
-0.07694 
(-4.64)*** 
-0.13003 
(-5.765)*** 
-0.06706 
(-2.09)** 
(Post* Et+1) + 
-0.01128 
(-1.15) 
0.05418 
(3.04)*** 
-0.0097514 
(-0.17) 
(Post* Rt+1) ? 
0.00414 
(4.13)*** 
0.00349 
(3.56)*** 
0.00359 
(3.52)*** 
Adj. R2  0.4307 0.4576 0.4478 
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TABLE 10 Continued 
Panel B 
Relative Informativeness Tests using Returns in the Pre-SOX Period 
tttttt URbbbbR ++Ε+Ε+Ε+= ++− 1312110α  
N=447 
Variables Predicted sign GAAP Earnings Analyst’s 
Actual Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? -0.08725 (-5.51)*** 
-0.08324 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.14227 
(-6.20)*** 
Et-1 - 
-0.00235 
(-0.55) 
-0.00025 
(-0.05) 
-0.01049 
(-0.92) 
Et + 
0.01475 
(3.61)*** 
0.01223 
(1.51) 
-0.02328 
(-1.93)* 
Et+1 + 
0.02257 
(4.21)*** 
0.03165 
(3.75)*** 
0.08121 
(6.18)*** 
Rt+1 - 
-0.24591 
(-9.03)*** 
-0.23595 
(-8.62)*** 
-0.24313 
(-8.93)*** 
Adj. R2  0.2177 0.2119 0.2238 
AIC  -1088.72 -1085.39 -1092.22 
 (0.305)  
  (0.081) BBW Х
2 test 
(p-value) 
 (0.092) 
Panel C 
Relative Informativeness Tests using Returns in the Post-SOX Period  
N=110 
Variables Predicted sign GAAP Earnings Analyst’s 
Actual Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 0.54375 (11.80)*** 
0.47430 
(11.56)*** 
0.59382 
(11.22)*** 
Et-1 - 
-0.02019 
(-2.05)* 
-0.04659 
(-2.70)** 
-0.06858 
(-1.77)* 
Et + 
0.08054 
(3.68)*** 
0.11717 
(4.28)** 
-0.09603 
(-2.16)** 
Et+1 + 
0.03406 
(3.00)** 
0.08413 
(4.54)*** 
0.08271 
(3.72)*** 
Rt+1 - 
0.12612 
(1.02) 
0.10901 
(0.94) 
0.1152 
(0.92) 
Adj. R2  0.0997 0.1920 0.1308 
AIC  -246.81 -263.58 -252.26 
 (0.000)  
  (0.000) BBW Х
2 test 
(p-value) 
 (0.000) 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
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Table 10 Continued  
 
Note:  Panel A represents a specification that uses a dummy variable Post representing the adoption 
of SOX (years before the adoption of SOX i.e. 2000-2002 are coded as 0 and the post adoption years, 
2003-2004 are coded as 1).  Panels B and C on the other hand represent separate regressions with the 
data split into pre- and post SOX periods i.e. 2000, 2001, and 2002 represent the pre- SOX period and 
2002, 2003 and 2004 represent the post- SOX period.  
 
Rt and Rt+1 , obtained from CRSP, represent the returns computed three months after the firms’ press 
release date for years t and year t+1 respectively.  Returns computed one month after the press 
release date yields identical results.   
 
Pro forma earnings is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web 
sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169). 
 
Analysts’ actual earnings is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
 
Et-1, Et and Et+1 represent each of the earnings measures at times t-1, t and t+1. 
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TABLE 11 
Relative Informativeness Tests using Returns and Controlling for GAAP Loss 
Firms 
( tttttt URbbbbR ++Ε+Ε+Ε+= ++− 1312110α ) 
(n=115) 
Variables Predicted sign GAAP Earnings 
Analyst’s Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 0.08856[0] (1.27) 
0.06750[0] 
(0.93) 
0.05180[0] 
(0.75) 
Et-1 - 
-0.01283[-0.10108]
(-1.07) 
-0.01120[-0.09758] 
(-1.03) 
-0.07896[-0.23953]
(-2.28)** 
Et + 
0.01671[0.13727]
(2.68)*** 
0.00367[0.01950] 
(0.16) 
-0.06519[-0.20761]
(-1.61) 
Et+1 + 
0.01729[0.16101]
(1.47) 
0.03808[0.21448] 
(1.79)* 
0.10857[0.42361]
(3.05)*** 
Rt+1 - 
-0.23857[-0.24934]
(-2.63)*** 
-0.23909[-0.24990] 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.23136[0.24181]
(-2.63)*** 
Adj. R2  0.0569 0.0580 0.0925 
AIC  -92.9402 -95.0489 -97.3582 
 (0.432)  
  (0.000) 
BBW Х2 
test 
(p-value)  (0.000) 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
Note: In this test, the sample size is 115 firm year observations which is the number of firms with 
GAAP losses and pro forma profits in the same year.  
 
Et-1, Et and Et+1 represent each of the earnings measures at times t-1, t and t+1. 
 
Rt and Rt+1 , obtained from CRSP, represent the returns computed three months after the firms’ press 
release date for years t and year t+1 respectively.  Returns computed one month after the press 
release date yields identical results.   
 
PF is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169). 
 
AE is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
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TABLE 12 
Relative Informativeness Tests using Returns and Controlling for Firms  
where GAAP Earnings Exceeds Pro Forma Earnings 
( tttttt URbbbbR ++Ε+Ε+Ε+= ++− 1312110α ) 
(n=97) 
Variables Predicted sign 
 
GAAP Earnings  
Analyst’s Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 0.15701[0] (2.38)** 
0.23774[0] 
(0.93) 
0.23062[0] 
(3.93)*** 
Ei,t-1 - 
-0.02948[-0.28943] 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.05661[-0.28693] 
(-2.34)** 
-0.13213[-0.59200]
(-3.67)** 
E i,t + 
0.02643[0.13438] 
(1.11) 
0.00179[0.01023] 
(0.07) 
-0.05155[0.26348]
(-1.41) 
E i,t+1 + 
0.01808[0.23556] 
(1.87)* 
0.03975[0.34624]
(2.25)** 
0.07105[0.48158]
(2.91)*** 
Rt+1 - 
-0.25053[-0.22175] 
(-2.19)** 
-0.23911[-0.21164] 
(-2.05)** 
-0.36364[-0.32187]
(-3.05)*** 
Adj. R2  0.1074 0.0715 0.1621 
AIC  -167.8538 -166.0228 -173.9850 
 (0.000)  
  (0.000) 
BBW Х2 
test 
(p-value)  (0.000) 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
Note: In this test, the sample size is 97 firm year observations which is the number of firms where 
GAAP exceeds pro formas in the same year.  
 
Et-1, Et and Et+1 represent each of the earnings measures at times t-1, t and t+1. 
 
Rt and Rt+1 , obtained from CRSP, represent the returns computed three months after the firms’ press 
release date for years t and year t+1 respectively.  Returns computed one month after the press 
release date yields identical results.   
 
PF is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169).   
 
AE is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
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TABLE 13 
Relative Value Relevance  Tests using Price and Controlling for Book Value 
( tttt UEbBVbP +++= 10α ) 
n=1486 
Variables Predicted sign GAAP Earnings 
Analyst’s Actual 
Earnings 
Pro Forma 
Earnings 
Intercept ? 22.2738 (24.25)*** 
22.0743 
(24.19)*** 
20.1829 
(22.33)*** 
BV + 0.79304 (13.94)*** 
0.77808 
(13.65)*** 
0.6209 
(10.11)*** 
Ei,t + 
1.2010 
(7.42)*** 
1.9532 
(7.82)*** 
3.0697 
(9.76)*** 
Adj. R2  0.3292 0.3343 0.3616 
AIC  3985.6244 3979.9461 3948.8969 
 (0.061)  
  (0.000) BBW Х
2 test 
(p-value) 
 (0.000) 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level 
 
Note: In this test the sample size is 1486 firm year observations because the criterion that each firm 
have pro forma earnings for three consecutive years is dropped.  However, there are still missing 
price observations from the CRSP database. 
 
Et represents each of the earnings measures at time t. 
 
The dependent variable represents price, three months after the firm’s fiscal year end.  This is 
obtained from the CRSP database.  Price data obtained from Compustat yields identical results. 
 
Pro forma earnings is obtained from the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web 
sites.   
 
GAAP is obtained from the earnings press releases and in instances where this is not disclosed (less 
than 5%) it is obtained from Compustat (data item # A169).   
 
Analysts’ actual earnings is obtained from I/B/E/S database defined as analysts’ actual earnings.   
 
BV is shareholders equity obtained from Compustat (data item #216). 
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Appendix A 
Review of Value Relevance of Pro Forma Literature 
 
Panel A: Research using Proxies for Pro Forma Earnings 
 
No. Study Authors Date of Data 
Used 
Source of 
Data Used 
Pro Forma Proxy Analysts’ Actual 
Proxy/operating 
income 
GAAP Earnings (If used) Findings 
1. Bradshaw and 
Sloan (2002) 
1986 –  1997 I/B/E/S  and 
Compustat 
I/B/E/S actual 
earnings 
- EBEI – Earnings before 
extraordinary items from 
COMPUSTAT 
Street forecast errors are more 
highly associated with stock 
returns than with GAAP forecast 
errors 
2. Brown and 
Sivakumar 
(2003) 
1989 – 1997 
[1149 firm year 
observations] 
I/B/E/S and 
Compustat 
Operating income 
by I/B/E/S 
OPINC – Operating 
income 
[COMPUSTAT 
#Q177] 
EBED – Earnings from 
Continuing operations 
[COMPUSTAT #Q19] 
 
Pro forma earnings are more value-
relevant than a measure of 
operating earnings derived from 
firm’s financial statements 
3. Doyle et al. 
(2003) 
1988-1999 
[143,462 firm-
quarter 
observations] 
Compustat, 
CRSP, 
I/B/E/S 
I/B/E/S actual 
earnings 
Basic or diluted EPS 
per share before 
special items, 
extraordinary items 
and discounted 
operations 
[COMPUSTAT #177 
matched to I/B/E/S 
definition]   
Basic or diluted income per 
share before special items 
and discounted operations 
(matched to I/B/E/S 
definition) 
Expenses excluded in the 
determination of I/B/E/S earnings 
are far from unimportant. Higher 
levels of exclusions lead to 
predictably lower future cash 
flows.  Also, investors do not fully 
appreciate the lower cash flow 
implications at the time of the 
earnings announcement. 
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Panel B: Experimental Research and Research using Actual Pro Forma Earnings 
 
No. Study Authors Date of Data 
Used 
Source of 
Data Used 
Pro Forma Proxy Analysts’ Actual 
Proxy 
GAAP Earnings (If 
used) 
Findings 
1. Bhattacharya et 
al. (2003) 
1998 – 2000 
[1,149 press 
releases; 596 
firms] 
Earnings 
press 
release, 
Compustat, 
CRSP, and 
Compustat 
Actual pro forma 
earnings 
I/B/E/S actual 
earnings  
GAAP Operating 
Income 
Pro forma earnings are more 
informative and more permanent than 
GAAP operating earnings.  Market 
participants also believe pro forma 
earnings to be more representative of 
core earnings. 
2. Lougee and 
Marquardt 
(2004) 
 
1997-1999 
[249 firms] 
Earnings 
press release 
Actual pro forma 
earnings 
- GAAP Operating 
Earnings 
Firms with low GAAP earnings quality, 
as measured by the earnings-return 
correlation and its related R2 are more 
likely to disclose pro forma earnings 
than other firms.  Also, there is 
significantly greater relative and 
incremental information content of pro 
forma earnings over GAAP earnings 
when GAAP earnings quality is low 
and when strategic considerations are 
absent. Pro forma earnings also have 
significant predictive ability for future 
operating performance and returns. 
3. Bowen, et al. 
(2005)  
2001-2002 
[783 earnings 
press releases; 
196 firms] 
Earnings 
press release 
Actual pro forma 
earnings 
- GAAP earnings or 
other recognized above 
line GAAP earnings 
number 
Firms with less value-relevant earnings 
place greater emphasis on pro forma 
earnings.  Firms reporting pro forma 
profits but GAAP losses place more 
(less) emphasis on pro forma (GAAP) 
earnings to portray a more favourable 
story. 
4. Frederickson and 
Miller (2004) 
Experiment 
consisting of 
MBA students 
and analysts 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Nonprofessional investors who see an 
earnings announcement that contains 
both pro forma and GAAP disclosures 
assess a higher stock price than do 
nonprofessionals who see an earnings 
announcement that contains only 
GAAP disclosures, whereas analysts’ 
stock price judgments are not affected.  
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No. Study Authors Date of Data 
Used 
Source of 
Data Used 
Pro Forma Proxy Analysts’ Actual 
Proxy 
GAAP Earnings (If 
used) 
Findings 
5.  Johnson and 
Schwartz (2005) 
June – August 
2000 
[433 firms] 
Earnings 
Press 
Releases, 
Compustat  
Actual pro forma 
earnings 
Zacks actual EPS GAAP earnings from 
press releases 
 
GAAP operating 
income from 
Compustat 
Pro forma firms may be priced higher 
than non-pro forma firms but this 
overpricing is not related to the pro 
forma earnings numbers.  Also no 
evidence of a stock return premium for 
pro forma firms at the quarterly 
earnings announcement date.  
6. Entwistle et al. 
(2005) 
2001 
[S&P 500 firms; 
380 firms] 
 
Earnings 
press 
releases, 
Compustat, 
CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S 
Actual pro forma 
earnings 
I/B/E/S actual 
earnings 
GAAP net income from 
press release 
There are distinct differences between 
Canadian and U.S. managers.  Our 
evidence suggests that in both countries 
pro forma earnings is used by some 
corporations to affect users' perceptions 
of firm performance.  
7. Entwistle et al. 
(2006) 
2001 – 2003 
[S&P 500 firms; 
1608 firms] 
Earnings 
press 
releases, 
Compustat, 
CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S 
Actual pro forma 
earnings 
- GAAP net income from 
press release 
There is a 23% decline in the disclosure 
of pro forma by managers of S&P 500 
firms over the three year period.  Also, 
the magnitude of the difference 
between pro forma and GAAP earnings 
declined in the same period.   
8. Elliott (2006) 
 
Experiment 
consisting of 
MBA students 
and analysts 
    Non-professional investors’ judgments 
are influenced by the emphasis placed 
on pro forma profit relative to GAAP.  
The extent of influence is reduced if the 
pro forma and GAAP earnings 
statements are presented in a side-by-
side reconciliation as opposed to a 
sequential presentation.  However, 
professional investors’ judgments are 
influenced by pro forma when earnings 
are presented in a side-by-side 
reconciliation. 
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No. Study Authors Date of Data 
Used 
Source of 
Data Used 
Pro Forma Proxy Analysts’ Actual 
Proxy 
GAAP Earnings (If 
used) 
Findings 
9. Allee et al. 
(2006) 
 
1998-2003 
[1,896 firms] 
Earnings 
press 
release, 
Compustat, 
CRSP and 
I/B/E/S 
Actual pro forma 
from press release 
I/B/E/S actual 
earnings 
Actual GAAP earnings 
from press release 
Our results suggest that less-
sophisticated investors rely 
significantly more on quarterly 
earnings press releases that include a 
pro forma number than on those that do 
not, while more-sophisticated investors 
exhibit the opposite behavior. This 
result is consistent with Frederickson 
and Miller's experimental evidence. 
Also consistent with Elliott's results, we 
find that less-sophisticated investors 
rely more on the pro forma figure when 
it is placed before the GAAP earnings 
number in the press release, while 
more-sophisticated investors' trading 
behavior is unaffected by the relative 
placement of the two earnings metrics. 
10. Bhattacharya et 
al. (2006) 
 
1998 – 2003 
[5,736 earnings 
press releases] 
Earnings 
press 
release, 
Compustat, 
CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S 
Actual pro forma 
earnings 
I/B/E/S actual 
earnings 
GAAP operating 
income 
No association between sophisticated 
investors’ trading and manager-
reported pro forma information.  
Overall, the analyses suggest that the 
segment of the market that relies on pro 
forma earnings information is 
populated predominantly by less-
sophisticated individual investors.  
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CHAPTER 3:  PAPER 2 
THE CREDIBILITY OF PRO FORMA DISCLOSURES 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter demonstrates that pro forma earnings are value relevant – 
in fact, that pro forma earnings provide stronger association to value than does GAAP or 
analyst’s actual earnings.  This suggests that, in aggregate, where managers have 
significant discretion to disclose, that these disclosures will add value relevant 
information.  However, this finding is across all firms that issue pro formas.  One may 
expect that some firms are more likely to provide value relevant information and others 
to manage expectations (e.g., to mislead).  Can the market differentiate between these 
motives?    
If the market can identify good pro forma from bad – that is, if it can identify 
which firms are likely to provide value relevant information and which provide poor 
information – then this should lead to differential market reactions.  That is, those firms 
which provide credible pro formas will have a larger market reaction to the release of 
this information.    
What are the attributes or characteristics of firms which will provide more 
credible pro forma information?  These firms are likely to have stronger governance, 
higher quality auditors, and have higher overall information quality.  In this chapter, I 
test these relationships.  That is, I determine whether pro forma earnings announcements 
for firms with better governance, auditors, and overall information quality provide 
greater value relevance.  The study is conducted on S&P 500 firms that reported pro 
formas earnings between 2000 and 2004 – covering the period both before and after the 
implementation of the SOX Act.   
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3.1.1. Why Pro Forma Earnings? 
This study tests whether a firm’s corporate governance, auditor quality, and 
overall information quality will add credibility to a voluntary disclosure – that where 
these credibility attributes are high, voluntary disclosure will be more credible leading to 
a larger market reaction.  This may best be tested where there is little oversight and firms 
have significant discretion to disclose.  Pro forma earnings disclosure provides the ideal 
setting.   First, as pro forma earnings are not audited there is no independent third party 
validation.  Second, managers have absolute discretion to provide a pro forma measure 
in the firm’s press release, and almost unfettered discretion (even following SOX) in 
determining how the earnings measure is calculated.  This is in contrast to GAAP 
earnings which has far less discretion in its determination.  Third, pro forma earnings 
may be reported to provide value relevant information (the typical claim by 
management), or to manage investor expectations (e.g., to mislead).  That is, there are 
competing motives with evidence that some firms do so to inform and others appear to 
do so to mislead.   
As there are few restrictions on the use and calculation of pro forma, there are 
potential competing motives for their disclosure.  The perceived credibility of the 
measure is therefore of great importance.  If the pro forma is viewed as credible, one 
would expect investors to include it in their determination of value.  Conversely, if it is 
perceived as lacking credibility or even misleading, investors will discount the 
information (and may even view it negatively).   
Next, the three credibility attributes – independent variables in this study – are 
briefly examined. 
 
3.1.2. Credibility Attributes 
 A brief discussion of the credibility attributes used in the study is provided 
below.  Note that it is these attributes that an investor can observe and which may lend 
credibility to the pro forma disclosure.  These attributes are board characteristics, auditor 
quality, and overall information quality. 
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3.1.2.1. Boards Characteristics (Corporate Governance) 
Boards of directors tend to approve management disclosures in earnings press 
releases prior to their being made available to the public.  To avoid loss of reputation, a 
firm with an effective board may be less likely to approve a misleading or non-value 
relevant disclosure.  That is, it is posited that firms with highly effective boards can 
provide a more credible signal that the voluntary disclosure reflects value relevant 
information.   
Anecdotal evidence and prior research (for example, Ajinkya et al., 2005; Dey, 
2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007) suggests that high 
quality corporate governance is an important factor in perceived credibility of financial 
information.40  The recent concerns about earnings management and high profile 
accounting scandals have led most in the investing community to call for more stringent 
corporate governance.  This is based on the assumption that good corporate governance 
is necessary for credible financial disclosure.  Consistent with this, a primary objective 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) is to strengthen the credibility of 
corporate disclosures.  Prior to SOX, various reports asserted that certain dimensions of 
corporate governance increase the credibility of financial statements.  These reports 
include: the recommendations of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (1992); the Public Oversight Board of the SEC practice division 
of the AICPA (1988, 1995); the Cadbury Committee Report on Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (1992); and the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999). 
Using principal component analysis on 23 dimensions of board variables 
(representing governance dimensions) four factors emerge in this study.  These factors 
reflect (are interpreted as): the degree of board independence; the number of board 
meetings; the board structure; and the board separation of powers. 
 
                                                 
40 According to Bushman and Smith (2001) the role of governance research is to provide evidence on the 
extent to which information provided by the financial accounting systems mitigate agency problems, 
thereby facilitating the efficient flow of resources to promising investment opportunities.  This efficiency 
is based in part on the fact that investors make resource allocation decisions based on the available 
information. 
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3.1.2.2. Auditor Type 
Auditors provide investors with independent assurance that the firm’s financial 
statements conform to GAAP.  While it is easy to see why investors may regard GAAP 
earnings as credible – reasons which include regulation governing how GAAP earnings 
are prepared and penalties for deviation – the same direct relationship does not exist for 
pro forma earnings.  Pro forma earnings are therefore unlikely to be regarded with the 
same level of credibility as GAAP earnings because they are not audited.  However, one 
may expect that the quality of the firm’s auditor is consistent with the overall quality of 
information provided by the firm.   
Prior research provides evidence that external auditors, especially high quality 
auditors, serve as monitoring agents and help to reduce fraud and earnings management.  
Also, because of their greater expertise and resources, high quality auditors are able to 
enhance the informativeness of discretionary accruals by separating the information 
content from noise (Francis et al., 1999).   
While pro forma earnings are not audited, firms may not be willing to place at 
risk the overall perception of information quality through providing non-informative pro 
forma.  That is, if a firm uses a Big-5 audit firm – which provides a costly signal of 
information and firm quality – they may not wish to undermine this by providing pro 
forma to manage perceptions or to mislead.  One may therefore expect that, while pro 
forma is not audited, firms with better auditors will also have more value relevant pro 
forma.  
Conversely, one could argue that higher quality audits of GAAP earnings could 
lead to lower quality pro forma – a substitution effect.  With a stronger auditor there may 
be less opportunity for a firm with high quality auditors to manage expectations within 
their audited information (GAAP earnings), and therefore they may decide to manage 
expectations through voluntary disclosure including pro forma release.   
Between these two arguments – maintaining the overall information quality or a 
substitution effect – the first affect would appear to be the more important.  That is, 
firms with stronger auditors will provide more value relevant pro forma.   
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 This study therefore examines whether auditor type (measured as a Big-5 audit 
firm) is one of the credibility attributes which can increase the perceived credibility of 
pro forma earnings. 
 
3.1.2.3. Information Quality 
While not directly observable, investors will form judgments as to the overall 
information quality provided by a firm.  Some firms will be perceived as having high 
information quality, and some low.  In this study, I use two broad measures of overall 
information quality.  One following Frances, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) and 
the other following Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson and Schipper (2006).  The first measure 
provides information on whether a firm’s information system is likely to provide poor or 
high quality information signals while the second is a returns based measure of earnings 
quality which is based on the investors’ perceptions of earnings quality.  While investors 
are unlikely to directly apply either of these measures, they are reasonable proxies for 
sophisticated investors’ beliefs as to overall information quality. 
 
3.1.3. Hypotheses 
Firms may choose to release pro forma earnings in their earnings releases.  The 
quality of this information is not directly observable.  However, investors can observe 
firm attributes which may add credibility to the pro forma announcement.  Specifically, 
the quality of the firms’ governance and auditors, and overall historical information 
quality, are observable to investors.  I hypothesize that the observed quality of these 
attributes will lend credibility to the pro forma earnings release, increasing its value 
relevance.  The primary credibility hypotheses, developed more fully in Section 3.2 are 
therefore:  
• Pro forma earnings from firms with strong (poor) board characteristics 
have high (low) value relevance;  
• Pro forma earnings from firms with high (low) quality auditors have high 
(low) value relevance. 
• Pro forma earnings from firms with high (low) overall information quality 
have high (low) value relevance. 
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The hypotheses are predicated on the following investor behaviour.  First, investors must 
perceive that there are differences in pro forma information quality across firms (above 
we noted that these differences may be large for pro formas).  Second, investors will 
assess the credibility of the pro forma release based on observable firm attributes 
including the quality of governance, auditors, and overall information.  The stronger are 
the credibility attributes the greater the credibility given to the pro forma measure.   
Third, investors will react more strongly where the pro forma is perceived as credible – 
that is, the information will be perceived as more value relevant.  To illustrate, firms 
with “better governance” or a big five auditor will have a more credible pro forma 
leading to greater value relevance of the information. 
 
3.1.4. Dependent Variable (measure of Value Relevance)  
 The dependent variable in this study is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR).  As 
in many other academic accounting and finance studies, CARs are the measure of value 
relevance.  The credibility of pro forma is therefore determined through regressing the 
interaction of pro forma and the credibility attributes on CARs measured three months 
after the firm’s press release date. 
 
3.1.5. Motivation of the Study 
 This study is motivated by increased concerns about the credibility of financial 
accounting information – has accounting lost its relevance?  There is no issue more 
fundamental to accounting research and practice.  Prior studies on the credibility of 
financial information have focused on GAAP based measures.  Further, prior studies 
have tended to focus on only a single dimension of credibility.  In contrast, this study 
examines the credibility of voluntary disclosure (in the form of pro forma earnings), 
where credibility is operationalized by observable attributes of the board, the auditor, 
and overall information quality.  This study therefore adds to the literature on the 
credibility of management voluntary disclosure.  The study also investigates whether 
these credibility attributes mitigate management incentives to report potentially 
misleading disclosures and whether they increase the perceived credibility of pro 
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formas.  That is, do investors differentiate between pro forma created to inform, and pro 
forma intended to manage perceptions or mislead?   
 
3.1.6. Findings of the Chapter and Implications 
 Overall, this study supports each of the three primary hypotheses.  That is, strong 
board characteristics, auditor quality, and overall information quality enhance the 
credibility of pro forma thus providing greater value relevance.  Specifically, two of the 
governance variables – board structure (B-str) and board separation of powers (B-sep) – 
are statistically significant across models and tests indicating that these board attributes 
enhance the credibility of pro formas.  This study also finds that high auditor quality 
increases the perceived credibility of management voluntary disclosures.  Lastly, the 
study finds that overall information quality is statistically significant at increasing the 
perceived credibility of pro formas. 
 
3.1.7. Organization of the Chapter 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  The following section 
provides an overview of the literature on pro forma earnings and each of the credibility 
attributes and goes on to formulate the hypotheses.  Section three provides a description 
of the variables of interest, the empirical constructs and the research design.  In section 
four, the results of the study are presented while section five concludes.   
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3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1. Pro Forma Earnings  
 This study focuses on pro forma earnings reported in earnings press releases.  
Pro formas are defined as earnings prepared in a manner that varies from Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  Unlike earnings determined under GAAP, 
pro forma earnings are reported under the sole discretion of management and have no 
specific requirements for their calculation.  Two competing motives for issuing pro 
formas have been offered: to inform, or to manage expectations (which could be 
potentially misleading).   
Managers argue that they use pro forma reporting to provide value relevant 
information beyond that provided by GAAP.  Consistent with this assertion, the 
preceding chapter of this thesis, Bhattacharya, Christensen, Black and Mergenthaler 
(2004), Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Brown and Sivakumar (2003), all find that pro 
forma earnings are value relevant.   
However, the predominant belief among investors, and the public at large, is that 
managers’ purpose for reporting pro forma earnings is for strategic reasons – that is, to 
bias investors’ perceptions of the firm upwards (Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliott and 
Shaw, 1988, Schrand and Walther, 2000; Byrnes and Henry, 2001; Byrne and Elgin 
2002).  This belief is set against an environment in which regulators have become alert 
to the more traditional earnings management techniques like “cookie jar” reserves, and 
premature revenue recognition (Levitt 1998; Loomis 1999).  Regulators and other critics 
of pro forma reporting take issue with the “non-standard” and “ad-hoc” nature of pro 
forma reporting citing it as an avenue for managers to opportunistically mislead 
investors, especially as these pro formas are not audited.   
While some managers may report pro forma to inform, others may be doing so to 
mislead.  Empirical evidence that pro forma is value relevant (such as in the preceding 
chapter) reflects an average effect.  It does not imply that some firms (and perhaps a 
large proportion of firms) are not reporting pro forma to manage expectations rather than 
to inform.  If firms are using different motives, the degree of value relevance will vary 
across pro formas.  
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The first hypothesis in this study examines whether – consistent with the findings 
in the first study in this thesis, Bhattacharya, Christensen, Black and Mergenthaler 
(2004), Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Brown and Sivikumar (2003) – pro formas are 
value relevant.  Unlike the previous chapter that uses a returns model, this study 
examines the value relevance of pro forma earnings using CARs.  Stated formally, this 
study examines the following: 
  
H1. Pro forma earnings are value relevant. 
 
3.2.2. Credibility Attributes 
How does an investor assess the credibility or informativeness of a particular 
disclosure – in this study, pro forma earnings?  There is an extensive literature on the 
credibility of disclosures.  Mercer (2004) provides a synthesis of the literature and 
classifies these attributes into four categories:  situational incentives; management’s 
credibility; degree of external and internal assurance; and the characteristics of the 
disclosure itself.   
Consistent with this literature, in this study I examine the credibility of pro forma 
earnings announcements provided by the following credibility attributes: the strength of 
the board; the quality of the auditor; and the overall information quality (all aspects of 
corporate governance).41  In the following section, these credibility attributes are further 
examined. 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Note that broadly defined, corporate governance refers to the interaction of several participants 
including board members, internal control activities, external auditors, and managers.  The optimal 
governance structure of a firm may involve several aspects of governance variables acting as complements 
of or substitutes for each other (Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith, 2004; Perry, 2000; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996).  As a result, studies that have examined corporate governance have either examined 
components such as audit committee characteristics (independence, financial expertise and diligence); 
auditor quality, internal control system; CEO independence etc. or formed an index of these corporate 
governance variables and examined the relationship of the index to certain firm characteristics or 
disclosure.  With the exception of Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2005), studies that examine corporate 
governance (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003) form one dimensional governance indices which includes several 
governance variables but does not take into account the interactions between the variables. 
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3.2.2.1. Board Characteristics 
 
An active and effective board of directors, responsible financial 
management, skeptical and independent auditors and attentive 
regulatory authorities all have responsibilities to safeguard those 
who invest in public corporations.  Effective corporate governance 
of the financial reporting process is an important tool for enabling 
companies and their auditors to fulfill those responsibilities. 
 
     – Arthur Levitt, Chairman 
     Securities and Exchange Commission  
  
 This section provides a discussion of the first credibility attribute, board 
characteristics.  Board characteristics are a primary attribute that investors can evaluate 
in assessing the credibility of disclosures.  In fact, ensuring that financial disclosures are 
credible is one of the primary roles of the board.  According to the Blue Ribbon 
Committee, the board’s primary role is to help ensure “high quality financial reporting” 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 1999).  In addition, this report indicates that the audit 
committee of the board has significant roles to play in the financial reporting process as 
well as being the ultimate monitor of the fairness and validity of the financial statements.  
Herdman (2002) reports that the audit committee of the board may help reduce 
opportunistic earnings management by being proactive with respect to discussing and 
understanding the company’s critical accounting policies and by probing issues that 
management and the auditors give considerable attention to.   
 A sizeable body of prior research indicates that the market recognizes differences 
in the quality of monitoring controls provided by the board.  This body of research 
indicates that boards that do a more effective job of monitoring management enhance the 
quality and the frequency of information released by management.  Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examine the impact of board structure on both the 
quality and quantity of corporate information disclosures.  They find that companies 
with more effective boards issue more frequent earnings forecasts and that these 
  88
forecasts are more accurate.  Similarly, Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) examine the 
relationship between the quality of corporate governance and information asymmetry 
around quarterly earnings announcements.  They find that firms with higher levels of 
corporate governance have lower information asymmetry around quarterly earnings 
announcements.   
 In other related research, Carcello and Neal (2000) find an inverse relation 
between the proportion of inside or affiliated directors on the board audit committee and 
the likelihood of that firm receiving a ‘new’ going-concern report.  Similarly Abbott et 
al. (2004) study the relationship between board audit committee independence and the 
likelihood of a firm restating its financial statements and committing financial statement 
fraud.  They find a negative association between the occurrence of financial reporting 
restatements and (1) board audit committee independence and (2) board audit 
committees that meet on average four times a year.  They also report that firms with 
independent board audit committees are less likely to commit financial reporting fraud.  
Beasley (1996), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), and Klein (2002) find that less 
earnings management is found in firms whose boards and audit committees are 
independent, meet more frequently and have greater financial expertise, thus suggesting 
that audit committee characteristics of independence, financial expertise and diligence 
are associated with high information quality.  Vafeas (2000) examines whether the 
informativeness of earnings – proxied by the earnings-return relationship – varies with 
board size and the proportion of outside directors on the board.  He finds that the 
earnings of firms with the smallest boards are perceived as being more informative by 
market participants.  However, his findings show no evidence that the proportion of 
outside directors on the board is related to earnings informativeness.  Libby et al. (2003) 
also examine the role of the board of directors.  They contend that the presence of 
outside board members acts as a signal to the market regarding the credibility of 
management disclosures.  They find that the market values the monitoring role played 
by outside directors in reducing information risk associated with the firm.   
 Following from this research, investors should interpret the presence of good 
board characteristics as a signal that pro forma is credible thus leading to greater value 
relevance. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H2. Pro forma earnings from firms with strong (poor) board characteristics have 
higher (lower) value relevance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Auditor Type  
 Under the provisions of SFAS 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit, auditors must obtain an understanding of how the control 
environment affects the overall risk of material error in the financial statements (AICPA, 
1995).  According to this statement, control environment factors are explicitly expanded 
to include typical corporate governance characteristics such as composition and function 
of the board and its committees, especially the audit committee.  In the recent past, this 
concern has been raised to such a level that external auditors are now required to 
consider these institutional features in the conduct of their annual examinations.  As a 
result, the external auditor, while not directly responsible for the credibility of pro 
formas, helps to increase financial reporting quality and consequently the quality and 
credibility of voluntary management disclosures which includes pro formas.  It is 
believed that a higher quality external auditor will discharge these duties better because 
of their size and the amount of resources available to them.   
 Research on the monitoring activities of external parties such as the external 
auditor provides evidence of their importance in improving perceived credibility of 
financial disclosures.  Titman and Truman (1986) provide evidence that external 
auditors serve as monitoring agents that act as a signal to the market that management’s 
private information is credible and value relevant.  Similarly, Teoh and Wong (1993) 
find that the earnings response coefficient of firms audited by a Big-8 audit firm is 
higher than that of firms audited by a non-Big-8 firm.  They interpret this finding as 
evidence that investors perceive financial disclosures of firms with higher quality 
auditors as being more credible than those of lower quality auditors.42  This study 
therefore hypothesizes the following: 
 
                                                 
42 Please note that while these studies present interesting findings, none has examined whether a high 
quality external auditor improves the perceived credibility of pro formas. 
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H3. Pro forma earnings from firms with higher (lower) quality auditors have 
higher (lower) value relevance. 
 
3.2.2.3. Information Quality 
 Overall information quality is important in assessing the perceived credibility of 
pro formas.  While not directly observable, investors will form judgments as to the 
overall information quality provided by a firm.  Some firms will be perceived as having 
high information quality, and some low.  One may expect that a firm with overall high 
quality information would also produce more credible (i.e., value relevant) pro forma.  
Two measures of overall information quality are used in this study.  While 
investors are unlikely to directly apply either of these measures, they are reasonable 
proxies for sophisticated investors’ beliefs as to overall information quality.  The 
following is therefore hypothesized: 
 
H4. Pro forma earnings from firms with higher (lower) overall information quality 
have higher (lower) value relevance. 
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3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
 In this section, a detailed description of the research design is presented as well 
as the sample selection and empirical proxies employed.  It begins by describing the 
sample selection for pro formas. The three classes of credibility attributes are then 
discussed, followed by the control variables.  Next, the dependent variable (cumulative 
abnormal returns) is discussed.  Summary statistics and correlation data are then 
presented followed by a discussion of the empirical models.   
 
3.3.1. Sample Selection 
 One of the significant differences between this study and prior pro forma studies 
is the way pro formas are determined.  Unlike most prior studies that perform a search of 
the newswire for the term pro forma or other nomenclature used to refer to pro forma 
earnings, or that use a pro forma proxy such as analysts’ actuals, this study identifies pro 
forma earnings through a full reading of the earnings press release.  In order for a firm to 
be classified as a pro forma firm, it must report somewhere in its earnings press release a 
pro forma earnings per share (EPS) number clearly different from the GAAP number.    
The releases for all firms in the S&P 500 for the period beginning March 2000 
and ending February 2004 (covering five successive year ends) are read and coded.  An 
important aspect of this five year period is that it encompasses the period during which 
regulation (specifically the Sarbanes Oxley Act and Regulation G) was introduced into 
the financial markets.   
 As shown in Table 1, of the initial set of firms listed in the S&P 500 index over 
the five year period (2,500 firm year observations) a total of 1,608 firm year 
observations are identified as having reported a pro forma earnings measure in their 
annual earnings press release.   Table 1 shows a breakdown of the pro forma firms by 
industry and by year (with similar percentages across years).  Consistent with Entwistle 
et al. (2006), Heflin and Hsu (2004), and Yi (2006) there is a decline in the number of 
firms reporting pro formas from 2000 to 2004.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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To arrive at a sample for subsequent analyses, 38 firm year observations for firms 
missing CRSP data and 140 observations for firms missing Compustat data were 
eliminated.  In addition, 364 observations for firms in the financial and utilities 
industries were eliminated because the unique nature of regulation governing the 
industries makes estimation of accruals intractable.  This leaves a total of 1,066 firm 
year observations for subsequent analyses.  Panel B in Table 2 provides a breakdown of 
the distribution of the difference between pro forma and GAAP earnings for the sample 
of firms. 43   Note that, consistent with prior research, the mean difference between pro 
forma earnings and GAAP earnings is positive.  That is, on average pro forma is income 
increasing. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3.2. Variable Measurement and Data Reliability 
 To determine whether firms disclosed a pro forma earnings measure, the 
earnings press release is fully analyzed.  These press releases are primarily obtained 
from firm’s web sites. Where they are not available from the web, the firms are 
contacted by e-mail for a copy of their press release.  In order to determine if the press 
release has a pro forma measure or not, a detailed and time intensive coding process is 
adopted.  Although the process involves some judgment, it is a reliable means for 
identifying which firms reported pro forma earnings in the press release.  To be 
considered a pro forma earnings disclosure, an alternative measure of earnings (to 
GAAP earnings for the year) has to be provided in the press release, either in the 
headline or in the body of the press release.  A second criterion is that this measure has 
to be provided on a per share basis. 
 For reliability, a significant number of test cases in each of the five years are 
independently coded by individuals well trained in the coding protocol.44 Results from 
this independent coding are compared with the initial coding and only in a few cases are 
                                                 
43 The reduced sample appears similar to the full sample.  Tests of differences in the mean of the two 
distributions (Panel C of Table 1 and Panel B of Table 2) fail to reject equality of the mean.  Thus there is 
a high degree of comfort that the sample appropriately represents the population of S&P 500 firms. 
44 Inter-rater reliability and test-retest reliability are both high (98%) for a sample of 100 press releases for 
2002, 2003 and 2004. 
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differences observed.  In those cases (less than 2%) a consensus is obtained as to 
whether pro forma earnings exist and the amount. 
In the following section, a detailed discussion of the empirical constructs for the 
credibility attributes (the independent variables) is presented followed by a discussion of 
the empirical construct for the dependent variable – cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
3.3.3. Operationalizing Board Characteristics 
 Data on board variables is obtained from the Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) database of corporate governance.  This database covers a wide variety of 
companies and provides information including that relating to board of directors.45   
 Board characteristics refers to the interaction of several variables which include 
board committees, number of board and board committee meetings, separation of CEO 
and chairman, structure of the board, board tenure and board voting system.  As it is not 
econometrically feasible to include individually each board variable from the board 
database, principal components analysis (PCA) of the available variables is used to 
obtain a reduced set of board characteristics which is then used in the study.46   
 PCA is an effective data reduction tool that creates a reduced set of variables by 
summarizing the common information in the observed data.  It reduces redundancy in 
the data by creating a set of variables or principal components that account for most of 
the variance in the data.  These reduced variables or components are then used as a 
measure of the underlying board characteristics construct.  In this study, various board 
characteristics such as number of board meetings, board committees, separation of CEO 
and chairman, structure of the board, board tenure and board voting system to name a 
few, are considered.  See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the 23 board 
governance dimensions considered, their meaning and the coding scheme adopted.  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the governance variables prior to the PCA 
while Table 4 provides bivariate correlations of the board variables.   
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                 
45 The corporate governance variables are extracted from this database. 
46 Larcker et al. (2007) is another paper that utilizes this technique. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 As seen in Table 4, some of the variables are highly correlated and may 
effectively serve as substitutes for each other.  For example, the presence of a corporate 
governance committee and the presence of a nominating committee are highly correlated 
(.507). 
 In PCA, one of the most commonly used criteria for deciding on the number of 
components is the eigenvalue-one criterion, also known as the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 
1960).  In this approach, you retain and interpret all components that have an eigenvalue 
greater than 1.00.  The rationale is straightforward.  Any component that displays an 
eigenvalue greater than 1.00 is accounting for a greater amount of variance than is 
contributed by one variable and vice versa.  Stevens (1986) reviews studies that 
investigate the accuracy of the eigenvalue-one criterion and recommends its use when 
less than 30 variables are being analyzed and communalities are greater than 0.70, or 
when the analysis is based on more than 250 observations.  In addition to the 
eigenvalue-one criterion, Rummel (1970) suggests that each retained component should 
have at least three variables loading onto it when the procedure is complete.  Thus, these 
two criteria are simultaneously applied in choosing components to be retained for the 
corporate governance variables.  See Appendix 2 for a more detailed discussion of the 
PCA procedure. 
 The results of the PCA are presented in Table 5.  The board variables load onto 
four main factors which are defined descriptively as the independence of the board (B-
ind), the number of meetings of the board and board committees (B-meet), the structure 
of the board (B-str), and the separation of powers between the chairman of the board and 
the CEO (B-sep).  These four constructed variables are used in the subsequent analysis.  
B-ind includes affiliated directors, number of independent directors, and relatives on the 
board.  Each measure that loaded into B-meet relates to the number of either board 
meetings or committee meetings.  The measures that load onto B-str include: classified 
board, cumulative voting, board size, ownership, board tenure, and independent directors 
on the nominating committee.  The last factor, B-sep, includes such measures as board 
committees, separate chair, presence of a lead director and employee representative.  
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 The method used to compute each of the governance factors is such that higher 
scores for B-ind, B-str, and B-ind correspond to a higher quality on the governance 
dimension.  It is unclear whether higher scores on B-meet, indicating a higher number of 
meetings, would indicate a higher or lower level of governance.  Meeting more often 
may be a good thing (indicating greater attention) or a bad thing (indicating a firm in 
crisis).  Therefore, we do not sign this one constructed variable.     
 
3.3.4. Operationalizing Auditor Type 
Examining the impact of the quality of the external auditor is important given 
that the auditor is an external monitor that expresses an opinion on the fairness of 
mandated disclosure.  If the auditor’s opinion conveys that financial information is 
presented fairly, then investors may perceive non-GAAP disclosures to be credible 
because the same information environment that produces the mandated earnings 
information is also responsible for providing the voluntary disclosure.  Also, while pro 
forma earnings are not audited, firms may not be willing to place at risk the overall 
perception of information quality (signaled by the use of a Big-5 audit firm) by 
providing non-informative pro forma.  
 Auditor quality is a dichotomous variable that is coded as one if the external 
auditor is a Big-5 firm and zero otherwise.  This data is obtained from Compustat.  As an 
additional test, given the demise of Arthur Andersen, the sensitivity of the results to 
Arthur Andersen is examined.  This is done relative to the Big-5.  That is, among the 
firms that have a Big-5 auditor, if the firm’s external auditor is Arthur Andersen, this is 
coded one.  Otherwise, it is coded zero.47 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 When this is coded relative to all other firms, the results remain unchanged. 
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3.3.5. Operationalizing Overall Information Quality (OIQ) 
 This study uses two measures of overall information quality, both described 
below.  The first, referred to as EQ is an earnings quality metric that is accounting based 
and the second referred to as e-loading (Ecker et al. 2006) is a returns based 
representation of earnings quality. 
 
3.3.5.1. Earnings Quality 
 The first proxy for overall information quality follows Francis, Lafond, Olsson 
and Schipper (2005).  This measure, known as EQ, provides information on whether a 
firm’s information system is likely to provide poor or high quality information signals.  
Essentially, their model attempts to determine the variability of total accruals after 
economic factors have been accounted for.  To do this they measure the standard 
deviation of the residuals from an accrual equation.  Specifically, Francis et al. (2005) 
perform the following two part test.  First, they calculate McNichols’ (2002) 
modification of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model.  This modified model relates 
current accruals to lagged, current and future cash flows from operations as well as 
change in revenues and property, plant and equipment.  This model is specified as 
follows: 
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where:  
TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year 
)( ,,,, tjtjtjtj STDEBTCashCLCAt Δ+Δ−Δ−Δ= ; 
Assetsj,t = firm j’s average total assets in year t and t-1; 
CFOj,t = cash flow from operations in year t.  This is calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items (NIBE, Compustat data item #18) less total accruals (TA), 
where TA= ,,,,,, tjtjtjtjtj DEPNSTDEBTCashCLCA −Δ+Δ−Δ−Δ where  
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tjCA ,Δ  = firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat data item #4) 
between year t-1 and year t;   
tjCL ,Δ = firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat data item #5) 
between year t-1 and year t;  
tjCash ,Δ = firm j’s change in cash (Compustat data item #1) between year 
t-1 and year t; and 
tjSTDEBT ,Δ = firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat 
data item #34) between year t-1 and year t;  
tjDEPN , = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat 
data item #14) in year t; and 
tjv ,ReΔ = firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat data item #12) between year t-1 and 
year t; 
tjPPE , = firm j’s gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat data item #7) 
in year t; and 
tj ,ε  = Residual. 
 
Equation (1) is estimated for each firm using data from 1996 – 2004.  Similar to 
Francis et al. (2005) each firm is used as its own benchmark rather than estimating 
equation (1) by industry and using an industry-benchmark.48   Also Equation (1) 
includes both lead and lag terms which effectively requires that each firm have 
information from 1995 – 2005.   
Second, firm and year specific residuals, tj ,ε  form the basis for the information 
quality metric, EQ.  That is, the information quality for each firm for each year is 
calculated from the residuals from equation (1).  )( ,, tjtjEQ
∧= εσ  is equal to the rolling 
                                                 
48 The objective is to reduce noise in the measure of accruals quality.  Francis et al. (2005) document that 
as a result of the requirement of time-series of observations about each firm, there is a potential bias in 
favour of large firms in their data set.  This is a bias which this study will face as well as my sample is 
composed of large surviving firms. This bias should be taken into consideration in interpreting the results 
of this study.  More pertinent to this study is the absence of a long enough time series of observations.  As 
a sensitivity test, equation (1) is also estimated by industry using an industry-benchmark and the results 
are similar. 
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five year standard deviation of firm j’s estimated residuals from year t-4 to year t.  To 
illustrate, for year 2000, EQ is equal to the standard deviation of the residuals from year 
1996-2000.  To ensure that market participants have access to the same data that is used 
to calculate information quality, I ensure that the period t’s correspond in both the 
information quality tests and the perceived credibility tests.  Unlike Francis et al. (2005), 
the earnings quality metric is reverse coded in this study such that large (small) values of 
tjEQ ,  correspond to good (poor) information quality. 
 
3.3.5.2. E-Loading 
 A second measure of overall information quality (e-loading) is also used in this 
study.  This measure is a representation of earnings quality following Ecker et al. (2006).  
Ecker et al. create an accounting-based measure of accruals quality AQj,T using a 
restricted sample of firms and convert AQ to a time specific returns representation 
(AQfactort).  In order to obtain the e-loading, the following firm-year specific regression 
is run using the time-specific returns representation (AQfactort): 
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where 
t = index for the number of trading days in year T; 
Rj,t = firm j’s return on day t; 
RF,t = the risk free rate on day t; 
RM,t = the market return on day t; 
e = e-loading; the coefficient on AQfactor which is the measure of  
  information quality; 
AQfactort =  the difference between the daily returns of the highest and poorest  
  accounting accruals quality firms; and 
εt = the error term. 
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The firm year representation of earnings quality (e-loading) is the coefficient on the 
AQfactor.49  According to Ecker et al. an advantage of this measure is that it is not 
constrained to be slow to change unlike the accounting data representation which has a 
mechanical dependence year over year.   
 
3.3.6. Additional Independent (control) Variables 
Following prior studies, we include control variables to ensure less biased 
econometric results.  These variables control for those firm characteristics that are 
related to earnings informativeness.  These variables are as follows:   
Growth (Growth in the tables), controls for the anticipated higher future earnings 
in growth forms.  The proxy for growth is the book-to-market ratio, as operationalized 
by Ettredge et al. (2005).50   
Loss (Loss in the tables) controls for the differential valuation of loss firms as 
well as the persistence of earnings.  The proxy for this is a dummy variable equal to one 
if next year’s earnings are negative and zero otherwise as operationalized by Hayn 
(1995).  This variable also controls for the differential valuation of loss firms.51   
Current (Current in the tables) controls for the timeliness of earnings.  Bad news 
is timelier than good news and is more likely to be reflected in returns faster than good 
news.  Timeliness of earnings is proxied by a dummy variable as operationalized by 
Basu (1997) and is coded one for negative contemporaneous return, Rt, and zero 
otherwise.  Returns are obtained from the CRSP annual database. 
Earnings uncertainty (Var in the tables) controls for the dispersion in earnings.  
More variable earnings are less predictable.  Earnings uncertainty is calculated by 
dividing the absolute standard deviation of a company’s percentage change in EPS over 
                                                 
49 I thank Ecker et al. for making their AQfactor data available for use.  The earnings quality measure 
reported above is the one factor model.  Ecker et al. also suggest a three factor model following the 
regression: 
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This is also used in this study as a sensitivity test. 
50 Book value is Compustat data item (#216) while market value is Compustat data items (#25*#199). 
51 Earnings are obtained from Compustat data item #216. 
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20 quarters by the company’s average four quarter percentage for 20 quarters.  This is 
obtained from the Compustat annual data file. 
Size (Size in the tables) controls for the size of the organization.  Larger 
organizations have a richer information environment, therefore may have more 
informative earnings.  Size is measured as the log of the firm’s total assets.52  
 
3.3.7. Dependent Variable  
 The dependent variable is measured as cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  The 
association between CAR and the interaction terms (i.e. of the credibility attributes and 
pro forma) gives an indication of the credibility of the pro forma earnings measure.  
CAR is estimated using a market model as in Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002).  Using 
earnings informativeness as a measure of perceived credibility is not new to the 
literature.  Teoh and Wong (1993) use the informativeness of earnings as a measure of 
earnings credibility.   
A three month window is used as it provides adequate time for the market to 
impound information contained in earnings releases.53  The market model is defined as 
follows: 
tm
At
tjtj RRCAR
j
,,, −= ∑
∈
          (3) 
where: 
tjCAR , = cumulative abnormal return for firm j at time t; 
jAt∈  = represents the announcement window which is three months after the firm’s 
announcement date.  As a sensitivity test, a three day announcement window 
around the earnings announcement date is also used; 
tjR , = the return to firm j, at time t which is three months after the announcement date; 
 and, 
tmR , = the value weighted return to the market for the same time period. 
 
In the following section, the summary statistics and correlations are presented. 
                                                 
52 Obtained from the Compustat annual data file (data item A6). 
53 A three day window is also used and the results are unchanged. 
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3.3.8. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the primary variables of interest used in 
the study and the control variables.  While there is a bias towards larger firms, mean 
(median) of log assets 3.943 (3.915) representing about $8 billion, there is variation 
among the size of the companies (standard deviation = 0.5510) representing about $3.5 
billion.  The mean (median) of the pro forma earnings measure, $1.88 ($1.59) is greater 
than the GAAP equivalent $1.17 ($1.18).  This is consistent with prior studies that have 
found that pro forma measures are positively biased and greater than GAAP earnings 
measures.  This income increasing characteristic may lead market participants to 
perceive pro forma earnings as lacking credibility. 
   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 Table 7 presents the Spearman correlations between the independent variables 
used in the various regressions.  The signs on the correlations are largely as one would 
expect.54  The two overall information quality measures, EQ and e-loading are correlated 
at the .473 level.  Auditor quality is also positively correlated with the size of the firm 
and with the overall information quality measures. 
     
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
3.3.9. Models 
 In this section, the empirical models used to test the hypotheses are presented – 
that is, the value relevance of the credibility attributes on pro forma earnings is 
examined.   
 As noted above, value relevance is assessed using cumulative abnormal returns – 
that is, we examine the market’s reaction in the period immediately following release of 
the pro forma earnings announcement.  To test the credibility hypotheses (H2 through 
                                                 
54 Note that while GAAP earnings is not used in the study, it is provided as a reference point for the 
correlations. 
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H4), the focus is the interaction between pro forma and the three categories of credibility 
attributes.  For each category of the credibility attribute we run similar tests.   
 
3.3.9.1. Test of H1: the Pro Forma Main Effect 
The simplest test of H1 (the main effect for pro forma) is as follows:   
 
tjtjtj PFCAR ,,10, ελλ ++=        (4) 
 where: 
tjCAR ,   = cumulative abnormal return for firm j at time t; and 
tjPF ,    = pro forma earnings for firm j at time t. 
 
 However, as discussed above, we control for omitted variables which are related 
to the informativeness of earnings.  These variables include:   
• Market-to-book ratio is used to control for growth (Growth);  
• Earnings persistence (Loss) is coded 1 if next year’s earnings are negative and 0 
otherwise; 
• Contemporaneous return (Current) is coded 1 for negative returns Rt and 0 
otherwise; 
• Firm level earnings variability (Var) is calculated by dividing the absolute 
standard deviation of a company’s percentage change in EPS over 20 quarters by 
the company’s average four quarter percentage for 20 quarters.  This is obtained 
from the Compustat annual data file; and 
• Firm size (Size) is measured as the natural log of market capitalization each year.   
 
Including these control variables provides the following specification: 
 
tjtj
tjtjtjtjtjtj
Size
VarCurrentLossGrowthPFCAR
,,6
,5,4,3,2,10,
ελ
λλλλλλ
++
+++++=
     (5) 
 
 
  103
3.3.9.2. Test of H2: the Effect of Governance 
The following test on the value relevance of credible pro forma is estimated: 
 tj
k
tjktjktjtj GovPFPFCAR ,
4
1
,,,1,10, )*( ελλλ +++= ∑
=
+         (6) 
 where: 
tjCAR ,   = cumulative abnormal return for firm j at time t; 
tjPF ,    = pro forma earnings for firm j at time t; and 
tjkGOV ,,)(   = represents each of the four components of corporate governance from 
     the PCA for firm j at time t. 
  
Including the control variables provides the following specification: 
 
tjtjtjtjtj
tjtjktj
k
ktjtj
SizeVarCurrentLoss
GrowthGovPFPFCAR
,,10,9,8,7
,6,,,
4
1
1,10, )*(
ελλλλ
λλλλ
+++++
+++= ∑
=
+       (7) 
 
3.3.9.3. Test of H3: the Effect of Auditor Quality 
The equivalent equations to examine the impact of auditor quality are as follows: 
tjtjtjtjtj auditorqPFPFCAR ,,,2,10, )*( ελλλ +++=                      (8) 
 
Including the control variables provides the following specification: 
 
tjtjtjtj
tjtjtjtjtjtj
SizeVarCurrent
LossGrowthauditorqPFPFCAR
,,7,6,5
,4,3,,2,10, )*(
ελλλ
λλλλλ
++++
++++=
                   (9) 
 
 In these models, the term auditorq refers to auditor quality. Recall that this is 
coded as 1 if the firm is audited by a big-5 audit firm and zero otherwise.  As an 
additional test, this study examines the sensitivity of the findings on auditor quality to 
Arthur Andersen. 
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3.3.9.4. Test of H4: Effect of Overall Information Quality (OIQ) 
The equivalent equations to examine the impact of overall information quality 
are as follows: 
tjtjtjtjtj OIQPFPFCAR ,,,2,10, )*( ελλλ +++=               (10) 
 
where OIQ refers to information quality which is measured in two ways as discussed 
above – the first an accounting based measure referred to in this study as EQ and the 
second a returns based measure referred to by the authors as e-loading 1 factor.  
  
Including the control variables provides the following specification: 
 
tjtjtjtj
tjtjtjtjtjtj
SizeVarCurrent
LossGrowthOIQPFPFCAR
,,7,6,5
,4,3,,2,10, )*(
ελλλ
λλλλλ
++++
++++=
                   (11)
  
The above tests are run separately for expositional purposes.  A single regression 
including board characteristics, auditor type and overall information quality provides 
consistent results. 
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3.4. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 This section presents the results of the empirical tests outlined in the previous 
research design section.  While the results of the tests reported use CARs computed over 
a three month window, tests using CARs computed three days around the press release 
announcement window (untabulated) yield similar results.  
 
3.4.1. Results from the Test of H1: The Pro Forma Main Effect 
The results for the test of the main variable, pro forma, are provided in Table 8.  
Consistent with the prior chapter in this thesis, and Bhattacharya, Christensen, Black and 
Mergenthaler (2004), Bradshaw and Sloan (2002), and Brown and Sivakumar (2003), in 
aggregate pro forma releases are value relevant.  It is statistically significant at the 1% 
level for the restricted model (equation 4) and at the 5% level for the equation which 
incorporates the control variables (equation 5).  Of the control variables, Loss and 
Current are in the hypothesized direction and are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The coefficient on Growth is not significantly different from zero, while the coefficient 
on Size is significantly negative [-.0715 (t-stat = -3.52)].  This inverse relationship 
between Size and CAR could be due to a more complex information environment for 
large firms and its corresponding higher risk (Lu, 2007).  Also, note that the adjusted R2 
for the constrained regression is only about 1%.  This is not surprising as earnings 
measures alone tend to have very low explanatory power in explaining abnormal returns.  
Including the control variables, the explanatory power of the model increases to 20.53% 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
3.4.2. Results from the Test of H2: The Effect of Governance 
 The results for the test of the second hypothesis [H2] are reported in Table 9.  
This hypothesis suggests that there is a positive association between the perceived 
credibility of pro forma earnings and board characteristics.  That is, that the perceived 
credibility of pro forma increases with the strengthening of board characteristics.   
The variables of interest are the interaction between pro forma earnings and the 
board variables.  Overall, there is strong support that governance provides credibility to 
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pro forma earnings – that is, that the interaction terms are statistically significant in the 
hypothesized direction.  The interaction terms related to meetings (PF*B-meet), 
structure (PF*B-str) and separation (PF*B-sep) are statistically significant in each of the 
regressions.  Note that none of the regressions for the interaction term related to 
independence (PF*B-ind) is statistically significant although they are in the 
hypothesized direction.  Note also that while the regressions for the interaction term 
related to meetings (PF*B-meet) are statistically significant, they are negative.  This is 
consistent with the second explanation provided in the theory section – that a larger 
number of meetings may indicate distress in the firm leading to reduced credibility in 
pro forma earnings. 
Of interest, in adding the effects of governance, the explanatory power of the 
constrained equation increased from an R2 of .0095 (Table 8) to .0271 (Table 9).  That 
is, adding the governance credibility measures roughly tripled the explanatory power of 
pro forma in explaining cumulative abnormal returns.   
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
3.4.3. Results from the Test of H3: The Effect of Auditor Quality 
 Table 10 presents the results of the test of the hypothesis that auditor quality 
increases the perceived credibility of pro forma earnings.  Recall that in this test, the 
proxy for auditor quality is the size of the audit firm (Big 5 versus others).  The variable 
of interest is the interaction between pro forma and auditor quality.  As predicted, the 
interaction is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels across all 
models.   
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Following the events at Enron and the subsequent demise of Arthur Andersen, 
the study further examines whether investors perceive the pro forma earnings of firms 
that were audited by Arthur Andersen as being credible.  The results (not tabulated) 
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suggest that investors perceived pro formas of firms that were audited by Arthur 
Andersen to be less credible than the pro formas of other Big-5 firms.   
 
3.4.4. Results from the Test of H4: The Effect of Information Quality 
 Tables 11 and 12 present the results of the test of the hypothesis that overall 
information quality increases the perceived credibility of pro forma earnings.  The two 
measures of overall information quality are used.  The first measure, EQ, is an 
accounting based measure of earnings quality and the second measure, e-loading, is a 
returns based measure of earnings quality.  As in previous tests, the variable of interest is 
the interaction between the overall information quality variable and pro forma.  As 
predicted in H4, the higher the quality of information that the firm reports, the more 
credible is its pro forma. Table 11 documents the results using the EQ measure.  Table 
12 reports the results of the regression using e-loading.  All the variables of interest in all 
the four models are statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction.  That is, 
the results are consistent across two very different measures of overall information 
quality.   
 
 [Insert Table 11 here] 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
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3.5. CONCLUSION 
3.5.1. Summary of Findings and Conclusion  
 This study questions whether investors can differentiate between good and bad 
pro forma leading to differential market reactions.  The premise is that if investors can 
differentiate between credible pro formas and pro formas that lack credibility, then good 
or credible pro formas will lead to a larger market reaction.  However because 
managers’ motivations in reporting pro formas cannot be observed, credibility attributes 
such as the characteristics of the board, the quality of the external auditor and the overall 
information quality of the firms’ financial statements are used as a basis for the 
credibility of firms’ pro forma earnings.  Thus, this study examines the relationship 
between board characteristics, auditor quality, overall information quality and the 
credibility of pro formas.  The chapter hypothesizes that the credibility of pro formas is 
related to the strength of board characteristics, the quality of the external auditor and the 
overall quality of information.   
The study first finds that the 23 board governance dimensions analyzed distil into 
four major board characteristics.  These are board structure, board separation of powers, 
board independence and board meetings.  Second, the study finds that three of these 
board characteristics, board structure, board separation and board meetings, are strongly 
related to the credibility of pro forma earnings (i.e., these board characteristics are more 
likely to influence the perceived credibility of pro formas).  Specifically, the study finds 
that board structure and separation of powers are most strongly and positively related to 
the credibility of pro forma earnings (i.e. the greater the structure of the board and the 
more board powers are separated, the more credible investors perceive pro formas to be).  
Note also that while the number of board meetings is statistically significant, it has a 
negative coefficient.  This could suggest that having more meetings may not be a good 
thing as it could be related to more difficult issues that have to be addressed leading to 
less perceived credibility – that is, it is a bad signal. 
 The study also finds that external auditor quality is associated with the perceived 
credibility of pro formas.  In all the models examined, the interaction between auditor 
quality and pro formas is statistically significant and positive.  This finding suggests that 
while pro forma earnings are not audited, firms are not willing to place at risk the overall 
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perception of information quality through providing non-informative pro forma.  That is, 
if a firm uses a Big-5 audit firm – which provides a costly signal of information and firm 
quality – the firms are less likely to undermine this signal by providing pro formas that 
are intended to manage perceptions or to mislead.  When Arthur Andersen is controlled 
for, relative to other Big-4 firms the results are that pro formas of firms that are audited 
by Arthur Andersen are less credible than those of other Big-5 audit firms.   
Lastly, the two measures of overall information quality provide evidence that 
overall information quality is associated with the perceived credibility of pro formas.  
That is, while not directly observable, investors are able to form judgments as to the 
overall information quality provided by a firm and apply this judgment to pro forma 
earnings. 
In conclusion, the results of these tests provide support for the claim that 
investors perceive credibility attributes such as board characteristics, auditor quality and 
overall information quality, to be useful in inferring the credibility of pro formas.  These 
findings are robust to alternative specifications, for example, using a different window to 
determine the cumulative abnormal returns.   
In summary, managers have significant discretion to disclose pro forma earnings.  
This discretion can be used in one of two ways: to inform (to provide value relevant 
information), and to manage expectations (e.g., to mislead).  This study examines 
whether the credibility attributes are associated with an increase in the perceived 
credibility and value relevance of pro forma earnings.  That is, based on credibility 
attributes, is the market able to attribute credibility to certain pro formas while 
discounting others?  These results are consistent with the following.  First, investors do 
perceive that there are differences in pro forma information quality across firms.  
Second, investors assess the credibility of the pro forma release based on observable 
firm attributes including the quality of governance, auditors, and overall information.  
The stronger are the credibility attributes, the greater the credibility given to the pro 
forma measure.   Finally, investors will react more strongly where the pro forma is 
perceived as credible – that is, the information will be perceived as more value relevant.   
This study contributes to the empirical evidence on the association between 
board characteristics, auditor quality and overall information quality in terms of the 
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credibility of voluntary disclosures.  To shareholders and managers, the results suggest 
that a stronger governance environment, for example, having a high quality board and 
having high quality auditors, enhances the credibility of corporate disclosures and most 
notably, in this study, the disclosure of pro forma earnings.   
From a regulatory standpoint, it is important to note that this study covers a 
period of heightened interest regarding corporate governance, including the introduction 
of SOX.  Hence regulators will be interested in the finding that a better governance 
environment does improve investors’ confidence in the credibility of financial 
disclosures.  
 
3.5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
This study has two primary limitations.  The first relates to the sample of firms 
used.  While I use a major set of visible firms, being the S&P 500 firms, the results may 
differ if a different set of firms is used.  Second, this study uses an important set of 
attributes to proxy for credibility.  However, there are other variables that may also 
impact the credibility of firms’ disclosures.  Future research can address these 
limitations, for example, other studies can use the Russell 1000 or other expanded set of 
firms.  To address the second limitation, future studies can examine other variables such 
as the impact of situational factors like management compensation on the credibility of 
firms’ disclosures.    
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Table 1- Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: S&P 500 Firms Reporting Pro Forma for the Period 2000-2004 
Year Number Percent 
2000 367 73% 
2001 380 76% 
2002 331 66% 
2003 264 53% 
2004 266 53% 
Total observations 1,608  
Panel B: Sample Pro Forma Firms by Industry 
Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Basic Materials 26 (7%) 26 (7%) 22 (7%) 14 (5%) 14 (5%) 102 (6%) 
Services 51 (14%) 54 (14%) 49 (15%) 42 (16%) 38 (14%) 234 (15%) 
Health Care 38 (10%) 40 (11%) 39 (12%) 30 (11%) 37 (14%) 184 (11%) 
Technology 80 (22%) 83 (22%) 69 (21%) 47 (18%) 52 (20%) 331 (21%) 
Consumer Goods 24 (7%) 25 (6%) 23 (7%) 19 (7%) 18 (7%) 109 (7%) 
Industrial Goods 49 (13%) 49 (13%) 42 (12%) 34 (13%) 21 (8%) 195 (12%) 
Utilities 24 (7%) 26 (7%) 29 (9%) 24 (9%) 28 (10%) 131 (8%) 
Energy 19 (5%) 19 (5%) 16 (5%) 16 (6%) 19 (7%) 89 (6%) 
Financial 56 (15%) 58 (15%) 42 (12%) 38 (15%) 39 (15%) 233 (14%) 
Total 367 380 331 264 266 1,608 
Panel C: Pro Forma EPS Less GAAP EPS 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Per share Difference  
(Pro Forma – GAAP)      
Average $0.26 $0.80 $1.29 $0.32 $0.45 
25th percentile $0.00 $0.08 $0.05 $(0.04) $(0.06) 
Median $0.03 $0.34 $0.34 $0.13 $0.09 
75th percentile $0.37 $0.93 $1.19 $0.48 $0.48 
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Table 2- Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Process 
1. Total number of firm year observations 1,608 
2. Less observations with missing returns data from CRSP 38 
3. Less observations with missing COMPUSTAT data  140 
4. Less banks, other financial institutions and utilities  364 
5. Total observations used in study 1066 
Panel B: Pro Forma EPS Less GAAP EPS  
Per share Difference 
(Pro Forma – GAAP) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Average $0.25 $0.76 $1.29 $0.31 $0.40 
25th percentile ($0.02) $0.09 $0.05 ($0.04) ($0.07) 
Median $0.10 $0.32 $0.34 $0.12 $0.08 
75th percentile $0.38 $0.87 $1.09 $0.46 $0.45 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Coded Governance Variables from ISS Database 
 Governance Variable 
 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
1. Board Size 0.1728 0.0 0.3782 
2. Classified Board 0.5958 1.0 0.4908 
3. Cumulative Voting 0.1028 0.0 0.3038 
4. Relatives on Board 0.8959 1.0 0.3054 
5. Representatives on the Board 0.0021 0.0 0.0455 
6. Affiliated Directors 1.3877 1.0 1.4944 
7. Independent Directors 0.8594 1.0 0.3516 
8. Separate Chair 0.2222 0.0 0.4158 
9. Lead Director 0.1882 0.0 0.3910 
10. Nominating Committee 0.9034 1.0 0.2955 
11. Corporate Governance Committee 0.7189 1.0 0.4496 
12. Executive Committee 0.4420 0.0 0.4967 
13. Compensation Committee 0.9959 1.0 0.0643 
14. Independent directors on the nominating committee 0.5307 1.0 0.4992 
15. Independent directors on the compensation committee 0.7973 1.0 0.4021 
16. Independent directors on the audit committee 0.7177 1.0 0.4502 
17. Board Meetings 7.8735 7.0 3.4127 
18. Nominating Committee Meetings 2.8736 3.0 2.2888 
19. Compensation Committee Meetings 4.9594 5.0 2.3455 
20. Audit Committee Meetings 6.1041 5.0 3.0628 
21. Ownership 0.9096 1.0 0.2868 
22. Employed Directors 1.8545 2.0 1.1095 
23. Board Tenure 0.0422 0.0 0.2013 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the individual board dimensions used in the PCA procedure to 
obtain the board variables.  See Appendix 1 for a description of each of the variables.  Note that although the 
variables for affiliated directors (item 6) and employed directors (item 22) have been presented in the table as 
positive numbers, they are reverse coded in the PCA (are coded as negative numbers) for ease of interpretation. 
That is, more affiliated directors and employed directors are generally perceived as weakening the governance 
structure. 
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Table 4 
Correlations of Coded Governance Variables from ISS Database 
 
 Board Size Class. Board 
Cum. 
Voting 
Reatives on 
Board 
Reps on 
board 
Aff. 
Directors 
Ind. 
Directors 
Separate 
Chair 
Lead 
Director 
Nomination
Committee 
Corp. Gov. 
Committee 
Board size            
Class. Board -.043*           
Cum. Voting .014 -.061**          
Rel. on board .066** .054** .080**         
Reps on board -.024 .019 -.015 .016        
Aff. Directors .193** .035 .094** .265** -.013       
Ind. Directors -.607** .093** .050* .127** -.003 .252**      
Separate chair .008 .003 -.056** .125** .019 -.048* -.105**     
Lead director -.022 .003 -.020 .060** -.022 .061* .080** -.038    
Nom. Comm -.172** .040 -.023 .128** .015 .065** .331** -.035 .147**   
Corp. Gov. comm -.120** .007 -.010 .119** .028 .122** .274** -.038 .285** .507**  
Exec. Comm -.188** .056** -.004 -.041* .051* -.040 .206** -.102** -.177** .076** -.079** 
Comp. Comm.. -.031 -.001 .001 .084** .003 .035 .111** .003 .015 .197** .103** 
Ind. Dir. Nom. Comm.. -.120** .037 .027 .206** .020 .392** .452** -.050* .200** .781** .527** 
Ind. Dir. Comp. Comm..  -.027 .032 .017 .171** -.003 .498** .322** 0.000 .042* .164** .188** 
Ind. Dir. Aud. Comm. -.061** .003 .059** .127** -.014 .510** .346** -.035 .092** .211** .193** 
Board mtgs. -.020 .018 .023 .117** .018 .025 .085** .001 -.011 .059** .072** 
Nunber Com. Mtgs. -.160** .053** .005 .121** .050* .059** .306** -.052* .208** .411** .371** 
Comp. com. Mtgs. -.073** -.001 -.008 .102** .040 .033 .167** -.027 .082** .196** .171** 
Aud. Com. Mtgs. .005 -.043* .009 .062** -.016 .047* .052* .040* .319** .128** .264** 
Ownership -.118** .007 .060** .155** -.023 .072** .213** -.083** .027 .126** .146** 
Emp. Directors .256** .070** .075** .252** -.006 .120** .114** -.200** .059** .157** .183** 
Board Tenure -.070* .110** .098** .283** -.022 .735** .662** -.172** .107** .269** .282** 
*   Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4 Cont’d 
Correlations of Coded Governance Variables from ISS Database 
 
 Exec. 
Comm 
Comp. 
Comm. 
Ind. Dir. 
Nom.  Com 
Ind. Dir. 
Comp.  Com 
Ind. Dir. 
Aud. Comm. Board mtgs. 
Nom. Com. 
Mtgs. 
Comp. com. 
Mtgs. 
Aud. Com. 
Mtgs. Ownership 
Emp. 
Directors 
Board 
Tenure 
Board size             
Class. Board             
Cum. Voting             
Rel. on board             
Reps on board             
Aff. Directors             
Ind. Directors             
Separate chair             
Lead director             
Nom. Comm             
Corp. Gov. Comm             
Exec. Comm             
Comp. Comm.. .018            
Ind. Dir. Nom. Comm.. .024 .154**           
Ind. Dir. Comp. Comm..  .047* .373** .364**          
Ind. Dir. Aud. Comm. .011 .081** .390** .348**         
Board mtgs. -.021 -.019 .078** .026 .057**        
Nom. Com. Mtgs. -.011 .081** .415** .114** .139** .186**       
Comp. com. Mtgs. -.010 .136** .207** .124** .082** .338** .374**      
Aud. Com. Mtgs. -.189** .017 .184** .039 .103** .259** .274** .322**     
Ownership .002 .032 .173** .075** .072** .138** .197** .143** .024    
Emp. Directors -.100** .078** .226** .085** .118** .072** .179** .082** .103** .063**   
Board Tenure .039 .095** .575** .426** .477** .109** .313** .156** .083* .182** .546*  
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Table 5 
Results of Principal Components Analysis: Factors and Factor Loadings 
 
  PRINCIPAL FACTOR SIGNIFICANT COMPONENTS FACTOR 
LOADINGS 
B-ind (Fac 5-1) Affiliated directors .885 
   Board Independence Independent directors .796 
 Ind. directors – comp. comm.. .636 
 Independent directors- audit comm.. .728 
 Relatives on board .492 
 Employed directors .676 
   
B-meet (Fac 3-1) Number of board meetings .763 
   Board Meetings Number of comp. comm. meetings .737 
 Number of audit comm. meetings .547 
 Number of nominating comm. meetings .413 
   
B-str (Fac 6-1) Classified board .795 
   Board Structure Cumulative voting -.613 
 Ind. directors nominating committee. .763 
 Board size -.850 
 Ownership .492 
 Board tenure .668 
   
B-sep (Fac2-1) Corp. gov. committee .738 
   Board Separation Nominating committee .834 
 Executive committee .525 
 Compensation committee .869 
 Separate chair -.639 
 Lead director -.584 
 Employee representative .656 
 
This table reports the factor loading on each of the individual board variables for each factor.  Factors are 
computed using PCA where all factors with eigen values greater than 1 as well as those that have a 
minimum of three variables loading on to them are retained.  For each factor, individual variables with 
absolute values greater than 0.4 are retained and interpreted.  Definitions of the governance variables are 
provided in appendix 1. 
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TABLE 6 
 
Panel A: Sample Summary Statistics for Main Variables 
Descriptive Statistics (1,066 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2004) 
Variable Mean Median  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
CAR .080 .065 .450 -.890 4.770 
EQ .033 .026 .026 0.003 .170 
e-loading(1) .013 .151 .489 -1.325 2.569 
PF 1.880 1.590 1.580 -9.130 11.570 
B-ind .117 .324 .939 -4.460 2.210 
B-meet -.043 .074 .996 -5.070 2.440 
B-str .049 .0508 1.048 -2.217 14.520 
B-sep .032 .255 .952 -3.205 5.188 
Auditorq .746 0.000 .498 0.000 1.000 
 
 
Panel B: Sample Summary Statistics for Other Dependent and Control Variables 
Descriptive Statistics (1,066 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2004) 
Size 3.943 3.915 .551 2.557 5.902 
Current .419 .000 .493 .000 1.000 
Loss .173 .000 .378 .000 1.000 
var 17.38 3.985 1.222 .144 29.850 
growth 1.618 1.606 .328 1.151 3.619 
 
 
The sample consists of 1,066 firm year observations that have reported pro forma earnings over the period 
2000 – 2004.  CAR, obtained from CRSP, is computed three months around the firms’ press release date 
for year t.  EQ and e-loadings are the residuals and coefficients from the modified Jones model and the 
asset-pricing regressions respectively; PF is the pro forma eps disclosed in the earnings press releases 
downloaded from the firms’ web sites.  B-ind, B-meet, B-str, B-sep, are the board variables from the PCA. 
Auditorq is coded 1 if the firms is audited by a Big-5 firm and zero, otherwise.  For the control variables; 
Size is the log of total assets (compustat data item A6); Current is coded one for negative 
contemporaneous returns and zero otherwise; Loss is coded one if next  years earnings are negative and 
zero otherwise ; Var, is a measure of earnings predictability obtained from Compustat; and Growth is the 
ratio of the firm’s market value of equity (data item #25* data item #199) to its book value of equity (data 
item #216). 
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Table 7 
Panel B: Pairwise Spearman Correlations 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0, N=1,066 
 GP PF EQ 
e
-
l
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B-ind B-meet B-str B-sep 
A
u
d
i
t
o
r
 
l
o
g
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
var 
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GP               
PF .768 
(.000) 
             
EQ .223 
(.000) 
.299 
(.000) 
            
e-loading 
(1-factor) 
.396 
(.000) 
.509 
(.000)
.473 
(.000)
           
B-ind .099 
(.001) 
.172 
(.000) 
.074 
(.016) 
.202 
(.000) 
          
B-meet .175 
(.000) 
.285 
(.000) 
.312 
(.000) 
.417 
(.000) 
.058 
(.059) 
         
B-str .004 
(.907) 
.063 
(.040) 
.159 
(.000) 
.266 
(.000) 
.217 
(.000) 
.297 
(.000) 
        
B-sep .198 
(.000) 
.148 
(.000) 
-.033 
(.278) 
-.020 
(.505) 
-.104 
(.001) 
-.093 
(.002) 
-.394 
(.000) 
       
Auditor .006 
(.844) 
.017 
(.577)
.056 
(.067)
.251 
(.078) 
.015 
(.629) 
-.021 
(.494) 
.031 
(.305) 
.007 
(.832) 
      
logassets .196 
(.000) 
.314 
(.000) 
.273 
(.000) 
.305 
(.000) 
.094 
(.002) 
.499 
(.000) 
.014 
(.655) 
.093 
(.002) 
.016 
(.609) 
     
var -.157 (.000) 
-.056 
(.067) 
-.002 
(.948) 
-.033 
(.277) 
.118 
(.000) 
.105 
(.001) 
.117 
(.000) 
-.007 
(.824) 
-.051 
(.099) 
.040 
(.190) 
    
growth -.047 
(.127) 
.036 
(.237) 
.125 
(.000) 
.410 
(.181) 
.103 
(.001) 
.071 
(.020) 
.080 
(.009) 
-.029 
(.340) 
-.169 
(.000) 
.218 
(.000) 
.222 
(.000) 
   
Current -.252 
(.000) 
-.207 
(.000) 
-.131 
(.000) 
-.231 
(.451) 
-.006 
(.856) 
.060 
(.049) 
-.183 
(.000) 
-.226 
(.000) 
-.240 
(.437) 
-.014 
(.656) 
.082 
(.007) 
.123 
(.00) 
  
Loss -.310 
(.000) 
-.320 
(.000)
-.217 
(.000)
-.343 
(.210) 
.044 
(.149) 
.122 
(.000) 
-.476 
(.121) 
-.170 
(.000) 
-.004 
(.887) 
-.033 
(.285) 
.060 
(.051) 
.256 
(.000) 
.252 
(.000) 
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Table 8 
Results for the Association between Pro forma and CARs 
tjtj
tjtjtjtjtjtj
Size
VarCurrentLossGrowthPFCAR
,,6
,5,4,3,2,10,
ελ
λλλλλλ
++
+++++=  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Coefficient significant at the 0.10 level; ** Coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; *** 
Coefficient significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns three months around the earnings announcement date; PF is the 
pro forma eps disclosed in the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites; Growth is 
the ratio of the firm’s market value of equity (data item #25* data item #199) to its book value of equity 
(data item #216); Loss is coded one if next  years earnings are negative and zero otherwise; Current is 
coded one for negative contemporaneous returns and zero otherwise; Var, is a measure of earnings 
predictability obtained from Compustat; and Size is the log of total assets (compustat data item A6). 
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
(1) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (4) 
 
(2) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (5) 
Intercept ? .1125 (6.20)*** 
.5930 
(7.66)*** 
PF + .0247 (3.35)*** 
.0586 
(2.77)** 
Growth +  -.0464 (-1.35) 
Loss –  -.1330 (-4.26)*** 
Current –  -.2939 (-13.21)*** 
Var –  -.0192 (-.58) 
Size +  -.0715 (-3.52)*** 
Number of 
observations  1066 1066 
Adjusted R2  .0095 .2053 
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*Coefficient significant at the 0.10 level; ** Coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; ***Coefficient 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
Table 9 
Results for the Association between Pro forma Credibility and Governance 
tjtjtjtjtj
tjtjktj
k
ktjtj
SizeVarCurrentLoss
GrowthGovPFPFCAR
,,10,9,8,7
,6,,,
4
1
1,10, )*(
ελλλλ
λλλλ
+++++
+++= ∑
=
+  
Variable Predicted Sign 
(1) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (6) 
(2) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (7) 
(3) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (6) with 
main effects 
(4) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (7) with 
main effects 
Intercept ? .1042 (5.72)*** 
.5540 
(6.73)*** 
.1123 
(5.86)*** 
.05681 
(6.48)*** 
PF + .0345 (4.34)*** 
.0253 
(1.92)** 
.0295 
(2.32)*** 
.0283 
(2.07)*** 
PF*B-ind + .001 (.17) 
.0026 
(.50) 
.0208 
(1.63) 
.0197 
(1.65) 
PF*B-meet + or – -.0153 (-2.96)*** 
-.0464 
(-2.31)** 
-.0237 
(-3.02)** 
-.0210 
(-2.93)** 
PF*B-str + .0118 (2.11)** 
.0161 
(3.22)*** 
.0449 
(3.39)*** 
.0367 
(2.23)** 
PF*B-sep + .0188 (2.89)*** 
.0233 
(3.98)*** 
.0366 
(2.01)** 
.0347 
(2.31)** 
Growth +  -.0444 (-2.30)** 
 -.0498 
(-2.47)*** 
Loss –  -.1313 (-4.25)*** 
 -.1484 
(-4.72)*** 
Current –  -.3124 (-14.00)*** 
 -.3276 
(-14.62)*** 
Var –  -.0318 (-.64) 
 -.0441 
(-1.35) 
Size +  -.0630 (-2.93)*** 
 -.0614 
(-2.69)*** 
B-ind    .0030 (.16) 
.0071 
(.42) 
B-meet    -.0307 (-1.80)* 
-.0320 
(-1.83)* 
B-str    .0493 (3.69)*** 
.0423 
(3.48)*** 
B-sep    .0677 (4.44)*** 
.0597 
(3.74)*** 
Number of 
observations  1066 1066 1066 1066 
Adjusted R2  .0271 .2278 .0252 .2384 
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Table 9 Continued   
 
CAR  is the cumulative abnormal returns three months around the earnings announcement date; PF is 
the pro forma eps disclosed in the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites; B-ind 
(representing board independence), B-meet (representing board meetings), B-str (representing board 
structure) and B-sep (representing board separation) constitute the governance variables from the PCA; 
PF*B-ind, PF*B-meet, PF*B-str and PF*B-sep represent the interaction between the governance 
variables from the PCA and pro forma earnings; Growth is the ratio of the firm’s market value of equity 
(data item #25* data item #199) to its book value of equity (data item #216); Loss is coded one if next  
years earnings are negative and zero otherwise; Current is coded one for negative contemporaneous 
returns and zero otherwise; Var, is a measure of earnings predictability obtained from Compustat; and 
Size is the log of total assets (compustat data item A6) 
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Table 10 
Results of Regressions for the Association between Pro forma Credibility and Auditor 
Quality 
tjtjtjtj
tjtjtjtjtjtj
AuditorqSizeVar
CurrentLossGrowthauditorqPFPFCAR
,,8,7,6
,5,4,3,2,10, )*(
ελλλ
λλλλλλ
++++
+++++=
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
(1) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (8) 
(2) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (9) 
(3) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (8) with 
main effect 
(4) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (9) with 
main effect 
Intercept + .1128 (6.20)*** 
.5945 
(7.67)*** 
.1098 
(4.01)*** 
.5994 
(7.47)*** 
PF + .0233 (2.45)** 
.0161 
(2.08)** 
.0265 
(2.30)** 
.0120 
(2.11)** 
PF*auditorq + .0123 (2.24)** 
.0105 
(1.96)** 
.0206 
(2.24)** 
.0197 
(1.98)** 
Growth +  -.0486 (-2.41)***  
-.0480 
(-2.39)*** 
Loss –  -.1334 (-4.27)***  
-.1338 
(-4.27)*** 
Current –  -.2935 (-13.18)***  
-.2935 
(-13.17)*** 
Var –  -.0191 (-.58)  
-.0196 
(-.59) 
Size +  -.0715 (-3.52)***  
-.0717 
(-3.52)*** 
Auditorq +   .0053 (.15) 
.0079 
(.24) 
Number of 
observations  1066 1066 1066 1066 
Adjusted R2  .0087 .2048 .007 .2041 
* Coefficient significant at the 0.10 level; ** Coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; ***Coefficient 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
CAR  is the cumulative abnormal returns three months around the earnings announcement date; PF is 
the pro forma eps disclosed in the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites; 
auditorq is auditor quality coded one if the firm’s external auditor is a Big-5 audit firm and zero, 
otherwise; PF*auditorq is the interaction between pro forma earnings and auditor quality; Growth is the 
ratio of the firm’s market value of equity (data item #25* data item #199) to its book value of equity 
(data item #216); Loss is coded one if next  years earnings are negative and zero otherwise; Current is 
coded one for negative contemporaneous returns and zero otherwise; Var, is a measure of earnings 
predictability obtained from Compustat; and Size is the log of total assets (compustat data item A6).  
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Table 11 
Results of Regressions for the Association between Pro forma Credibility and Information 
Quality - EQ 
tjtjtjtj
tjtjtjtjtjtj
IQSizeVar
CurrentLossGrowthIQPFPFCAR
,,8,7,6
,5,4,3,2,10, )*(
ελλλ
λλλλλλ
++++
+++++=
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
(1) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (10) 
 
(2) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (11) 
(3) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (10) with 
main effect 
 
(4) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (11) with 
main effect 
Intercept + .1157 (6.35)*** 
.6374 
(8.06)*** 
.1438 
(7.51)*** 
.6671 
(8.45)*** 
PF + .0162 (1.83)* 
.0189 
(1.90)* 
.0490 
(2.76)** 
.0191 
(2.01)** 
PF*IQ + .0342 (1.76)* 
.0466 
(2.80)*** 
.0480 
(2.03)** 
.0437 
(2.73)** 
Growth +  -.0457 (-2.34)***  
-.0473 
(-2.93)*** 
Loss –  -.1440 (-4.60)***  
-.1254 
(-3.93)*** 
Current –  -.2930 (-13.22)***  
-.2854 
(-12.82)*** 
Var –  -.0130 (-.39)  
-.0452 
(-1.30) 
Size +  -.0781 (-3.84)***  
-.0887 
(-4.30)*** 
IQ +    
.1270 
(4.43)*** 
.0799 
(3.76)*** 
Number of 
observations  1066 1066 1066 1066 
Adjusted R2  .0115 .2123 .0286 .2172 
*Coefficient significant at the 0.10 level; ** Coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; ***Coefficient 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
CAR  is the cumulative abnormal returns three months around the earnings announcement date; PF is the 
pro forma eps disclosed in the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites; IQ represents 
the overall information quality computed as the standard deviation of firm specific residuals from a 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model; PF*IQ is the interaction between pro forma earnings and 
earnings quality; Growth is the ratio of the firm’s market value of equity (data item #25* data item #199) 
to its book value of equity (data item #216); Loss is coded one if next  years earnings are negative and 
zero otherwise; Current is coded one for negative contemporaneous returns and zero otherwise; Var, is a 
measure of earnings predictability obtained from Compustat; and Size is the log of total assets (compustat 
data item A6). 
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Table 12 
Results of Regressions for the Association between Pro forma Credibility and 
Information Quality – e-loading 
tjtjtjtj
tjtjtjtjtjtj
IQSizeVar
CurrentLossGrowthIQPFPFCAR
,,8,7,6
,5,4,3,2,10, )*(
ελλλ
λλλλλλ
++++
+++++=
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
(1) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (10) 
 
(2) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (11) 
(3) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (10) with 
main effect 
 
(4) 
Coef. 
 (T-stat) 
Eq (11) with 
main effect 
Intercept + .1122 (6.19)*** 
.5901 
(7.62)*** 
.1405 
(7.74)*** 
.5992 
(7.74)*** 
PF + .0191 (2.44)** 
.0179 
(1.82)* 
.0101 
(1.85)* 
.0175 
(1.83)* 
PF*IQ + .0434 (2.15)** 
.0294 
(2.02)** 
.0156 
(2.26)** 
.0119 
(1.89)* 
Growth +  -.0443 (-2.29)***  
-.0386 
(-2.12)*** 
Loss –  -.1371 (-4.38)***  
-.1267 
(-3.99)*** 
Current –  -.2912 (-13.05)***  
-.2865 
(-12.79)*** 
Var –  -.0183 (-.56)  
-.0387 
(-1.12) 
Size +  -.0710 (-3.50)***  
-.0737 
(-3.63)*** 
IQ +    
.1500 
(4.34)*** 
.0678 
(2.96)*** 
Number of 
observations  1066 1066 1066 1066 
Adjusted R2  .0129 .2065 .0293 .2088 
*Coefficient significant at the 0.10 level; ** Coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; ***Coefficient 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
CAR  is the cumulative abnormal returns three months around the earnings announcement date; PF is the 
pro forma eps disclosed in the earnings press releases downloaded from the firms’ web sites; IQ represents 
the information quality metric which is computed as the e-loading - 1 factor; PF*IQ is the interaction 
between pro forma earnings and the e-loading; Growth is the ratio of the firm’s book value of equity (data 
item #216) to its market value (data item #25* data item #199).; Loss is coded one if next  years earnings 
are negative and zero otherwise; Current is coded one for negative contemporaneous returns and zero 
otherwise; Var, is a measure of earnings predictability obtained from Compustat; and Size is the log of 
total assets (compustat data item A6). 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Governance Variables and Coding Scheme 
 
 
 Governance 
Variable 
 
Description Coding Scheme 
Board size The number of 
directors on the 
board 
This is coded +1 if 
the directors are 
between 5 and 8 and 
0, otherwise.  An 
alternative coding 
scheme is used – the 
negative of the 
number of directors 
– and the results are 
the same. 
1. 
This variable refers to the size of the board.  Smaller boards are 
considered more effective in achieving results because of the fewer 
number of disagreements in arriving at a consensus.  Boards with 
between five and eight members are considered the optimal size 
because they are more likely to be more efficient and organized in 
carrying out board functions than larger boards are. 
 
Classified Board Is the Board 
Classified? 
 
This is coded +1 if 
the board is 
classified and 0, if 
not. 
2. 
This is a structure of the board that requires directors to serve for 
different lengths of time depending on their classification.  Under a 
classified board system, directors serve different terms from one to 
eight years with longer terms awarded to more senior board positions.  
Different classes of directors are up for replacement each year.  This 
system ensures continuity and is sometimes used as a defense against a 
takeover.  A classified board reduces enshrinement since different 
director positions are up for replacement each year. 
 
Cumulative Voting Does the Company 
allow cumulative 
voting? 
This is coded +1 if 
the Company does 
and 0, if the 
Company does not. 
3. 
Cumulative voting is a type of voting process that helps strengthen the 
ability of minority shareholders to elect a director.  Under the 
cumulative voting method, a shareholder is allowed to cash all their 
votes for a single nominee up for consideration for a board position 
when there are multiple positions available.  This method is different 
from regular voting where shareholders are not allowed to give more 
than one vote per share to any single nominee.  Cumulative voting is 
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 considered an effective method of gaining minority representation on 
the board and of ensuring that the board is somewhat independent of 
management. 
 
Relatives on Board Are any directors 
related? 
 
This is coded +1 if 
there are no related 
directors and 0, if 
there are. 
4. 
This refers to whether any directors on the board are related.  Related 
directors on the board are more likely to form a voting block on issues 
of interest to the board and these could reduce the independence of the 
board. 
Representatives on 
the Board 
Are there employee 
representatives on 
the Board? 
This is coded +1 if 
there are employee 
representatives on 
the Board and 0, if 
not. 
5. 
This refers to whether there is a board position reserved for employee 
representatives.  While not very common in the US this is considered 
good corporate governance, especially in Europe. 
Affiliated Directors The number of 
directors on the 
board that are 
affiliated with the 
Company 
This is coded as the 
negative of the 
number of affiliated 
directors. 
6. 
This refers to directors who have dealings with the company.  Affiliated 
directors have family and/or business relationships with the company 
and may also be associated with other organizations that have dealings 
with the company.  Such relations with the company are more likely to 
materially affect the independent judgment of such directors.  As such 
affiliated directors are considered less independent than fully 
independent directors. 
Independent 
Directors 
Percentage of 
independent 
directors on the 
board 
This is coded as 1 if 
the percentage of 
independent 
directors is greater 
than 50% and 0, if 
less than. 
7. 
Independent directors are directors who are considered to be 
autonomous from management and free from any business or other 
relationship that could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgment. 
Separate Chair Is there a separate 
chairman of the 
board? 
This is coded +1 if 
the Chairman of the 
Board is not the 
CEO and 0, 
otherwise. 
8. 
This refers to whether the Chairman of the board is also the CEO of the 
company.  The CEO’s role as the chairman of the board implies that the 
CEO runs both the company and the board.  Thus there is little 
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 separation of power between the board and management.  Also, if the 
other board members do not take decisions that oppose the chair, then 
the chair has ultimate power in decisions that involve the company. 
 
Lead Director Is there a lead 
independent 
director? 
This is coded +1 if 
there is a lead 
independent director 
and 0, otherwise. 
9. 
The lead director is an independent director that works closely with, 
and in an advisory capacity to, the Chair of the board.  The primary 
focus of the lead director is to ensure that the board is organized 
properly, functions effectively and operates independently of 
management.   
Nominating 
Committee 
Is there a 
nominating 
committee 
This is coded +1 if 
there is a 
nominating 
committee and 0, 
otherwise 
10. 
In most firms, the nominating committee is primarily responsible for 
nominating people to the board of directors.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the quality of appointments to the board is better in firms 
that have a nominating committee. 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
Is there a corporate 
governance 
committee? 
This is coded +1 if 
there is and 0, 
otherwise. 
11. 
The corporate governance committee is primarily responsible for 
developing and formulating the corporation’s approach to governance 
issues.  While the corporate governance committee is not a feature of all 
boards, where the committee is absent these functions are usually not 
performed.  Thus boards that have corporate governance committees 
are regarded as more effective. 
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Executive 
Committee 
Is there an executive 
committee? 
This is coded +1 if 
there is an executive 
committee and 0, 
otherwise. 
12. 
The executive committee is a standing committee of the board.  Its 
purpose is to assist the board in discharging its responsibilities with 
respect to the management of the affairs of the company at times when 
it is impracticable for the full board to act.  The presence of the 
executive committee improves the overall governance structure of the 
board because board powers are delegated to a committee and not to a 
single individual in the person of the chair. 
 
Compensation 
Committee 
Is there a 
compensation 
committee? 
This is coded +1 if 
there is a 
compensation 
committee and 0, 
otherwise. 
13. 
The compensation committee usually comprises of non-management 
directors and the responsibility of the committee is to recommend to the 
board the compensation of full time directors and other senior personnel 
of the company.  The existence of a compensation committee improves 
the governance structure of the company because no single individual is 
responsible for the compensation of senior members of the company. 
 
Independent 
directors on the 
nominating 
committee 
The ratio of 
independent 
directors on the 
nominating 
committee. 
This is coded as +1 if 
the nominating 
committee is 
composed of fully 
independent 
directors and 0, 
otherwise. 
14. 
The more independent the members of the nominating committee are, 
the higher the quality of individuals nominated for election to the board. 
 
Independent 
directors on the 
compensation 
committee 
The ratio of 
independent 
directors on the 
compensation 
committee. 
This is coded as +1 if 
the compensation 
committee is 
composed of fully 
independent 
directors and 0, 
otherwise. 
15. 
The more independent the members of the compensation committee 
are, the more independent are decisions regarding the compensation of 
the CEO and senior members of management. 
 
16. Independent 
directors on the 
audit committee 
The ratio of 
independent 
directors on the 
audit committee. 
This is coded as +1 if 
the audit committee 
is composed of  
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 The more independent the members of the audit committee are, the 
more independent are decisions regarding the financial statements. 
 
Board Meetings Number of board 
meetings held in 
prior year 
This is coded as the 
number of board 
meetings held in the 
prior year. 
17. 
The number of meetings held during the year by the board may provide 
an indication of both the effectiveness of the board and the seriousness 
of the issues that are brought forward for deliberation.  This is true of 
the committees of the board as well.  The audit committee for example, 
is responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process and so the 
more meetings they have could be an indication of the seriousness of 
the issues that the committees have to deal with. 
 
Nominating 
Committee Meetings 
Number of 
nominating 
committee meetings 
held in prior year. 
This is coded as the 
number of 
nominating 
committee meetings 
held in prior year. 
18. 
The number of meetings held during the year by the nominating 
committee may provide an indication of both the effectiveness of the 
committee or it could be an indication that there are major issues that 
need to be resolved. 
 
Compensation 
Committee Meetings 
Number of 
compensation 
committee meetings 
held in prior year. 
This is coded as the 
number of 
compensation 
committee meetings 
held in prior year. 
19. 
The number of meetings held during the year by the compensation 
committee may provide an indication of both the effectiveness of the 
board and the seriousness of the issues that are brought forward for 
deliberation.   
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Audit Committee 
Meetings 
Number of audit 
committee meetings 
held in prior year. 
This is coded as the 
number of audit 
committee meetings 
held in prior year. 
20. 
The number of meetings held during the year by the audit committee 
may provide an indication of both the effectiveness of the board and the 
seriousness of the issues that are brought forward for deliberation.  The 
audit committee is responsible for overseeing the financial reporting 
process and so the more meetings they have could be an indication of 
the seriousness of the issues that the committee has to deal with. 
 
Ownership Percent of shares 
owned by the 
directors and 
officers of the 
company. 
This is coded as +1 if 
the directors and 
officers own less 
than 25% of the 
Company and 0, 
otherwise.  An 
alternative coding 
scheme – if directors 
own less than 1% as 
suggested by the 
SEC, this is coded as 
1 and 0, otherwise – 
is also used and the 
results are similar. 
21. 
This refers to the percentage of outstanding common shares owned by 
directors and officers.  If the directors own more than 25% of the 
shares, this suggests that they have a certain amount of control over the 
company and could influence the decisions of the company. 
 
Employed Directors Number of 
employed directors  
This is coded as the 
negative of the 
number of directors 
who are employed in 
the company. 
22. 
Employed directors are employees of the company.  They are not 
independent directors.  There is the argument that even though they are 
not independent, they have the expertise and knowledge of the company 
that is required to smoothly run the operations of the company. 
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Board Tenure Maximum tenure of 
directors 
This is coded as +1 if 
the directors have a 
maximum tenure 
that they can serve 
and 0, otherwise. 
23. 
There is the argument that longer serving directors have more expertise, 
commitment and experience in running the affairs of the Company.  
However, when directors serve too long, they could also become too 
friendly with the management which may impair their independence.  It 
is likely that when specified tenure exists for directors, management 
friendliness is likely to be reduced.   
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Appendix 2: Principal Components Analysis 
 This section outlines some of the concepts of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
procedure.  PCA is a data reduction procedure that is useful when there are a large number of 
variables most of which are proxies of each other because they are essentially measuring the 
same underlying construct.  To eliminate redundancy, PCA reduces the variables into a smaller 
number of scores (factor scores) or artificial variables which are used in any further analysis.  
Thus the goal of PCA is to compute the most meaningful basis to re-express a noisy data set.  
The ultimate objective is that this new basis will filter out the noise and reveal hidden structure 
while maintaining most of the original variability in the data.  The first principal component 
accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible, and each successive component 
accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible.   
 The general form for the formula to compute scores on the first component in a PCA is 
as follows: 
)(...)()( 12121111 pp xbxbxbc +++=  
where: 
c1 =  the firm’s score on principal component 1 (the first component extracted); 
b1p =   the regression coefficient (or weight) for observed variable p, as used in creating 
 principal component 1; and 
xp =  the firm’s score on observed variable p. 
 
The regression weights (b) from the preceding equation are determined using a special type of 
equation called an eigenequation.  The weights produced by these eigenequations are optimal 
weights given that for a set of data, no other set of weights could produce a set of components 
that account for more of the variance in the observed variables.  In creating these weights, the 
principle of least squares has to be satisfied.  This is similar but not identical to that used in 
multiple regressions. 
 The means of computing the factor scores provides the rationale for why PCA is referred 
to as a linear combination optimally weighted observed variables.  When a variable is given a 
great deal of weight in constructing a component, that variable is said to “load” on that 
component.  For example, the variable “number of affiliated directors” is given a lot of weight in 
computing the first component which I refer to as B-ind.  Thus “number of affiliated directors” is 
said to load onto B-ind.  It is highly desirable that at least three variables load onto any retained 
component. 
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 In establishing the number of components extracted in a PCA for rotation and 
interpretation, one has to rely on a number of criteria that are helpful.  In general, only the first 
few components will account for meaningful amounts of variance while the latter components 
will tend to account for only trivial variance.  The four criteria that are mainly used to determine 
how many meaningful components should be retained include the following: (1) the eigen-value-
one criterion; (2) the scree test; (3) the proportion of variance accounted for; and (4) the 
interpretability criterion.  I provide some more detail on each of these criteria below.  However, 
in this study, I adopt the eigen-value-one criterion and the scree test. 
 
The Eigen-value-one Criterion 
 In PCA, the most commonly used criteria for solving the problem of the number of 
components retained is the eigen-value-one criterion, also known as the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 
1960).  Under this approach, any component with an eigen value greater than one (1) is retained 
and interpreted.  Recall that the eigen value represents the amount of variance that is accounted 
for by a given component.  The rationale for this is quite simple – each observed variable 
contributes one unit of variance to the total variance in the data set.  Therefore, any component 
that displays an eigen value greater than one is accounting for more variance than is contributed 
by a single variable.  On the other hand, a component that has an eigen value of less than one, is 
accounting for less variance than is contributed by one variable.  Since PCA is a data reduction 
technique, it only makes sense to retain components that account for the variance that is 
contributed by more than one variable and to treat those components that account for less 
variance than is contributed by one variable as trivial.  The eigen-value-one criterion has a 
number of positive features that have contributed to its popularity.  Perhaps the most important is 
its simplicity.  There is no subjectivity in applying this criterion.  In addition, this method has 
been shown to retain the correct number of components, particularly when a small to moderate 
number of variables are being analyzed and the communalities are high.  Stevens (1986) based 
on a review of the accuracy of studies that have used this criterion, recommends its use when 
less than 30 variables are being analyzed and communalities are greater than 0.70, or when the 
analysis is based on over 250 observations and the mean communality is greater than or equal to 
0.60.  When these conditions don’t hold, it can lead to retaining the wrong number of 
components.  Note however, that an arbitrary application of this approach can also lead to 
retaining the wrong number of components for example if a component with eigen value of 
0.999 is dropped while one with an eigen value of 1.0001 is retained.  This can lead to serious 
errors of interpretation.  
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The Scree Test 
 The scree test (Cattell, 1966) plots the eigen values associated with each component and 
looks for a “break” or “scree”.  Scree is a term from geology which refers to the rubble at the 
bottom of a cliff.  The idea in the scree test is that if a factor is important, it will have a large 
variance associated with it.  By plotting the eigen values by factor number, one is able to assess 
the relative importance of each of the factors.  The number of components retained corresponds 
to the number of factors above the “elbow” in the plot.  The components above the elbow 
account for the bulk of the variance and are the important components that are retained.  With 
the scree test, one can see where the important factors stop and the unimportant ones start. 
 The scree test can be expected to provide reasonably accurate results, provided the 
sample is large (over 200) and most of the variable communalities are large (Stevens, 1986).  
However, this criterion has its own weaknesses as well, most notably the difficulty in identifying 
the scree in typical research conditions. 
 
Proportion of Variance 
 A third criterion used in determining the number of components to retain is the 
proportion of variance in the data set criterion.  This involves retaining any component that 
accounts for a specified percentage (proportion) of the variance in the data set.  This proportion 
is specified a priori.  For example, one may decide to retain any component that accounts for at 
least 5% of the total variance.  This proportion is computed as follows:  
 
Proportion of variance = eigen value of the component of interest / total eigen values 
of the correlation matrix 
 
In PCA, the total eigen values of the correlation matrix is equal to the total number of variables 
being analyzed (in this study, 22) because each variable contributes one unit of variable to the 
analysis. 
 An alternative way of applying this criterion is to retain enough components such that 
the cumulative percent of variance explained is equal to some specified minimum.  When this 
alternative approach is used, enough components are usually retained so as to explain at least 
70% of the variance. 
 The proportion of variance criterion has a number of positive features.  For example, in 
most cases, one would not want to retain a group of components that, combined, account for 
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only a very limited amount of the variance in the data set (say less than 50%).  Nonetheless, the 
critical values (10% for individual components and 70%) for the combined components are 
arbitrary.  The subjectivity in this approach is a major criticism (Kim and Mueller, 1978). 
 
The Interpretability Criterion 
 The fourth and last criterion for deciding on the number of components to retain is the 
interpretability criterion.  This is simply the ability to interpret the substantive meaning of the 
retained components and verifying that this interpretation makes sense in terms of what is known 
about the constructs under investigation.   
 
In the following section, I discuss the results of the PCA and how these are interpreted. 
 
Rotation to a Final Solution: Factor Patterns and Factor Loadings 
 In PCA, when more than one component has been retained, the output usually includes a 
table showing the paths from the factors to the observed variables.  This table of paths, also 
called an unrotated solution, is difficult to interpret.  Obviously, one would like to understand, 
label or name the components that are retained.  In such a case, it would normally be easy to 
understand the factors if the observed variables only correlate highly with a single factor.  If 
variables are correlated with multiple factors, then identifying what the factors are becomes an 
almost insurmountable challenge.  To make the results easier to interpret, one needs to perform 
an operation called a rotation.  A rotation is a linear transformation that is performed on factor 
loadings so that the factors are easily interpretable. 
 When the initial components are extracted, the PCA procedure creates an unrotated 
factor pattern matrix.  The rows of this matrix represent the variables being analyzed while the 
columns represent the retained components.  The entries in the matrix are the factor loadings.  A 
factor loading is a general term for a coefficient that appears in a factor pattern matrix or a factor 
structure matrix.  A rotated solution can be interpreted by determining what is measured by each 
of the retained components.  This involves identifying the variables that demonstrate high 
loadings for a given component and determining what these variables have in common.  Usually 
a brief name is assigned to each retained component that describes its content.  The first decision 
to be made at this stage is to decide how large a factor loading must be to be considered “large.”  
Usually a loading is considered “large” if its absolute value exceeds 0.40 (Stevens, 1986). 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
4.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Prior literature has not provided conclusive evidence on the value relevance of 
pro forma earnings relative to GAAP and analysts’ actuals.  The debate surrounding the 
value relevance of earnings measures – both GAAP and non-GAAP continues in the 
academic press.  The first study in this dissertation introduces the Collins et al. (1994) 
returns model to the examination of the value relevance of three earnings measures – 
GAAP, analysts’ actual, and pro forma earnings.  This model assesses the 
informativeness of the earnings measures as a function of the markets’ ability to 
anticipate future earnings.  The empirical evidence is consistent with future GAAP 
earnings, future analysts’ actual, and future pro forma earnings being impounded in 
current stock price.  However, after controlling for firm characteristics, pro forma 
earnings is more informative than is analysts’ actual earnings which in turn is more 
informative than is GAAP earnings.  These findings are robust to alternative model 
specifications.  In price regressions (price as the dependent variable), pro forma earnings 
significantly outperforms both GAAP earnings and actual earnings.  The findings also 
hold where the earnings measure is used to predict future cash flows, or for those firms 
that report a GAAP loss and a pro forma profit or where their GAAP earnings exceed 
their pro formas.  These results are consistent with pro forma earnings being used across 
firms for value relevance reasons and not for strategic reasons or to mislead.  Note 
however that these findings are based on the traditional assumption that the markets are 
efficient.  If stocks are mispriced, then the results are open to alternative interpretations.   
While the findings of the first study are in aggregate (they represent average 
behaviour across firms), the second study examines the value relevance of pro forma  
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earnings based on the perceived credibility of the measure.  That is, the study asks 
whether investors are able to differentiate between pro formas that are credible and those 
that lack credibility.  In assessing whether a pro forma is credible, investors can observe 
credibility attributes – board characteristics, external auditor quality, and overall 
information quality – even though managers’ motives in disclosing pro formas cannot be 
observed.  The study finds that the value relevance of pro forma is different for firms 
with strong credibility attributes than for those with weak credibility attributes. An 
interpretation is that pro forma earnings have a larger market reaction where they are 
perceived to be credible.  The results from the study are consistent with some firms 
using these disclosures to inform (to provide value relevant information), and others to 
manage expectations (e.g., to mislead).  That is, based on credibility attributes, the 
market appears to differentiate between these motives.   These results are consistent with 
the following.  First, investors do perceive that there are differences in pro forma 
information quality across firms.  Second, investors assess the credibility of the pro 
forma release based on observable firm attributes including the quality of governance, 
auditors, and overall information.  The stronger are the credibility attributes, the greater 
the credibility given to the pro forma measure.   Finally, investors will react more 
strongly where the pro forma is perceived as credible – that is, the information will be 
perceived as more value relevant.   
 This dissertation contributes to the empirical evidence on the value relevance of 
pro forma earnings measures.  The first study, contributes to the evidence on the relative 
value relevance of GAAP earnings, analysts’ actuals, and pro forma earnings.  It also 
provides empirical evidence on which future earnings measure is closest to investors’ 
expectations of future earnings.  This is especially relevant in valuation and resource 
allocation decisions. 
This dissertation also contributes to the empirical evidence on the usefulness of 
board characteristics, auditor quality, and overall information quality in improving the 
perceived credibility of voluntary disclosures.  To shareholders and managers, the results 
suggest that improving the governance environment by having a high quality board and 
high quality auditors enhances the perceived credibility of corporate disclosures.  This 
evidence is particularly interesting from a regulatory point of view since a primary aim 
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of SOX is to improve investor confidence including their confidence in firms’ financial 
reporting.     
 
4.2. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The first study in this dissertation assumes that markets are efficient and that 
stock prices are reflective of value.  However if stocks are mispriced and the markets are 
inefficient, then the results are open to alternative interpretation.  This study uses data on 
only the S&P 500 firms.  Thus the findings of this study are generalizable to only this 
group of firms.  Future research can examine firms that are not included in the S&P 500.  
Also, this study uses data that is collected from the period 2000 – 2004 during which 
significant business failures occurred.  Therefore the findings of the study may be period 
specific.55  Future research can examine the value relevance of pro forma earnings over 
a longer time frame.     
The second study in this dissertation examines observable credibility attributes 
which form part of the overall corporate governance structure of a firm.  Similar to the 
first study, it is limited by its use of only S&P 500 firms.  Thus the results are only 
generalizable to this group of firms.  Also, as only three governance dimensions are 
considered in this chapter – board variables, the quality of the external auditor and the 
overall information quality, this study states the importance of further research on the 
relationship between an expanded set of governance and monitoring dimensions and the 
impact on reporting credibility.  Such other governance dimensions could include banks 
and other fund providers.  This will help increase our understanding of the association 
between other aspects of governance and the credibility of voluntary disclosures. 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Note though that if anything, the bias would be against finding that pro formas are value relevant as they 
are unaudited management voluntary disclosure. 
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